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Society, Environment and Human Security
in the Arctic Barents Region
The Arctic-Barents Region is facing numerous pressures from a variety of
sources, including the eﬀect of environmental changes and extractive industrial
developments. The threats arising out of these pressures result in human
security challenges.
This book analyses the formation, and promotion, of societal security
within the context of the Arctic-Barents Region. It applies the human security
framework, which has increasingly gained currency at the UN level since 1994
(UNDP), as a tool to provide answers to many questions that face the
Barents population today. The study explores human security dimensions
such as environmental security, economic security, health, food, water, energy,
communities, political security and digital security in order to assess the
current challenges that the Barents population experiences today or may
encounter in the future. In doing so, the book develops a comprehensive
analysis of vulnerabilities, challenges and needs in the Barents Region and
provides recommendations for new strategies to tackle insecurity and improve
the wellbeing of both indigenous and local communities.
This book will be a valuable tool for academics, policy-makers and students
interested in environmental and human security, sustainable development,
environmental studies and the Arctic and Barents Region in particular.
Kamrul Hossain is a Research Professor and Director of the Northern
Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, University of Lapland.
Dorothée Cambou is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki.
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Preface
In academic literature, the Arctic Barents Region is relatively underexplored.
While Arctic challenges addressed in both academic and policy documents
also include regional features prevailing in the Barents Region, the latter
is somewhat distinct compared to general Arctic features. The Barents Region
is generally composed of both the European high Arctic and its sub-Arctic
regions, including northern parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden (the
Nordic Barents), and the larger Northwestern Russia (Russian Barents). In
terms of socio-cultural, economic, political and infrastructural development,
the Nordic Barents has seen greater advancement than the Russian Barents.
However, the entire region faces common environmental challenges exacer-
bated by industrial processes and climate change. Interest for developing, new
projects such as mining and other extractive industrial activities also continue
to increase across both parts of the Barents. Local and indigenous commu-
nities are managing challenges to the loss of traditional subsistence activities
in response to increasing human activity. Navigation and oﬀshore oil and gas
resource extraction are becoming more open for international usage in the
marine regions of the Barents. As a byproduct of industrial development and
globalisation, external actors and forces are entering the region. On the one
hand, these developments bring environmental challenges, but on the other
hand, they also oﬀer economic incentives for the region to prosper. However,
the beneﬁts arising out of these new economic developments and human
activities apparently oﬀer less opportunity to those of the communities living
in remote areas. As a result unequal beneﬁt sharing from development activities
in the Barents economy is resulting in tensions amongst the various groups
living in the region.
In this book, our theoretical analysis is structured around the concept of
societal security, which is a concept yet to concretely develop. However, given
the uniqueness in regard to the shared geographical and socio-environmental
features as well as shared consequence of the transformation of the region, we
point the Barents Arctic Region as a transnational society – the society which
is threatened by a number of stressors. We are convinced that many of the
threats prevailing in the region are synonymous to human security challenges.
We view that the promotion of human security will eventually promote
societal security in the region, and provide a number of recommendations or
suggestions to further explore based on the research conducted by the individual
chapter authors.
This book is the product of a research project entitled: ‘Human Security as
a promotional tool for societal security in the Arctic: Addressing Multiple
Vulnerability to its Population with Speciﬁc Reference to the Barents Region
(HuSActic)’ funded by the Academy of Finland. We gratefully acknowledge
this ﬁnancial contribution in supporting our ability to carry out this research.
In the process of preparing this manuscript, we also relied on a number of
persons who both directly and indirectly supported us including a number of
peer reviewers, and Timo Koivurova Director of the Arctic Center at the
University of Lapland, whose comments and suggestions throughout the process
signiﬁcantly contributed to our research. We also greatly acknowledge the
research assistance and support provided by Joëlle Klein and Karolina Sikora.
Finally, we are grateful to all the chapter authors for their patience and hard
work during the writing and revision processes.
Kamrul Hossain and Dorothée Cambou
30 November 2017
Preface xv
General introduction and the
structure of the book
Kamrul Hossain and Dorothée Cambou
The Barents Region, compared to other parts of the circumpolar Arctic, is a
relatively densely populated region. Among others, the original population of
the region consists of a number of indigenous groups including the Sámi of
Fennoscandia, who transnationally inhabit all four of the Barents countries.
Also, in comparison to other Arctic regions, the Barents is more developed in
terms of both physical infrastructure and social networks. The region’s
autonomous identity has been developing since the beginning of the 1990s
after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
During the Cold War, the region was the object of a reiﬁed conceptualisation
of security that was the purview of national interests and high politics. At the
end of the Cold War, high politics were replaced by a new agenda, forming
the regions’ new identity. The recognition of particular concerns, such as the
threat to its pristine environment aﬀecting the region at large, was developing
in the 1980s, and slowly became a broader priority. In 1987, the former Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s famous speech in Murmansk was a milestone in
raising awareness for the region’s emerging issues – environmental protection.
He declared the whole of the Arctic Region to be considered as a ‘zone of
peace’ (Gorbachev 1987), with a desire to create a nuclear-free Northern
Europe. This development represented a new dynamic in the context of
regional aﬀairs. It was not an isolated event, as the simultaneous development
of security as a regional concept was also growing. From the beginning of the
1990s, a number of schools of thought in security studies developed further
conceptualisations of security, by analysing ontological aspects of security as
well as by broadening and deepening the concept. Security developed a new
dimension that challenged its use as solely a mechanism to deal with state
sovereignty and inter-state matters.
The conceptualisation of security as only protecting states’ border, territory
and national interests was replaced by other agenda, namely the protection of
environment, and by extension the promotion of human wellbeing. The
Barents Region is an interesting example of the integration of multiple chal-
lenges, mostly deriving from risks associated with environmental changes,
which can be classiﬁed in the contemporary discourse of human security. The
sustenance of the whole of the region in its unique form depends on the
protection and promotion of its natural environment. Hence, the ﬁrst formal
step in an eﬀort to develop an inter-state cooperation process was the adop-
tion of the so-called Rovaniemi Declaration adopted in 1991 which included
protections for the Arctic environment. By virtue of this process, the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) has been endorsed by the eight
circumpolar countries (Koivurova 2005, 208; Nuttall 2005, 116). Two years
later in 1993 another forum was established – the Barents Euro-Arctic
Council – in order to promote further systematic and coherent cooperation
process within this European sub-region of the Arctic, namely the Barents
(Bailes and Ólafsson 2017; Olsson et al. 2016). Today, the AEPS has been
integrated into the Arctic Council, which was established in 1996 as a high-
level intergovernmental forum of the eight arctic states (Nord 2015; Koivur-
ova 2005; Young 1996). These institutional eﬀorts continue to progressively
safeguard and promote the environmental, economic and social-cultural
sustainability of the region.
The term ‘sustainability’ is rather ambiguous, unless precisely conceptualised
in a given context. It can be a source of conﬂict in considering the interests of
diﬀerent stakeholders and actors. For example, talking about environmental
sustainability can often conﬂict with economic sustainability, and vice versa.
At the same time, socio-cultural sustainability is dependent on both environ-
mental and economic sustainability. Therefore, contextualising sustainability
in the Barents Region requires contextualising speciﬁc challenges, including
environmental changes facing the region, that have socio-cultural and eco-
nomic eﬀects on the region’s inhabitants. In addition, promoting mechanisms
to deal with these challenges in a way that preserves a continuity of societal
identity supports a more resilient form of sustainability. Throughout this
book, we use the language of human security, which seeks to protect ‘the vital
core of all human lives’ (CHS 2003, 4), and ensure freedom and human fulﬁl-
ment, and promote human wellbeing which provides a resilient sustainability
through preserving the continuity of authentic societal existence.
The concept of human security, as deﬁned in the Human Development
Report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1994) is linked
to a number of issues that inﬂuence societal sustainability, and thereby promote
societal security (see Chapter 1.1). Deﬁning the concept ‘societal security’ is
complex given that the formation of a society is linked to both structural and
functional conditions at diﬀerent levels. When the ability of a society to ‘per-
sist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual
threats’ is challenged, then the society’s existence is threatened (Waever et al.
1993, 23). Within the Barents Region, the application of a relevant human
security agenda in policy processes would promote societal security in the
regional context. Despite diﬀerences between the referent objects in human
security and societal security, the concepts can still be interlinked in the
Barents context. Threats to a society’s collective identity include ‘the sup-
pression of its expression, to interference with its ability to reproduce’
(Waever et al. 1993, 21). In the Barents, societal insecurity exists in not only
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threats to cultural identity, but also threats to health, economy, environment,
etc. These threats are not distinct – they are human security concerns threa-
tening the ‘ability to reproduce’ for its population in the region.
The concept of human security has gained signiﬁcance in the Arctic-
Barents Region in recent years, as it oﬀers a diﬀerent angle to under-
standing the complex threats facing its communities. The link between
human security, climate change and the environment has been signiﬁcantly
endorsed in a number of available literatures and especially in Mark Nut-
tall’s contribution relating to the Arctic Region (e.g. Gjørv et al. 2013;
Nuttalls 2013); human security’s link to societal integrity in the regional
context so far remains abstract. Additionally, a substantial focus on
addressing the Barents Region in speciﬁc regional terms has not been
properly explored in this context. Given that states are no longer the only
subject of security, and that the focus of security discourse has shifted to the
protection of individuals and communities from a wide range of interconnected
threats, the conceptualisation of security in the Barents Region must be
inclusive. Similarly, the institutional arrangements referred to above play a
diﬀuse role in the governance of the region. The governance approach
includes the participation of new actors demonstrating that the governance of
the region must be developed on shared understandings between various sta-
keholders at varied levels. Thus, taking a policy-oriented approach, we
explore the human security challenges faced by the Barents population in
order to address the new and particular causes of insecurities aﬀecting the
Barents society at large.
The Arctic-Barents Region has unique features, including its pristine natural
environment, the presence of distinct communities including a number of indi-
genous communities with distinct livelihood practices, cultures and subsistence
activities. The communities in the Arctic-Barents Region share norms, values and
institutions connected to the region’s natural environment, which provide them
with an incentive for a cohesive society. However, changes occurring in the region
aﬀect such cohesion. While some changes bring new opportunities for the region,
others adversely aﬀect individuals and communities as the socio-environmental
and cultural integrity held by its population is threatened.
The overall progression inﬂuences the continuity of societal identity in its
own form. We have conceived that the idea of formation, of a society or its
continuity is dependent on particular common issues at various levels (see
Chapter 1.1), and deﬁned by historical, geographical, political and environ-
mental relations prevailing amongst the particular society in a given regional
context. Thus, our perception of the homogeneity of Barents society formed
around particular common challenges. For example, threats posed by climate
change and an increase in industrial activities are common across the region
and impact all communities, although their manifestation is context speciﬁc.
Methodologically, we use the concept of human security as a framework to
improve societal security within the Barents Region. In accordance with the
human security approach introduced in the 1994 UNDP Human Development
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Report, we focus on economic, health, environmental, food, personal, commu-
nity and political security as means to assess current challenges in the Barents
Region. In addition, we have included water security, energy security and
digital security in our analysis in order to oﬀer a more comprehensive
assessment. While evaluating human security can be challenging, each security
dimension will include a unique deﬁnition of assessment variables, to provide
the reader with context-speciﬁc understandings of its role in the Barents
Region. The resulting analysis will constitute a critical starting point for
policy-making focused on the development of the Barents Region and the
wellbeing of its population.
The book is organised into two main sections. Part 1 is composed of two
chapters that set out the theoretical and contextual background for subsequent
assessments. In the ﬁrst chapter, Kamrul Hossain provides an analysis of the
theoretical framework used in our assessment and deﬁnes the main concept of
societal security, its link to human security and relevance in the Barents
Region. Then, Dorothée Cambou and Lassi Heninen provide contextual
background with a descriptive analysis of the Barents Region, focusing on the
institutional development of the Barents cooperation. Part 2 comprises the
subsequent security assessments, and is composed of ten chapters. Each
chapter focuses on one of the ten human security dimensions: environmental,
economic, health, food, water, energy, personal, community, political and digital
security. We invited a diverse group of scholars to discuss each dimension of
human security. Although all contributors were asked to structure their argu-
ments identically – Deﬁnition, Assessment, Conclusion – they were also invited
to openly address other speciﬁc issues that they considered relevant for the
analysis. The ﬁnal section of the book includes a short summary of the principal
recommendations that could be useful for policy development in the region.
Human security is multifaceted, and threats to security are interconnected.
In the Barents Region, environmental threats constitute a major challenge to
the immediate and long-term wellbeing of the population, and considerably
aﬀect all other human security dimensions. Environmental changes can for
instance undermine the economic prosperity of the region, which relies on
primary sectors such as forestry, extractive industries and agriculture. In turn,
environmental threats also have implications for the livelihoods and health of
existing communities. Thus, environmental security is an overreaching
dimension of human security in the Barents Region, which also feeds into all
other dimension of human security. Therefore, the ﬁrst chapter of Part 2
focuses on the assessment of environmental security and is followed by two
chapters on economic and health security.
More precisely, in Chapter 2.1, Sarah Mackie analyses the speciﬁc challenges
that aﬀect the environment of the Barents Region. After deﬁning environ-
mental security and describing the diﬀerent habitats found across the region,
the chapter considers three major threats to the environment: climate change,
industrial pollution and nuclear contamination. In the following chapter,
Anna Petrétei and Dorothée Cambou present economic security as it applies
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to the Barents Region. They expand the concept of economy security to go
beyond economic growth or the market sphere, and to assess the capacities of
peoples to sustain adequate standard of living in accordance with their own
needs, cultural standards and the environment. In their analysis, they examine
factors in demographics, migration, education, transportation and existing
conﬂicts with extractive industries as elements of economic security. Chapter 2.3
examines key health security issues in the Barents population. In this chapter,
Susanna Pääkkölä and Dorothée Cambou describe the impact of environmental
challenges on the health situation of the population, including its cold climate,
transboundary pollution and climate change. The analysis also includes
references to the speciﬁc epidemiological situation of the population, and the
existence of diﬀerent trends in Russia and the Nordic countries. The chapter ends
with considerations on the link between mental health and the wellbeing of
indigenous communities.
The next three chapters focus on the food-water-energy nexus. While it is
clear that improving food, water and energy security requires an integrated
approach to the governance of all three resources, the analysis is divided into
three chapters in order for the authors to provide recommendations based on
their speciﬁc research expertise. In Chapter 2.4 on ‘Food security in the Barents
Region’, Dele Raheem and Shaun Cormier highlight for instance the important
contribution of traditional and local foods to the food security of indigenous
and non-indigenous people in the Barents Region. They also brieﬂy underline
how globalisation aﬀects food systems to challenge food security in the
Barents Region. Chapter 2.5, written by Antonia Sohns, explores how Arctic
freshwater systems are threatened by concomitant impacts of aging and
insuﬃcient infrastructure, impaired freshwater resources, ecosystem degradation,
industrial development, climate change and demographic shifts. Chapter 2.6
by Hanna Lempinen and Dorothée Cambou focuses on societal dimensions
of energy security in the region. Lempinen and Cambou draw attention to the
contextual nature of energy security and through the dimensions of 1) avail-
ability, 2) aﬀordability, 3) environmental aspects, 4) acceptability and 5) the
diversity of energy sources as well as socio-cultural diversity inhabitants,
including indigenous peoples, in the Barents Region.
A ﬁnal but central aspect of the assessment focuses on the protection of
individuals and their cultures and political rights, through the study of personal,
community and political security. Chapter 2.7 on personal security is written
by Tahnee Prior and Patrick Ciashi and focuses on three particular dimensions
of personal (in)security: suicide, domestic violence, migration and mobility. In
exploring some of these areas, the authors focus on two groups in particular:
women and indigenous peoples. They do so to pinpoint the evolving tensions
and conﬂicts related to personal insecurity as they arise in the Arctic and the
Barents Region, more speciﬁcally. Ultimately, their assessment also highlights
areas where current work remains insuﬃcient or imminent. Chapter 2.8 focuses
on community security. Although personal security is vital to human security,
most peoples derive security from their membership in a group (UNDP
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1994). In this regard, Giuseppe Amatulli and Joelle Klein address community
security in the context of the Barents Region, with a particular focus on
indigenous peoples living in the area. In their analysis, the authors stress
emphasis on the promotion and preservation of indigenous languages as a
central aspect of identity, and argue that access and rights to traditional lands
and natural resource management pose a serious risk to the sustainability of
traditional lifestyles. Chapter 2.9 focus more broadly on the issue of political
security in the Barents Region. In this chapter, Dorothée Cambou argues that
although traditionally loosely deﬁned, political security gains currency in the
framework of human rights, as it includes both the individual rights of the
citizens and the collective rights of indigenous peoples, through the defence of
democracy, peace and stability. The ﬁnal assessment chapter by Mirva Sal-
minen addresses the inter-linkage between digitalisation and human security.
More precisely, Mirva Salminen examines digital security under six themes:
(1) access to digital networks, (2) availability of digital services, (3) access to
(relevant) information, (4) digital awareness and skills, (5) digital inclusion
policies and protection of human rights, and (6) state of cybercrime and
digital abuse. Her chapter places the wellbeing of individuals and commu-
nities in the Barents Region at the centre of digital security hence broadening
the conceptualisations of, for instance, information security and cybersecurity,
which traditionally focus on the protection of information or national secur-
ity. In addition, the chapter serves as a reminder of the importance of
empowerment alongside protection for the constitution of a truly compre-
hensive digital security framework.
While each contribution represents several distinct perspectives on human
security issues in the Barents area, the overall assessment provides a general
understanding of key challenges faced by the population. In this regard, we
believe the assessment will not only serve as a basis for knowledge develop-
ment, future scientiﬁc inquiry and policy development, but also contribute to
improving overall human security in the Barents Region.
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Part I
Theory and context

1.1 The question of societal security
in the Arctic
Kamrul Hossain
1.1 Society and a transnationally organised community
The formation of a ‘society’ is complex, given that there is no set deﬁnition
for it. According to the Cambridge English Dictionary (Cambridge Dictionary,
n.d.), society is:
a large group of people who live together in an organised way, making
decisions about how to do things and share the work that needs to be
done. All the people in a country, or in several similar countries, can be
referred to as a society.
This deﬁnition suggests that a society can be formed both within and beyond
the domain of a nation state. Generally, individuals are the core of a society,
living in a particular geographical setting and having common issues to share.
They interact with each other and bind themselves in a functional relation-
ship with each other by virtue of a number of mutually recognised identical
norms broadly known as culture. The practising of culture provides a sense of
cohesion by which members within the community identify each other as part
of the same group. However, this cohesion may not always have to be homo-
genous in a strict sense, as there are smaller groups within bigger groups, thus
forming both smaller societies and bigger societies.
The construction of a social group is based on particular likeness amongst its
members. Persons with similar interests join together and build their smaller
societies within a bigger society. For example, individuals from the same profes-
sion ﬁnd a likeness in their belonging to that particular profession. Yet, there is
a shared understanding that an individual also belongs to a broader identity or
broader collective identity at large, which also distinguishes them from other
outside groups (Ross 2009, 58). Individuals ﬁnd their aﬃnity to a group through
the particular surroundings that form its culture. It is ‘the set of meanings owned
by a given culture that sets it apart from other cultures’ (Keillor et al. 1996, 58).
The factors that distinguish a group from ‘others’ are largely based on repre-
sentations of a common historical heritage, symbols, customs and traditions,
which oﬀer the in-group community a basic homogeneity.
Such a homogenous society or community is built around the common
features prevailing in a particular geographical location, which are the result
of a so-called ‘we feeling’. Such features may have international, inter-regional,
trans-national, national or sub-national dimensions. Internationally, for
example, the ‘we feeling’ can be built around the common interests of human-
kind, such as protecting the planet from the global eﬀects of climate change.
We unite ourselves together as an international community to ﬁght against
the threats that an increased concentration of greenhouse gasses pose to the
planet. At the regional level, for example, the European Union (EU) – a
supra-national body – ﬁnds aﬃnity around the common values of democracy,
human rights, rule of law, good governance, transparency, etc. Any threat to
these values jeopardises its societal integrity, hence aﬀecting European identity.
Similarly, community identity at the national level is built around the feelings
resulting from the political aﬃnity amongst its members. This aﬃnity is based
on particular features, such as deﬁned geographical space, that can include a
set of negotiated aspects, such as the notion of citizenship. The national
identity of a group of people who share ‘a community of history and culture,
possessing a uniﬁed territory, economy, mass education system and common
legal rights’ (Smith 1996) is sometimes regarded as a socially constructed
community, which, in other words, is known as a ‘political community’.
However, within each political community, several cultural communities may
exist, deﬁned by ethnicity, for example. These cultural communities are still
tied to one broader national culture, forming a single identity as one political
community known as ‘civic nationalism’ (Ipperciel 2007, 397). A cultural
community may nevertheless ﬁnd an aﬃnity towards identical cultures across
borders, where shared elements are more strongly connected than that of the
ones found within ‘civic nationalism’. Understanding that the formation of an
identity is not just a deliberate imposition but an inherent development, by
extension, a political community or society can also be formed beyond national
political structures, within a relatively broad geographical setting. A cultural
community can be composed within sub-national as well as cross-national
(regional) structures, albeit deﬁned by a set of values at various levels. The
basic characteristics of a state – deﬁned territory, government, deﬁnite laws
and sovereignty – while ensuring a political existence, are not necessarily
inclusive enough of the cultural communities within it unless forms of identities
of various other groups within it at various levels are acknowledged. A state
as a political community receives legitimacy in the exercise of its political
function by acknowledging the values inherent in the cultural and communal
practices of various other groups. Hence, socially constructed ideas of a
nation as a single community is at times problematic.
The Barents Region provides us with examples in this regard. The region is
situated in the far North, containing areas that are far from the central capitals
of each of the Barents countries. However, the region as a whole is identiﬁed
as distinct, sharing identical characteristics across borders in terms of envir-
onment, demographic composition, livelihood practices and common
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customary set of norms in the maintenance of everyday life amongst the
communities. Thus, an identiﬁable cultural community in the Barents exists
where shared elements are more strongly connected transnationally than that
of the ones found within ‘civic nationalism’. To the extent that the formation
of an identity, as referred to earlier, is not just a deliberate imposition but an
inherent development, a new form of political community or society can be
formed to extend beyond national political structures, where a group of states
recognise a set of common values inherent in themselves. Such a society is
deﬁned as follows:
a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and
share in the working of common institutions.
(Bull 2002, 13)
The creation of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) – the inter-
governmental forum of countries around the Barents Region – can also be
considered a political community. Each state acknowledges the common
interests and values of the segments of the population that transnationally
recognise a common history, common culture, common values, etc. Thus the
‘we’ feeling, we argue here, is context-dependent. The ‘we’ feeling in perceiving
a national identity may co-exist in the ‘we’ feeling in perceiving a transna-
tional communal identity. The point is that states’ deliberate accommodation
of certain ideological features transcending across national borders promotes
further legitimisation in its exercise of sovereign function, by which states
recognise a transnational society. According to Nelson (2006), although states can
theoretically exist through their basic structures – possessing deﬁned terri-
tories, governments, deﬁnite laws and sovereignty – without an ideology of
legitimation, a state loses its authority generally derived from the negotiated
understanding between the rulers and the ruled. This sort of political identity
building is also connected to ‘region building’ (e.g., Keskitalo 2004a) via the
creation of trans-national institutions. In the case of the Barents Region, the
presence of indigenous peoples and their particular context in a regional and
societal scope, for example, require the integration of political processes
transcending their national border lines.
1.2 Broadening security concept
The traditional understanding of security derives from the Westphalian notion
of state sovereignty, driven by political realism, where security discourse is
deﬁned through power relations (Elman 2012, 16). Realism calls for military
build-up in order to protect the territorial integrity and political independence
of nation states using military means as the decisive factor to provide security.
There have been serious discussions in the 1980s seeking to include other
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elements within the security framework such as economic collapse, political
oppression, resource scarcity, overpopulation, diseases and natural destruc-
tion which also eventually threaten state sovereignty, either from inside or
outside of a given territory. However, no clear challenge to state-centric
security matured out of such discussions until the Cold War tensions faded.
In the beginning of the 1990s, just at the end of the Cold War, a small
group of scholars led by Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the Centre for
Peace and Conﬂict Research in Copenhagen developed a framework to
re-conceptualise security discourses by expanding the concept to extend
beyond a sole focus on military relations between states (Buzan 1991). Their
work established the foundation of securitisation theory by which they broa-
dened the concept to include four other dimensions – political, economic,
societal and environmental – in addition to the military dimension. The
reconceptualisation of security does not undermine the state centric approach,
but is replaced by a broader ‘network-based’ and ‘horizontal’ structure, given
that the modern threats do not necessarily emanate from states but also from
nebulous sources (Burgess and Sissel 2008), such as the actions of non-state
actors, or from social phenomena, such as threats arising out of social
inequalities. However, the broadening of the concept of security has not been
unchallenged. The presence of unrestricted elements identiﬁed as possible
security threats, such as within the ambit of human security discussions,
complicates the security framework (Ullmann 1983, 129). It has nevertheless
been argued that, ‘[c]onceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of
insecurity suﬀered by people and collectives’ (Booth 2005, 22) which can be
impacted by multiple other sources such as internal conﬂicts, environmental
degradation and economic crisis. The process of horizontal broadening con-
tinued to expand to include many other inter-dependent challenges as part of
new risk scenarios, hence posing new threats – for example, the emerging
cyber security threat.
Hence, the post-realist approach to security is founded on a socially con-
structed structure whereby security has not only broadened in scope but also
deepened to include the subjects facing security threats (Jano 2009, 74; Tarry
1999, 1). To determine the scope of security, Buzan et al. (1998) suggest that a
given issue be transformed into a security matter because of its social con-
struction, whereby the transformation is due to social pressure built around
that particular referent object identiﬁed as an ‘existential’ threat requiring the
adoption of extraordinary or emergency measures. Generally, actors deﬁne an
issue as an objective threat, which is not automatic but a deliberate process of
identiﬁcation of an object as threat, under the claim that security is a ‘self-
referential practice: an issue becomes a security issue only by being labelled as
one’ (Diskaya 2013). Then the referent audience – the subjects of security – is
mobilised around the object of threat, and their acceptance of the issue as a
serious concern for survival pushes the central actors to introduce emergency
measures by adopting changes in policies. A policy change is required to
bring the referent object back within the normal process of politics. The
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acceptance by the audience provides the actors with the legitimacy to use
extraordinary means in order to ensure the referent object’s removal from the
threat agenda (Buzan et al. 1998, 21). As such many more subjects, actors,
factors and dimensions at various levels can be included within the security
framework, and each of them is, in one way or another, inter-connected and
interdependent. While these interdependencies complicate the security picture
and present diversiﬁed challenges in our everyday lives, all of them do not
necessarily begin as or become existential threats. They eventually become
existential threats if they are not received as political priorities during their
emergence within the normal process of politics.
1.3 Societal security
The theory of securitisation refers to societal security as the protection of ‘we’
feeling, and requires emergency measures to be materialised for its protection.
To the extent that the reconceptualisation of security pertains to survival, a
state cannot survive an existential threat to its sovereignty – making it
a national security issue within traditional military security. Similarly, when a
community is threatened and faces the possibility of losing its ‘we feeling’ –
the identity – it ceases to survive collectively, making the community’s exis-
tence uncertain in a societal context. A threat to societal security may also
result in conﬂicts between the state authority and the societal community at
risk, thereby ultimately aﬀecting state sovereignty and jeopardising state-centric
traditional security.
As previously deﬁned, a society is formed through the belongingness of its
members in a given community around certain values shared by them as a
group, the continued preservation of whose identity/existence is referred to as
societal security. It is one of the expanded notions of security, which oﬀers the
security of collective groups in relation to other communities or the institutions
of the state in which they reside (Thiel 2007). Societal security can also be
presented as identity-based self-determination, where a particular community
meets its people’s needs for belonging to that particular societal formation.
According to Buzan, societal security is:
the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing
conditions and possible or actual threats. More speciﬁcally, it is about the
sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional
patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national
identity and custom.
(Buzan 1993, 41–58)
Sustainability within the acceptable conditions for evolution is dependent on
many issues in a particular geographical setting and varies by region. The
protection of the surrounding environment of a region, for example, provides
a community with a platform to exercise its socio-economic and cultural
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functions, and in which it ﬂourishes in itself as a distinct societal group with
particular belongingness. Therefore, when a feeling of belongingness is threa-
tened because society’s essential characteristics do not oﬀer the necessary
conditions for its continued existence and evolution, the society suﬀers from
the loss of its societal identity. The creation of threats depends on a group’s
capability of constructing socially powerful arguments that the ‘we’ feeling is
threatened. The construction of collectivities as well as the perception of
threats are nonetheless context-dependent. Buzan argues that threats against
societal values come from within the states rather than beyond (Buzan 1991,
123). However, at times external forces beyond the national border also play a
role whereby they can inﬂuence one group of society more rigorously than the
other – which makes the distinction between ‘within’ and ‘outside’ categories
diﬃcult (Ozolina 2016, 15). This is particularly the case in the context of the
Barents Region where both transnational forces as well as cross-border issues
inﬂuence the communities from both inside and outside in various ways. For
example, states’ national interests sometimes arguably conﬂict with regional
interests and threaten societal security. Yet, the state can also be a promoter
of societal security. Unless a balance between these interests is properly
addressed, societal security in the regional context becomes an intricate issue.
Societal security is threatened when individuals perceive changes as threats to
their wellbeing or to community viability. The wellbeing of individuals also
depends on the continued functioning of a community as a social group. Such
functioning includes factors such as successful resource management, the role
of public services and infrastructure (Arsæther 2004), the possibility of parti-
cipation in policy making (Duhaime and Caron 2009), and a set of common
values from which most individuals derive their identity (UNDP 1994).
In addition to a broadening theoretical analysis of societal security, the
practical approach to societal security has adopted an interdependent and
broader, conceptual framework. Today, the broadened scope of security is
linked to issues found also in safety discourses, such as in emergency pre-
paredness and response mechanisms. The inter-relationship between security
and safety is a relatively recent development in relation to societal security.
Both safety and security are concepts that are intertwined in understandings
of human challenges. The aim is to utilise a bridge between security and
safety concepts to deal with challenges that have consequences for societies
both within, and transcending, the national border. Bengt Sundelius formulated
the security/safety inter-linkages to refer to societal security (Sundelius 2005).
Moreover, the complexity of modern society requires an understanding of our
increasing interdependencies with new technologies. Today, infrastructural
interconnectedness has become an obvious part of our daily lives, and society is
dependent on the reliable functioning of the system found within this inter-
connectedness (Sundelius 2016, 160). For example, uninterrupted functioning
of IT networks is connected to uninterrupted energy supply. A breakdown
of one of the systems aﬀects the other one and vice versa. Therefore, the
theoretical approach to societal security presented in the Copenhagen School
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as social construction is somewhat diﬀerent from what it refers to at the
practical level.
A deﬁnition of societal security is presented in the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO/TC 223). According to the deﬁnition, societal
security refers to ‘protection of society from and response to incidents, emer-
gencies, and disasters caused by intentional and unintentional human acts,
natural hazards, and technical failures’ (Tangen 2011). The deﬁnition also
highlighted threats in connection to all-hazards perspective ‘covering adap-
tive, proactive and reactive strategies in all phases before, during, and after a
disruptive incident’. According to the deﬁnition, societal security ‘is multi-
disciplinary, and involves actors from both the public and private sectors,
including not-for-proﬁt organizations’. Given that challenges threaten com-
munities diﬀerently, an approach to ensuring societal security needs to be
rather ﬂexible both in scope and in scale to take into account the complex, yet
often intertwined, challenges that various communities and community
members experience (see also Hossain et al. 2017). The diversity of threats to
societal security is linked to the framework of human security – a policy tool
to analyse diverse perspectives of security threats at the individual and com-
munity levels. Hence the notion of human security, as discussed in the fol-
lowing section, can be used as an eﬀective analytical tool to interpret societal
sustainability within acceptable conditions.
1.4 Linking human security to societal security
The core notion of human security is not new. Its origin can be traced back to
the 17th century social contract theory, where individuals agree around a
number of common security goals to be provided by an entity they approve
themselves – the so-called sovereign entity. However, the modern approach to
human security, re-deﬁned since the early 1990s, rejects hegemonic relationships
between states and its subjects and calls for a broader inclusive agenda. The
Human Development Report (HDR) of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) (UNDP 1994) endorsed the concept of human security in
order to safeguard the humans (and communities) at the sub-state level. The
concept has been used to refer to situations or conditions which aﬀect the
survival of individuals, and not that of the states’. The referent objects of
security include individuals; it also includes communities such as ethnic
minorities, and indigenous and local communities, who are largely the victims
of human security challenges in diverse ways. The security threats to these
referent objects, unless safeguarded, may, however, result in large-scale societal
unrest that has the potential to disrupt traditional national security. Therefore, at
times the concept of human security can be understood as an expansion of
traditional security concerns that put individuals at their core. Going beyond
physical security, it perceives a holistic relationship to socio-economic, envir-
onmental and cultural wellbeing, where an individual can freely maintain and
develop their identity.
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The HDR incorporated seven categories of threats to human security:
environmental, economic, food, health, political, personal and community
security. These categories relate to concerns associated with violent conﬂicts
from various sources at both the intra-state and supra-state levels. They also
largely relate to non-violent issues aﬀecting the conditions of human lives,
such as diseases, hunger, environmental catastrophes, etc. Such non-violent
aspects of security have been reported to ‘kill far more people than war, gen-
ocide, and terrorism combined’ (Human Security Centre 2005). Protection
from threats and the promotion of identiﬁed objects of the security agenda
are the goals of human security and seek to broadly ensure ‘freedom from
fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ among the individuals and communities in a
given society. While the former is about guaranteeing security from physical
violence, the latter concerns economic, social and cultural demands of indi-
viduals and communities (UNDP 1994). Human dignity suﬀers where such
fulﬁlment is not guaranteed. Since the causes and expressions of human
security depend on a complex interaction of regional and local factors, the
concept oﬀers normative and procedural tools to respond to particular threats
arising from the interactions aﬀecting overall societal structure in a given
geographical setting. As a broad, dynamic and ﬂexible framework, human
security captures such variation in speciﬁc contexts; builds processes that are
based on people’s own perceptions of fear and vulnerability; identiﬁes the
concrete needs for people under stress; enables solutions based on local realities;
helps identify priority security needs at the local level; and looks at the
impact of global developments on diﬀerent communities (HSU 2009). By
providing a holistic and contextual account of the concrete needs of individuals
and communities and the factors endangering their security, human security,
when applied in speciﬁc context, is capable of analysing and assessing the
overall social impact (ibid.). The concept of security is negotiated and formed
amongst the various stakeholders at various levels. Therefore, by integrating a
larger agenda, such as economic globalisation, the environment and sustain-
ability into the concept of security, the identiﬁcation of threats and the
mechanisms for their removal, by extension, promotes the self-preservation of
societal communities.
Human insecurities are closely related to environment-induced phenomena
that inﬂuence many factors aﬀecting the lives of individuals and communities.
Such diverse insecurities can hamper societal cohesion, which then threatens
to destabilise society’s political structure. Political instability leads to various
societal challenges, such as resource scarcity and social discrimination
(Dabelko et al. 2000). We, by highlighting the concept of human security,
identify societal challenges and thereby we go beyond the securitisation
approach of existential threats. We argue that societal security is not just a
ﬁght for survival, it is also about (human security’s approach to) the promotion
of conditions for the greater sustenance of a society – it is about ‘survival
plus’ (Booth 2007, 102). It is about any danger of risks or threats that may
have the potential to aﬀect the referent object’s survival but that may not be
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mature enough to threaten society’s immediate existence. While survival refers
to an existential condition, societal security perceives an ability to promote
socio-cultural, economic and environmental abundance for society’s con-
tinued sustainability. Often, this aspect of security is referred to as ‘positive
security’ – in other words, ‘security to’ (enablement) rather than ‘security
from’ (threats) – found in human security literature (Hoogensen 2012, 836).
Addressing security this way accommodates the everyday concerns of a given
community, making it more relevant, recognised, visible and socially integrative
(ibid., 838), which eventually promotes an ability to make ‘life-choices’ for
that particular community (Booth 2007, 106). Thus, we highlight the human
security concept’s normative utility and guiding role for the promotion of
value additions and ethical norms in security debates (Tadjbakhsh and
Chenoy 2007) as they relate to the formation and promotion of societal
sustainability.
1.5 Societal security: the Barents Region in context
The Barents Region transcends the national borders of four countries. The
region comprises the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of mainland Europe,
encompassing the northern parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland, and north-
western Russia. The region is the homeland of around 5.2 million inhabitants,
including a number of indigenous groups. The majority of the Barents popu-
lation live in the Russian parts of the region. While the people of the region
are (sub-)nationally divided, most people live in relatively large urban areas.
However, the population size in these places is small (Tennberg et al. 2014).
They are composed of mixed groups of local and indigenous peoples, forming
smaller communities within each group and speaking diﬀerent languages.
These smaller communities are also tied to other groups and to the region
through shared experiences. These include the enjoyment of unique cultural
and communal distinctness derived from common interests developed in
connection to common geo-physical structures supported by identical natural
environments, similar cultural practices and values, and common threats
aﬀecting their lives, livelihoods and community wellbeing. They ﬁnd likeness
amongst themselves beyond national dimensions in many ways. For example,
the Sámi live in four countries in the region transnationally, yet share a
common understanding as it relates to their cosmology and unique worldview,
which is distinct from those of other groups of people living outside of the
Barents Region in these countries. This likeness extends also to other groups
of peoples, not just indigenous peoples in the Barents, and has led to the for-
mation of a broader identical community known as the Barents community,
which has been recognised and actively promoted through various political
processes. The creations of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) in 1993
and the Barents Regional Council (BRC) within the framework of BEAC are
examples of transnational region building where the common concerns led to
a formalisation of the region in institutional structures (Keskitalo 2004b). The
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process started at the end of the Cold War in 1991 with the establishment of
the Protection of Arctic Environmental Strategies (AEPS) (later integrated
within the framework of the Arctic Council), where the integration of common
environmental concerns were incorporated in a broader Arctic framework (e.g.,
Koivurova 2011). These concerns, as they aﬀect the whole of the Arctic
region, and as they develop over time, have been identiﬁed as risking society’s
unique features in many ways. The Arctic Human Development Report
(AHDR) has largely addressed many of these issues from the viewpoint of
socio-cultural, economic and environmental aspects (Larsen and Fondahl
2014) in order to promote community cohesion within the region.
Many of these challenges, as they aﬀect societal security in one way or
another, are discussed in detail from the perspective of human security in the
subsequent chapters of this book. However, in order to better understand the
particular issues discussed in those chapters, we herein provide a general
overview of the conditions prevailing in the Barents, which inﬂuence the
threats and opportunities present in this transnational society.
The Barents cannot be identiﬁed as a completely homogenous region;
hence its population cannot be identiﬁed as one homogenous community in
any strict sense. As discussed, it includes many small groups of communities
in each of its sub-regions that share similarities and diﬀerences. Political and
social variations in each of these sub-regions (which are split into a number of
territories within diﬀerent countries) oﬀer diverse experiences for their inha-
bitants. For example, the sub-regions of the Russian Barents cannot be com-
parable to those of the Nordic Barents Region. These sub-regions are
diﬀerent from each other across countries, even sometimes within one single
country – some places are more infrastructurally developed and some are less;
some are located in remote and inhospitable places and some others are more
easily accessible; and the population in some places are subject to more political
discrimination than others because of varied political infrastructure, etc. As
shown in the chapter on economic security, human development indicators
vary widely in diﬀerent parts of the Barents Region. Despite this variance,
determining the formation of society does not depend entirely on narrowly
deﬁned indicators. Common challenges, as indicated, have the potential to
inﬂuence community structures and perceived values, albeit at varied levels and
varied scales, and to create an identical society. The uniqueness of this societal
formation is that it extends beyond civic nationalism and towards identical
elements shared amongst members, regardless of their nationality.
Thus, the uniqueness of the Barents is that the region’s geographic setting,
as well as climatic conditions, are largely identical. Its unique natural envir-
onment provides the population with a similar means of livelihood and sub-
sistence, oﬀering a form of transnational homogeneity in a broader sense.
Today, the transformation of the regional environment presents common
challenges across the Barents community in terms of livelihood practices,
modiﬁcations to regional economies, alterations in demographic balances,
changes in socio-cultural values, etc.
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For example, the eﬀects of climate change are rapidly impacting the region,
and the resulting increase in temperature and the expectation of future warming
presents a common challenge for Barents states to address (Kattsov and
Källén 2005; Overland et al. 2011). While climate change and its consequences
pose both new challenges and new opportunities in the Barents Region, the
region’s environmental and societal sustainability is often times imbalanced
due to uncertain and unsafe societal conditions (Mustonen and Nieminen
2007) that commonly aﬀect the inhabitants of the region. The region also
similarly faces the consequences of increasing economic globalisation, as
numerous economic activities, such as forestry, oil and gas, mining and related
extractive industrial activities, energy development, tourism, etc. (Tennberg
et al. 2014), replace the traditional economic activities, such as hunting, ﬁshing,
reindeer herding, berry and mushroom picking, etc. While the former is of
importance for national, local and regional economies (Glomsrød and
Aslaksen 2009), the latter is relevant for environmental sustainability, local
economy, subsistence and recreation of communities in the region (Jansson
et al. 2015, 32).
Whereas there is a need for the co-existence of both economic and envir-
onmental sustainability for the region’s stability, research shows that the
beneﬁts derived from economic development are not shared equally, giving rise
to social inequality and leading to social injustice and societal insecurity. Con-
ﬂicts of diﬀerent interest groups over land use and over the unequal distribu-
tion of resources often pose threats to socio-economic opportunities. The
expansion of extractive industrial activities and their subsequent impact jeo-
pardises the socioeconomic and environmental integrity of the region. Local
inhabitants suﬀer from increasingly uncertain living conditions whereby they
lose possibilities for economic subsistence as a group. Moreover, the cultural
sustainability of the region is also at risk due to patterns that increasingly lead
to demographic changes. Tennberg states that one common characteristic
across the Barents Region is out-migration (Tennberg et al. 2014), which
impacts the region’s societal structure in terms of demography. While out-
migration of the young population is observed in many parts of the region, an
inﬂow and increase in the population are also evident in many other parts.
For example, as the opportunity to practise traditional activities decreases
and opportunities grow from increased extractive activities, people from out-
side the region are attracted to move to the region. While this is more or less
common across the region, it is most common in the Russian Barents Region
(Heleniak and Bogoyalensky 2014). A transformed societal structure, with
newcomers in the region possessing diﬀerent skills and education (Rasmussen
et al. 2014) and with the usage of new technology reducing the diﬀerences
between local and global practices in everyday life, inﬂuences the culture and
tradition of existing communities. Hence a transformed societal structure
oﬀers a new lifestyle having had inﬂuence, among others, on the local languages
spoken amongst the communities, which is, in fact, vital for the maintenance
of cultural identity. For example, in the region, elderly people often speak
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indigenous languages mostly, while younger generations often grow up bilingual,
with the national language as the dominant one (Schweitzer et al. 2010).
The consequences of such changes present a broad threat and put the
region’s indigenous populations at risk, which eventually leads to denial of a
coherent societal progression. Therefore, necessary and timely response
mechanisms should be developed for the continued viability of societal functions
for greater stability. Our perception of societal security in the context of the
Barents Region, as referred to earlier, addresses a broader conceptualisation
of security that extends beyond the limited scope endorsed within traditional
securitisation theory. These new risk landscapes, as referred to by Burgess and
Sissel (2008), are constitutive of societal security threats, and we have taken
them into consideration. For Burgess and Sissel, societal security ‘is not con-
nected to speciﬁc threats or scenarios but encompasses all possible strains and
hazards that a society could face’ (Burgess and Sissel 2008). Thus, societal
security is connected to ‘objective factual threat’, which forms security in
relation to ‘disaster risk reduction’, ‘resilience of nations and communities to
disasters’, ‘civil protection’ and ‘civil emergency planning’. These aspects
of security are diﬀerent in nature from a socially constructed security approach,
such as those articulated in the Copenhagen School’s conceptualisation of
securitisation. The promotion of security refers to developments of new and
rapid response mechanism in reply to these new risks (ibid.). Thus, we ﬁnd
that the concept of human security, as it applies to the region, oﬀers eﬀective
mechanisms for both the protection and promotion of societal security.
The response mechanisms associated with human security oﬀer measures
that are applicable in both reactive and proactive manners in order to promote
society’s sustainability within ‘acceptable conditions’. Given the indeterminate
nature of the term ‘acceptable conditions’ as it relates to societal sustain-
ability, the process-oriented approach to security, found within the analytical
framework of human security, pertinently ﬁts to create guiding norms for
societal security discussions. Therefore, protecting or maintaining society’s
essential features within acceptable conditions for evolution requires a pro-
cess, which is best analysed by human security tools. Such a process has been
referred to by Ozolina (2016, 10) as ‘securitability’. The concept of ‘securit-
ability’, as it applies to societal security, not only relates to protection from
threats but also perceives both promotion of resilience and empowerment of
individuals and communities going hand-in-hand with the concept of positive
security as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Resilience refers to the pro-
motion of ‘the capacity of the system to continually change, adapt, and yet
remain within critical thresholds’ and ‘the ability of an individual to recover
from adversity’ (Berkes and Ross 2013, 6). Empowerment, on the other hand,
is about the promotion of the involvement of individuals and societal net-
works to proactively invoke their personal and communal choices (Ozolina
2016, 10). Securitability provides a process that ‘attempts to advance political
priorities in the face of a new threat landscape’ (Sundelius 2016, 162) resulting
from, for example, threats to food, health, pollution and climate change. The
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functionality of a society is inﬂuenced by such attempts, which eventually
promote broader human wellbeing that contributes to communal viability.
The term ‘wellbeing’, like ‘acceptable conditions’, cannot be precisely measured
by one metric. Thus, a human security approach provides guidance for measur-
ing wellbeing by taking speciﬁc indicators and perspectives into consideration.
The speciﬁc indicators oﬀer an impetus on how each of them is relevant to
analyse threat pictures in a given part of the region.
Part 2 of this book has extensively analysed a number of identiﬁed human
security factors as they relate to the Barents Region and provided recommen-
dations to guide the use of human security in promoting societal security. In
particular, methods prescribed by the concept of human security – the identiﬁ-
cation of speciﬁc challenges in a given geographical context, the adoption of
strategies indicating eﬀective measures that integrate the concerns and voices of
relevant actors, and the implementation of these strategies by invoking estab-
lished and emerging norms such as resilience – can be endorsed as the guiding
norm for the promotion of societal sustainability. The Barents Region faces
multiple stresses, both internal and external, natural and human-induced, and
which have raised social, political and environmental concerns (Adger 2000,
347–64). These concerns relate to the economy, social capital, formal and infor-
mal relations amongst the communities, the promotion of skills via training and
education, as well as the creation of knowledge for information and commu-
nication in emergencies (Jermalavicius 2015, 160–61). To this degree, they
impact the ability of a society to maintain sustainability within acceptable
conditions. Such acceptable conditions within the Barents Region require an
ability to manage outside inﬂuences and local culture and social competence
(Rasmussen et al. 2014, 462). Our arguments in this book lie in the recognition
of societal security as central to resilient security strategies. Societal security
underpins the development of abilities to respond to threats to communities,
regardless of whether such threats are yet to mature, emerging or existential.
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1.2 The Barents Region, a society with
shared security concerns in the Arctic
Dorothée Cambou and Lassi Heninen
Introduction
Since the beginning of the 19th century, the Barents Sea area, as a sub-region
of the entire Arctic, has been considered one of the most peaceful regions in
the world. However, historically, there was high tension between the countries
of the northernmost parts of Europe – Finland, Norway, Sweden and
Russia – and the relationships between these counties have been characterised
by their struggle for sovereignty and security.1
Despite historical tensions and conﬂicts, in 1993, Finland, Norway, Russia
and Sweden established the so-called Barents Euro-Arctic Region – covering
the northernmost counties of Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the North-
western regions of the Russian Federation – based on common interests, and
the desire to strengthen shared identities across national borders (e.g., Heininen
2009). With the Barents cooperation in place, interregional cooperation
between the northern parts of the Nordic countries and Russia drastically
improved over the years and allowed for the creation of a governance frame-
work to improve the human security of its inhabitants. As mentioned by
Former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, Bjorn Thore Godal,
throughout most of history … a regional identity emerged, a sense of
common destiny among peoples sharing the experience of trying to make
a living in harsh surroundings.
(Godal 1996)
In practice, this has contributed to foster peace and stability in the region and
laid the ground for the creation of a political region. Today, despite growing
tension between Russia and the West, speciﬁcally the USA and European
Union, and the consequent decrease in activities of Arctic cooperation since
2014 as a consequence of the crisis in Ukraine, cooperation in the Barents
Region still stands strong in promoting the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the
region.
Against this background, it is the aim of this chapter to describe and analyse
inter-regional cooperation in the European Arctic. More speciﬁcally, the
objective of this chapter is to provide a contextual background describing the
major characteristics that led to the establishment of the Barents cooperation.
While the assessment of this development for improving human security in
the region is mostly left to the following chapters, the last section concludes
with some remarks about the speciﬁc identity of the Barents Region as a
special ‘community’ within the Arctic Region, as well as the importance of
the interregional cooperation to strengthen human security in the region.
1 Geography and demography of the Barents Region
The Barents Region covers an area of 1.75 million square kilometres (about
three times the size of France), which extends from Lofoten in Norway in the
west to the Russian coal-mining town of Vorkuta in the east, and from Lake
Ladoga in the Russian Karelia in the south to Nordkapp in the North.2
The Barents Region includes lands and territories situated in the northernmost
parts of the continental Europe on the southern coast of the Barents Sea, and
consists of the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland, and the
northwestern regions of the Russian Federation. The Barents Sea, named
after a Dutch explorer, Willem Barentsz who undertook three Arctic expedi-
tions searching for the North West Passage in the sixteenth century, does not,
however, include the oﬃcial Barents Region. As a political region, the Barents
Figure 1.2.1 Maps of the Barents Region by the Barents Norwegian Secretariat
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area comprises the land along the coast of the Barents Sea but does not
include cooperation over the sea. This is mostly due to unsettled sovereignty
issues between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea (Carrillo 1998, 21).
From a geographic perspective, the Barents Region constitutes parts of the
Arctic and sub-Arctic regions which share a number of physical features. The
Kirkenes Declaration (1993) which created the Barents Euro-Arctic Council
notes that these include a ‘harsh climate, sparse population and vast territory’.3
To this could be added physical features such as large swathes of Arctic
tundra, polar night and midnight sun and areas of permafrost. There are
however, a number of diﬀerences, particularly between the Nordic countries
and Russia, such as living standards, language, culture, religion, history and
political traditions (Zimmerbauer 2012, 94). The Barents Region is located at
the intersection between eastern and western culture, between Catholic and
Orthodox Christianity (nowadays Lutheran and Orthodox), and conse-
quently, the population also shares diﬀerent languages, cultural and religious
traditions. Furthermore, it is a region that is culturally diverse with diﬀerent
livelihood systems.
The Barents Region is a home to 5.23 million people, the Finns, Norwegians,
Russians, Swedes and a number of indigenous people groups. Among the
inhabitants of the region, the Sami, the Nenets and the Veps account for the
indigenous peoples living in the region.4 These peoples have much maintained
their traditional way of life with diﬀerent usage of local resources, which were
established before nation-states were formed. The most populous of them, the
Sami people, are comprised of approximately 70 000–90 000 people living
across Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Kola Peninsula, Russia. The Sami
communities remain closely attached to their traditional livelihoods including
ﬁshing, hunting, reindeer herding and berry picking. It is estimated that
10 per cent of the Sami population is still involved in herding-grazing activities
on a fulltime basis. Indeed, their cultural, economic and political development
remains a core issue in the region, and for this reason, the protection of the
lands and resources of the traditional Sami territory – Sapmi – across the
northern borders of the four states of Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia
are of utmost importance. In all three Nordic countries, the Sami people have
their own assemblies to represent their interest at the state level and in Russia
they are recognised as indigenous peoples. Despite state borders, the Sami
people have maintained a common history, culture, language and traditions,
and their relations have increased since the end of the Cold War through the
development of political and cultural cooperation.
In addition, the Veps, who live in the southern part of the Republic of Karelia
and in remote parts of the Leningrad and Vologda Oblasts, form another indi-
genous minority of approximately 8200 people according to the 2002 census
(barentsinfo.org, 2017). While agriculture was always at the heart of their liveli-
hoods, most of the traditional occupations of the Veps have today vanished
(Kolga 2001). Finally, the Nenets are the most numerous indigenous people in
the Russian Federation. In the Barents Region they form a minority of about
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41 000 people living in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Arkhangelsk Oblast,
Komi Republic and Murmansk Oblast. Today, the majority of the Nenets live in
rural communities and are engaged in agricultural sector, in education and
health care. In addition, 14 per cent of the Nenets work in reindeer herding,
which are still migrating while other have settled in villages. On the whole, the
rural population of the Nenets has to count on local renewable resources to ful-
ﬁll their needs, though it is said that ‘the local economic situation has improved
thanks to high revenues from oil and gas development’ (Tuisku 2004).
In this context, national integration accompanied by modernisation and
industrialisation processes have raised tensions and conﬂicts of interests
between peoples and their livelihoods at regional and local levels. While parts
of indigenous peoples groups often follow a traditional lifestyle, engaging in
activities such as reindeer husbandry and subsistence ﬁshing, there is also a
highly skilled workforce in the region, which exploits the rich forestry, mineral,
oil, gas, ﬁshing and even diamond resources.5 It is signiﬁcant that not many
other parts of Europe have access to the amount of forests, ﬁsh, oil and gas
and other minerals present in the region. This has raised both growing con-
cerns regarding the environment, and has sparked important economic and
business interests in the region. Large mining sites have been exploited for
decades in the Barents Region. Recently, the region has also received interest
due to the discovery of several important natural gas and oil deposits in the
Barents Sea and Petsoran Sea.
All in all, the Barents Region is extremely rich in minerals and while extractive
industries cause controversy through their impact on the environment and
livelihoods of local communities, they are important for the development of
the region. Finally, renewable resources are also important, as Nordic counties
of the Barents Region have large hydropower resources and are currently
investing in massive wind power energy projects to meet the demand for
sustainable energy production and consumption.6
All these elements constitute the foundations for economic, social and cultural
development in the Barents Region and the markers for its speciﬁc identity.
2 The history of the Barents Region7
The history of the European Arctic, today the Barents Region, is that of
colonisation, state expansion and cooperation. Until the 13th century the states’
inﬂuence was small, and the region ‘was uncharted territory totally without
borders, taxation, conscription and other traits of nation states’ (Gyllenhaal
2017). Between the 13th and 20th centuries, the region was subject to many
geopolitical changes, mostly caused by hegemonic power struggles between
diﬀerent sovereigns. Only indigenous peoples, mostly nomadic, and small
groups of hunters and ﬁshermen from the Nordic countries and Novgorod
lived within the region. Most of these groups adapted to the environmental
conditions, possessed diﬀerent cultures and interacted to some extent with
each other. The absence of any homogenous population, still today, raises
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some diﬃculty for addressing the history of the Barents Region. Yet, the
impact of the colonisation process, the conﬂicts between nation-states and the
establishment of cooperation across state borders have forged a unique his-
torical relationship for the inhabitants of the region, which have helped to
shape the contours of a distinct society.
The colonisation of the Arctic region approximately began when non-
indigenous populations moved in the region and accentuated trade and cultural
relations with local communities. During the 14th century, the local popula-
tion also became the target of royal taxation and the inﬂuence of the church
increased. The colonisation process led to the establishment of competing
areas of authorities between local settlements and the kingdoms of Sweden,
Norway and Novgorod.8 For indigenous communities, the colonisation of the
Arctic also meant their connection to national political structures, including
rules of taxation, laws and control over local resources. The colonisation
process triggered important changes in the governance of the region, accom-
panied by major societal transformations fuelled by trade, industrial and
cultural developments. Historically, this process accelerated in the more
accessible Barents Region during the 16th century while, by comparison, the
Canadian Arctic remained relatively isolated until the mid-1900s.
With a focus on territorial control as a key element to strengthen sover-
eignty, the expansion of nation-states also spurred conﬂict in the region.
Between the 13th and 20th centuries, the countries that today consist of
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia were involved in various struggles for
supremacy in the governance of the population, land and resources of the
region. From 1397 until 1523 all the Nordic countries and nations were
governed under one kingdom, the Kalmar Union. During part of this
period, Sweden was a European great power. From 1523–1814 Nordic
governance consisted of two main states. Denmark ruled Norway, Iceland,
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and Sweden ruled Finland from the 12th
century until Russia ﬁnally won control in 1809. In 1814, Norway became
part of a union with Sweden, lasting until 1905 when Norway gained inde-
pendence. In 1917, the October Revolution created Soviet Russia. In the
same year, Finland was able to use the chaos caused by the First World War
and the Bolshevik revolution to declare its full independence. The Second
World War, with human catastrophes and losses of inhabitants, meant
extensive geopolitical changes in the Barents Region. Despite two wars,
Finland remained independent but was partly destroyed and lost large
territories to Russia, such as the Petsamo region, which was only regained in
1920. Norway managed to keep its independence as well, even though Nazi
Germany occupied the whole country and used it, as well as Petsamo, as a
convenient launching point for the failed attack on the Russian city of
Murmansk. The Soviet Union was the main target of Nazi Germany in the
European Arctic. Supported by the Allies and their material assistance, such
as maritime escorts to Murmansk, the Soviet Union survived the siege,
though with important casualties.
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During the Second World War, the northernmost areas of Europe became a
place of great geopolitical signiﬁcance, especially as the German troops
occupied Norway and Svalbard, and were in charge of the Northern Front of
Finland (comprising half of the Finnish territory). With the Finnish-Russian
peace treaty ceding the Petsamo border region to Russia, Norway found itself
beside a closed border with the Soviet Union and with a large military pre-
sence next door. After the Second World War, the Kola Peninsula was indus-
trialised and militarised, transformed into a platform for industrial and
military activities with a stockpile of both conventional and nuclear weapons
as an important part of the military competition between the USSR and the
USA. As a consequence, traditional interaction in the northern areas became
even more diﬃcult, especially considering that there was almost no access
across the border from Finland or Norway into or out of the Soviet Union
from the late 1940s until the fall of the Soviet Union. This situation conse-
quently underlined an East–West divide that was practically impossible to
overcome until the end of the Cold War.
At the same time, Nordic states began to increase trans-border cooperation
to strengthen the integration and development of their northern areas. In
1952, the Nordic Council was established. This inter-parliamentary institution
has been instrumental in facilitating contact between peoples and developing
a sense of aﬃnity between them.9 The Nordic Council’s ﬁrst real contribution
was the establishment of a common labour market and a free visa zone for
citizens. In order to further cooperation between Nordic states, the inter-
governmental forum of the Nordic Council of Ministers was also established
in 1971 to complement the activities of the Nordic Council. In 1967, the
northernmost counties of Finland, Norway and Sweden also established the
North Calotte Committee as a forum for Nordic cooperation in the North
Calotte, to further cross boundary exchanges and cooperation in the ﬁeld of
regional policies, local economic development, culture and art.
Following stronger cooperation between Norway, Finland and Sweden,
their collective relations with the Soviet Union also evolved. Although ten-
sions between the two blocs remained, possible modes to integrate the Soviet
border regions within the inter-regional cooperation of the North Calotte
region were discussed. Starting in 1964, cultural meetings such as the North
Calotte Peace Days were organised under the auspices of peace and friend-
ship, and to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Various forms of
cultural co-operation and the increase of individual contacts also accom-
panied such meetings across the Iron Curtain (Elenius et al. 2015, 341–343;
also Heininen 1999a, 1999b, 107–198).
3 The forerunners of the Barents cooperation: peace and
environmental collaboration
In 1985, perestroika opened a new window of opportunity to facilitate coop-
eration across the East–West border. In October 1987, the Soviet leader
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Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech in Murmansk and proclaimed the Arctic a
zone of peace. This event was fundamental to the transformation of the
region, constituting the beginning of a new phase in the history of its population.
As a result of these new opportunities, the organisation of international peace
and environmental events, many of which were Nordic-Russian, took place in
the summer of 1988 in Murmansk. Thus, in spite of the Cold War cleavage,
and due to the rich tradition of regional cooperation such as the Pomor
Trade, ‘it was during this period that the seeds of the future Barents were
sown’ (Elenius et al. 2015, 365) and that cooperation in this sub-arctic region
begun its journey.
In his speech, Mikhail Gorbachev (Pravda 1987) made concrete initiatives
outlining a goal to establish a nuclear-free zone and ‘zone of peace’ in the
(European) Arctic. Among the initiatives were measures that included a
restriction of naval and air force activities in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian
and Greenland Seas and the promotion of conﬁdence-building measures
in those areas, cooperation on resource development, the organisation of an
international conference on Arctic scientiﬁc research coordination, and
cooperation in environmental protection.
The Murmansk speech was followed by immediate negative and positive
reactions as well as a series of diplomatic discussions and negotiations to
ensure peace and stability in the region and to increase functional coopera-
tion. Due to long-range and regional pollution, in particular radioactivity,
concern for the environment resurged in the 1980s as the subject of a number
of diﬀerent threats in the Barents Region, as well as the entire Arctic (e.g.,
Heininen and Lomagin 2017). Mostly emanating from the Russian side of the
Barents Sea, nuclear safety and air pollution became a signiﬁcant concern
and threat, particularly to Norway.10 As a result, the environment became a
new security issue in the region and the main target of a new international
cooperative framework, negotiation for the adoption of the Arctic Environ-
mental Protection Strategy (AEPS), began in 1989. It culminated in 1991 with
the adoption in Rovaniemi of a common document signed by the govern-
ments of the eight Arctic states and Arctic indigenous peoples’ organisations.
This non-binding agreement was the ﬁrst major political achievement after
the Cold War and marked the introduction of an Arctic dimension into
Northern European politics.
Building on the AEPS and need to enhance collaboration at the regional
level, new governance structures were also created to support this cooperation
including the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) established in 1993 and
the Arctic Council established in 1996. The ﬁrst step towards the creation of
the Arctic Council occurred in the late 1980s and was accelerated in 1991
after the AEPS was signed. After several years of meeting, the 1996 Ottawa
Declaration formally established the Arctic Council as an inter-governmental
forum for promoting cooperation among the Arctic States – Canada, the
United States, Russia, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway and Finland –
with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities, but excluding
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representations of other Arctic inhabitants and sub-national governments.
The mandate of the Arctic Council focuses essentially on increasing coopera-
tion in the domain of environmental protection and sustainable development,
leaving military issues aside as too sensitive issues.
The creation of these new regional structures set the stage for deﬁning the
Arctic region and the Barents Region as distinctive, international political
regions (Young 1996; Käkönen 1996; Artic Council 2004; Griﬃths 1988;
Heininen 2009). This was also meant to stabilise the post-Cold War Arctic
and institutionalise interstate relations in the Arctic region, as well as develop
a new governance framework for reinforcing functional cooperation among
Arctic countries, regions and sub-regions.
4 The institutionalisation of the Barents Region’s cooperation
In December 1991, the Soviet Union ﬁnally collapsed, and the international
geopolitical landscape changed. With it came the opportunity for the Nordic
countries to reassess their foreign policies to work with, rather than against,
Russia with the ultimate aim of decreasing military tension from the Cold
War period and increasing political stability in the European North, as well as
the entire Arctic Region (e.g. Heininen 2009). The Norwegian Foreign Minister,
Thorvald Stoltenberg, ﬁrst proposed the concept of regional cooperation to
his Russian counterpart, Andrei Kozyrev as early as March 1992, a mere
three months after the Soviet Union was formally dissolved (Stokke and
Tunander 1994, 1). His proposal was based on the experience of the Baltic
Sea cooperation and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). In April 1992,
the governors of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk provinces in Russia were
invited to a meeting in Tromsø to discuss possible cooperation. In January
1993, a joint conference of the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden, Fin-
land and Russia took place in Kirkenes just beside the Norwegian-Russian
border. It was at this ministerial meeting that the Barents Euro-Arctic
Region, as well as intergovernmental and interregional cooperation on the
region, was formally established.11
The Kirkenes Declaration was signed in January 1993 in Kirkenes, and set
out the objectives and purposes of the cooperation. It listed ‘environmental
protection’ in line with the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and
‘sustainable development’ in line with the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, as the main objectives of the collaboration. Further, while
participants of the cooperation indicated ‘that the environmental dimension
must be fully integrated into all activities in the Region’, other areas of
cooperation are also listed in the document, such as economic cooperation,
science and technology, regional infrastructure, tourism, education and cultural
exchange.
In relation to economic cooperation, the Kirkenes Declaration also makes
clear that the environment should be preserved and that ‘the principles of envir-
onmental soundness and sustainability in all ﬁelds of economic co-operation’
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should be observed. Finally, the cooperation speciﬁcally targets the situation
of indigenous peoples, notably in support of the restoration and preservation
of Nenets and Sami cultures, and stresses that ‘wider human contacts and
increased cultural co-operation in the Region should be encouraged to pro-
mote constructive co-operation and good neighbourly relations’. Overall,
cross-border relations, with an aim to increase mutual conﬁdence, are at the
centre of the cooperation.
From a functional perspective, the Barents cooperation operates at diﬀerent
levels, on a dual level structure, which involves both national and regional
governments.
Firstly, at the national level, there is the Barents Euro-Arctic Council
(BEAC), an intergovernmental forum with the purpose ‘to serve as a forum
for cooperation among the participants’.12 The BEAC is made up of the
Foreign Ministers of member countries, Denmark Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Russia, Sweden and the European Union’s Commission. There are also nine
countries with observer status: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.13
The chairmanship of the Council rotates between Finland, Norway, Russia and
Sweden with each country holding the chair for two years at a time.14 For
example, for the period 2015–2017 the chairmanship was being held by
Russia, and for 2017–2019 it is being held by Sweden.15 Initially the BEAC
met annually, but in recent years, it meets biennially. Between meetings, the
Committee of Senior Oﬃcials deals with administrative matters. This committee
is made up of civil servants from the member states and from the European
Commission, and meets regularly to consider progress and to establish working
groups on various topics relevant to the cooperation.16
Second, at the regional level, there is the Barents Regional Council (BRC)
as a parallel body for interregional cooperation. While the BRC initially
included seven member regions, today it comprises 14 member counties and a
representative of the indigenous peoples in the northernmost parts of Finland,
Norway and Sweden and northwest Russia.17 The most recent member to
join was the Finnish county of North Karelia, which was approved as a
member in November 2016, having held observer status for many years.
There are also two organisations with observer status: The Council of Christian
Churches in the Barents Region and The Parliamentary Association of North
West Russia.18 With the same purposes as the BEAC, the BRC has a mandate
to support and promote cooperation and development in the Barents Region.
The purpose of the BRC is also to recognise and share local knowledge and
to provide the opportunity to identify and work on cooperative projects. The
chairmanship of the Regional Council rotates between the countries in
Norway, Sweden, Russia and Finland every two years with the provision that
the same country cannot chair both the interregional council and the inter-
national council at the same time.19 The executive body of the BRC is the
Barents Regional Committee, which is composed of civil servants from the
member counties.
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Furthermore, 15 working groups have been established to enhance coop-
eration on issues relevant to the Barents Region. Each working group is able
to enhance cooperation in its area of expertise and coordinates projects across
the Barents Region. Some of the working groups, such as the Working Group
on Environment and the Joint Committee on Rescue Cooperation, are working
groups established by the BEAC. Correspondingly, the BRC has established
others, such as the Regional Committee on Environment and the Regional
Working Group on Transport and Logistics. There are also a number of joint
working groups, including the Joint Working Group on Energy and the Joint
Working Group on Youth.
As part of these, the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples (WGIP)
established in 1995 on a permanent basis. It is composed of representatives of
the Sami, the Nenets and the Veps of the Barents Region. On a daily basis, the
main goal of the WGIP is ‘to secure indigenous peoples’ rights, foundation for
trade, society, culture and language through implementation of the Action
Plan of Indigenous Peoples’ (WGIP 2017, 7), which constitutes WGIP’s
policy development framework.20 The 2017 Action Plan lists diﬀerent issues
and a set of measures to implement in order to secure indigenous peoples’
rights.21 With this action plan, the WGIP sets the priorities of indigenous
peoples in the region and can advise the BEAC or the BRC when they initiate
projects concerning them. Unlike other regional working groups, in addition
to its operational role, the WGIP has also an advisory role to both the BEAC
and the BRC, which consequently gives it a political dimension. The chair of
the WGIP sits also as a member of the Committee of Senior Oﬃcials in the
BEAC and the Barents Regional Committee, which gives the WGIP a per-
manent right to attend all meetings organised by the councils. Thus, WGIP
constitutes an important platform for indigenous organisations to strengthen
their political stance at the regional level, as well as to enhance their coop-
eration with the national, regional and local authorities of the Barents
Region’s countries and counties (WGIP 2017, 7).
5 The development of the Barents cooperation, its achievements
and challenges
Those who established the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and signed the 1993
Kirkenes Declaration hoped that cooperation would lead to stability, pro-
gress, peace and security throughout the region and eventually promote the
wellbeing of the entire population. To celebrate its twentieth anniversary, the
Barents countries adopted a new declaration at the Barents Summit in 2013.
In the document (Kirkenes Declaration 2013) all states reaﬃrmed their com-
mitments to the cooperation, which is justiﬁed by ‘the important role the
Barents cooperation has played in strengthening mutual trust, stability and
security in Europe, by joint eﬀorts in northern Europe based on the shared
commitment to indivisible and comprehensive security’. Twenty years after its
establishment, these renewed statements certainly demonstrate that the
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cooperation is still playing an important role in the enhancement of security
and cooperation in the region. In fact, as an outcome of this development,
the Barents Region is also no longer a periphery of Europe, as it was before
1993, and ‘the demand for cooperation is greater today than ever’ (Kirkenes
Declaration 2013).
During these 20 years the geopolitical situation of the Barents Region, as
well as the entire Arctic, has signiﬁcantly changed from confrontation during the
Cold War period, when the Barents Sea area was mostly a military ‘theater’, to
an international, much more functional, cooperation (see Heininen and
Lomagin 2017, 269–274). In the 2010s there are two main developments or
tendencies. On the one hand, the Arctic region, with high geopolitical stability,
is globalised and impacted by grand environmental challenges, in particular
(rapid) climate change, and interests and plans for mass-scale exploitation of
natural resources located in the region. On the other hand, there is geopo-
litical tension between Russia and the West (in particular the USA and the
EU) much due to the Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian
crisis/war.
However, despite this tension and colder political climate between the
Arctic states, the Barents Region’s oﬃcial and unoﬃcial cooperation remains
largely unaﬀected. Behind this lies Arctic ‘exceptionalism’, as high geopolitical
stability in the Arctic remains and is resilient (see Heininen 2016). In fact, it
has been suggested that ‘the Arctic to this point remained largely insulated
from wider geopolitical issues following 2014 – and in some cases cooperation
has deepened’ (Cliﬀord 2017) and contacts between regional and local repre-
sentatives still goes on (Nilsen 2016a). Compared to the Baltic Sea Region, it
was also stressed that in the Barents Region, ‘it is not as high tension’ and
that there is ‘good cooperation with Russia on a lot of common areas and issues
of importance’ (Nilsen 2016b). As a result, the Barents regional cooperation
stands strong (at the moment), and even in this diﬃcult geopolitical context,
it continues to promote the development of the region across national borders.
Regarding its achievement, over the last twenty years, the cooperation in
the Barents Region has led to the sharing of expertise, technology, ﬁnances
and other resources which has resulted in a number of improvements to
the environment for the beneﬁt of the whole of the region and, as a result, to the
security of the people in the region. Although the environmental threats have
not yet been completely eradicated (see Chapter 2.1), thanks to the cooperation
the threat of major environmental disasters, with all the implications for the
environment and for human security, has been dramatically reduced. There
have also been a number of cultural, educational and other projects with an
aim to bring the people(s) of the Barents Region together, some organised by
the formal institutions of the Barents Region, others merely as a result of
increased community cooperation. These include exhibitions and festivals,
such as the Barents Spektakel 2016, an impressive display of art, ﬁlm, work-
shops, seminars, music and sport in the nearby towns of Kirkenes (Norway)
and Nikel (Russia); and the Calotte Academy, an annual academic gathering
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and travelling symposium for scientiﬁc work and open discussion to implement
the interplay between science and politics (e.g. Final Report of the 2016 Calotte
Academy, Huotari et al. 2016). Other projects include student exchanges, a
multi-stage ski race dubbed the ‘Tour de Barents’ and a health programme
specialising in tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS (e.g. Wilson Rowe 2009, 35–52).
In 2016, the Ministers of Culture of the member states announced funding for
a number of scholarships across the region to foster cultural cooperation.
However, there are, also weaknesses, uncertainties and criticism regarding
the Barents cooperation. These notably relate to the fact that cooperation is
neither deep enough nor is there a common historical-cultural identity. As
Zimmerbaur (2012) argues ‘the idea of [the] region as an imagined community
is stronger elsewhere than in situ’. It can also be questioned how much activities
and tasks are currently performed under the auspices of each working groups.
The development of new projects to further cooperation is highly dependent
on resources and national support, which are manifestly insuﬃcient to support
cooperation. Currently, ‘the majority of Barents Region consider the current
level of ﬁnancing insuﬃcient for their joint activities’ and to ﬁnance every day
work (BEAC 2015, 7). The main issue in ﬁnancing the Barents cooperation
relates to a ‘lack of ﬁnancial mechanisms that would encompass the whole
Barents Region’. This situation ‘prevents regional actors from developing
geographically-wide projects and leads to unequal access to ﬁnancial oppor-
tunities of diﬀerent regions’ (BEAC 2015, 43). In addition, non-governmental
organisations and other civil society actors have also indicated that ﬁnancial
support remains insuﬃcient in supporting small-scale activities (BEAC 2015,
51). Thus, it seems that cooperation could be improved if more funding was
made available.
Furthermore, while the working groups and programme developed under
the auspices of the Barents cooperation have obtained tangible results in
reinforcing cross borders ties and relations, there are still issues that continue
to challenge the wellbeing of the Barents population that have not been
addressed institutionally. As already mentioned, this includes the grand scale
of environmental challenges, in particular the impact of global warming and
the development of natural resources located in the region. In addition,
whereas the Ukrainian crisis has not aﬀected the Barents cooperation directly,
it has strained the economic development of the region and increased political
tensions between states, a topic that is largely outside the purview of the
Barents cooperation. Thus, any real assessment of the Barents situation
cannot be fully examined through the lens of the existing cooperation frame-
work. To this degree, there is an entire human experience that exists beyond
the cooperation institutions.
Therefore, while the wellbeing of peoples of the region constitutes the
overriding goal of the Barents cooperation, and collaboration has enabled
better cross-border relations over the years, there is a continuous need to
consolidate cooperation in addressing present and emerging societal challenges.
Against this background, the following chapters intend to assess the
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challenges faced by the Barents population in relation to several human
security issues in order to assess how regional cooperation can address the
populations’ interests and wellbeing.
Conclusion
Since its establishment, the vision of the Barents Region’s cooperation has been
‘to improve peoples’ living conditions, to encourage sustainable social and
economic development, and to have a peaceful and sustainable development in
the northernmost part of Europe’ (BRC 2014, 6). The Kirkenes Declaration
has been the basis for the establishment of a comprehensive framework to
ensure functional cooperation in many ﬁelds, excluding military-security, such
as the environment, economy, human health, tourism and cultural interaction.
Despite occasional tensions between the governments of Russia and the
Nordic countries, the contacts between sub-national governments of, and
regional capitals in, the Barents Region have remained, and contacts between
peoples and civil societies continue to be supported through the institutional
mechanisms that have been created for enhancing cooperation in the region
(e.g., Nilsen 2016a). This precisely accords to the ultimate aim of region-
building with states as major actors – one of the main trends of the post-Cold
War Arctic IR and geopolitics (Artic Council 2004) – i.e. the establishment of
the BEAR as an international, cooperative region located in the former military
theatre of the Cold War. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that from the
point of view of the states, the main objective has been completed, even
though other objectives, such as sustainable development require more eﬀorts
(Heininen 2009).
In eﬀect, the Barents cooperation continues to operate as an institutional
forum to promote dialogue and concrete cooperation with the purpose of
strengthening regional stability, sustainable development and the wellbeing of
the Barents population. The Barents cooperation is truly an achievement,
especially considering the historic context of the Cold War. The borders of
the socialist Soviet Union were closed through much of the 20th century,
and there was very little contact or cooperation across the national borders of
the countries surrounding the Barents Sea, and with the open, democratic
Nordic countries in the West. Such an achievement highlights the deep value
of, and commitment to, mutually beneﬁcial cooperation across borders.
Indeed, for centuries the populations of the Barents Sea area have been closely
intertwined through trade and cultural exchanges, as the Pomor Trade era
well shows. Behind this, the peoples of the region share several features that
were similar, especially for indigenous peoples and settlers, whose families
have lived there for centuries. A problem of the past was that there were few,
if any, opportunities for those living on either side of the border to meet or to
share culture or expertise during most of the 20th century. Despite this, it is
evident that the population has established strong relations under the auspices
of the Barents cooperation.
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As argued, one of the key motives for cooperation between the countries in
the Barents Region was the desire to ensure the wellbeing of the population
across the borders that separate them by consolidating cooperation in key
areas of issues relevant to the region. Despite criticism that the interregional
cooperation is not deep enough, or that the region lacks cultural identity or
ﬁnancial resources, the work of the two Barents Councils shows there is an
ever-growing amount of cooperation among the countries of, and counties in,
the Barents Region. This ranges across diverse sectors such as youth, culture
and human health to tourism and transport, and has strengthened the societal
bonds of the Barents Region’s populations. The sharing of ideas, expertise and
resources has led to improvements in standards of living across the region.
Alongside the exchange of culture and ideas, higher living standards and
increased economic opportunities for all ensures greater levels of economic
and political stability which promotes human security.
Every time a project results in the collaboration between previously oppo-
nent countries, it leads to greater levels of understanding and cooperation.
This form of cooperation is cumulative, and contributes to increased levels of
peace and security within the region. While the Barents cooperation certainly
faces a number of challenges, it remains an important framework to enhance
human security among its civil societies and to strengthen the societal bonds
of its peoples. Indeed, the Barents Region is a society with shared human
security concerns.
Notes
1 For more information about the Barents Region see Olsson et al. (2016), The
Encyclopedia of The Barents Region.
2 www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Facts (visited on 6 October 2016).
3 Declaration of Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Conference of
Foreign Ministers in Kirkenes, 11 January 1993.
4 www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Facts visited on (6 October 2016).
5 Webpage of the Barents Council: www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Facts (visited
on 7 March 2017).
6 In Norway, nearly 100% of the electricity demand is produced locally with hydro-
power in the counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. Since the beginning of
the 21st century, Sweden is also investing in major wind power development pro-
jects, especially in the counties of Norrbotten and Vasterbotten. While Finland is
also following a similar trend, Russia lags behind in term of investment concerning
renewable energy.
7 For more detailed information about the history of the Barents see Elenius et al.
(2015) and Olsson et al. (2016).
8 At that time, King Magnus Karl Eriksson jointly ruled the territory of Norway
and Sweden but the kingdom remains politically distinct.
9 Webpage of the Nordic Co-operation: www.norden.org/en/fakta-om-norden-1/his
tory-of-the-nordic-region/ﬁve-welfare-states-in-a-global-world-1920 (visited on 7
March 2017).
10 By the time the Soviet Union ended, northwest Russia was the most highly nucle-
arized region in the entire world. The city of Murmansk was home to the Russian
Northern Fleet, which controlled large numbers of nuclear submarines, and there
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were estimated to be at least 270 nuclear installations, both military and civil
situated in the region. There had been very little investment in the region and little
attention paid to quality or to safety during the ﬁnal years of the USSR, which
meant that the nuclear installations posed a huge environmental threat to the
entire region.
11 Declaration Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Conference of Foreign
Ministers in Kirkenes, 1993.
12 Annex to the Kirkenes Declaration Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic
Region Conference of Foreign Ministers Kirkenes, Norway, 11 January 1993
Terms of Reference for the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, art 1.
13 Administrative Manual for the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 17 June 2008.
14 Administrative Manual for the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 17 June 2008.
15 Webpage of the Barents Council: www.barentscooperation.org/en/Barents-Eur
o-Arctic-Council/Chairmanship (visited on 4 March 2017).
16 Administrative Manual for the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, June 17 2008
17 The Barents Region includes the following counties or their equivalents:
 in Finland: Kainuu, Lapland, Oulu Region and North Karelia.
 in Norway: Finnmark, Nordland and Troms
 in Russia: Arkhangelsk, Karelia, Komi, Murmansk and Nenets.
 in Sweden: Norrbotten and Västerbotten.
18 Barents Regional Council, Barents Regional Committee Terms of Reference
Adopted by the Barents Regional Council on November 14 2012 in Oslo, Norway.
19 Barents Regional Council, Barents Regional Committee Terms of Reference
Adopted by the Barents Regional Council on November 14th 2012 in Oslo,
Norway.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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Part II
Assessment

2.1 Environmental security in the
Barents Region
Sarah Mackie
Environmental security is vital to the future of the Barents Region and its
population, which relies on the environment for their food and water, their
health and their livelihoods. When the environment is damaged or harmed,
the security of human communities is threatened.
1 Deﬁnition
The idea that environmental security is a vital part of human security is not
new. In 1994 the United Nations Development Programme published the
Human Development Report which introduced the concept of human security
linked to factors other than conﬂict (UN Development Programme 1994).
Right from the very beginning, environmental security was included on the
list of seven categories of threats to human security (UN Development
Programme 1994).
Despite this, there are few formal deﬁnitions of environmental security. The
Millennium Project provided an overview of the deﬁnitions which existed at
the turn of the century. The report found no single agreed deﬁnition but the
authors created a synthesis deﬁnition which has since been widely used
(Glenn et al. 1997; Coskun et al. 2008; Hull et al. 2009). They deﬁned
environmental security as ‘environmental viability for life support with three
sub-elements: (1) preventing or repairing military damage to the environment;
(2) preventing or responding to environmentally caused conﬂicts; and (3) pro-
tecting the environment due to its inherent moral value’ (Glenn et al. 1997).
While this deﬁnition covers much of what is meant by environmental security,
it is not an exhaustive deﬁnition as it does not consider the requirement of
environmental security for food, health and livelihoods.
In 1994, the Russian Inter-Agency Commission on Environmental Security
adopted the following deﬁnition:
Environmental security is protectedness of natural environment and vital
interests of citizens, society, the state from internal and external impacts,
adverse processes and trends in development that threaten human health,
biodiversity and sustainable functioning of ecosystems, and survival of
humankind. Environmental security is an integral part of Russia’s national
security.
(Glenn et al. 1997; Russian Security Council 1996)
From a purely environmental point of view it includes biodiversity and sus-
tainable ecosystems and from a human security perspective it covers both
health and survival. It fails to consider livelihoods but is a broader and more
complete deﬁnition than the synthesis deﬁnition derived from the Millennium
Project (Glenn et al. 1997).
Taking the positive aspects of the deﬁnitions discussed above, this analysis
will work on the basis that environmental security means the protection of the
natural environment to ensure the sustainable functioning of ecosystems and
biodiversity both for the intrinsic value of nature and for the support of the
survival, health and livelihoods of both individuals and communities. Com-
munities which are environmentally secure will be less vulnerable to, and will
be able to survive, changes in their environmental surroundings.
2 Contextualisation
The environment of the Barents Region is remarkably diverse, covering as it
does Europe’s Arctic region, parts of Russia’s Arctic and areas of land which
lie south of the Arctic Circle (Barents Info 2017). The Barents Euro-Arctic
Council described the region as ‘compris[ing] most of the remaining pristine
wilderness areas in Europe. It has unique values of biodiversity, natural
resources and high recreational qualities’ (Barents Euro-Arctic Council 1994).
The region is wild and remote, icy, raw and often severe but is, at the same
time, exceptionally beautiful.
The southern part of the Barents Region is characterised by coniferous
forests while the north is predominantly unvegetated Arctic tundra in the east
and mountains in the west (Barents Info 2017; Olson et al. 2001). While the
climate of the Barents Region is cold, it is not the coldest part of the Arctic;
very little of the area falls within the 10°C isotherm in July (Przybylak 2015,
1–4). Winter temperatures are lowest in the east where the average tempera-
ture in January can reach −20°C and are warmest on the Norwegian coastline
which averages only −3°C in January (Rekacewicz 2005a).
The Barents Region is home to 5.3 million people (Barents Euro-Arctic
Council 2017a). Around 7% of the population is reliant on the natural envir-
onment for their livelihood, undertaking activities including hunting, ﬁshing,
reindeer herding and forestry (Plummer and Baird 2013). Other people sup-
plement their diet with food such as berries and mushrooms foraged from
their surroundings (Kozlov and Barcan 2000, 514, 516). For the indigenous
and non-indigenous populations, the environment is vital for both cultural
and economic reasons. Reindeer herding has a deeply cultural aspect to it
with the practice dating back thousands of years (Stammler 2005; UNESCO
2006). Other activities, such as berry picking, also have a signiﬁcant cultural
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element (Fryer et al. 2010, 16). A large, and ever increasing, part of the
economy of the Barents Region is based on tourism with the pristine wilderness
being one of the region’s major attractions (AMAP 2017a, 12; Stonehouse and
Snyder 2010).
3 Assessment of environmental security in the Barents Region
The Barents Region faces some severe environmental threats, in particular from
climate change, industrial pollution and the risk posed by nuclear contamination.
3.1 Climate change
There is little doubt that climate change is one of the most pressing environ-
mental threats currently facing the Arctic, both in the Barents Region and
beyond. There is now scientiﬁc consensus that climate change across the
planet is occurring and that it is caused by human activity (Pachauri et al.
2014). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (‘the IPCC’) reported
in 2014 that ‘[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the
1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to
millennia’ (Pachauri et al. 2014, 40).
While climate change is a global problem, temperatures in the Arctic are
rising almost twice as fast as temperatures in other parts of the world and, in
the foreseeable future, the impact of climate change is predicted to be greater
in the Arctic than in any other part of the planet (Solomon et al. 2007, chap. 4;
AMAP 2005). In 2011 the Snow, Water, Ice, Permafrost in the Arctic Report
(SWIPA) reported that substantial changes were being seen in the Arctic
environment (AMAP 2011, 22). The changes were so great that the report
concluded that earlier predictions made by the IPCC in 2007 had under-
estimated the likely rate of change, particularly in sea ice measurements
(IPCC 2007; AMAP 2011, chap. 9). The ﬁndings of SWIPA 2017 have made
it clear that changes in the Arctic are becoming increasingly dramatic.
Temperatures in the Arctic in recent years have been unprecedented, January
2016 being a full 5°C warmer than the average from 1981–2010 (AMAP
2017b, 10). According to the USA’s National Snow and Ice Data Centre,
seven of the months in 2016 showed the lowest sea ice extent since records
began 38 years ago (National Snow and Ice Data Center 2016). SWIPA 2011
reported that temperatures in the Arctic’s permafrost had risen by up to 2˚C
causing the southern limit of the permafrost to move north (AMAP 2011,
chap. 2). By 2017 even these concerning numbers had been exceeded, with
permafrost in the high Arctic 0.5°C warmer than had been recorded as
recently as 2007–2008 (AMAP 2017b, 66). It is now predicted that the Arctic
Ocean will be ice free in the summer within two decades (AMAP 2017b, viii).
Research shows that it is likely that the Barents Sea will be the ﬁrst Arctic sea
to be free of ice, not just in the summer but for the entire year by the middle
of the century (AMAP 2017a, 9). This will impact marine life, sea levels and
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weather patterns (AMAP 2017a, 9). On shore, the increasing temperatures will
see the northward movement of ‘species, pests and diseases’ which will have a
dramatic eﬀect on the food chain and the human societies (AMAP 2017a, 9).
As the Arctic warms, species which are adapted to the cold environment
and are unable to cope in a warmer climate will become extinct; warming
temperatures will also result in new predators moving into the Arctic areas
with a resultant risk to the species which will become prey (AMAP 2011).
Species already noted to be at risk include a number of mosses and lichens
and some small herbivores such as lemmings and voles which will also aﬀect
predators further up the food chain reliant on these species such as reindeer
(Larson et al. 2014, 1580). The vegetation in the area is changing with more
abundant deciduous shrubs and grasses being observed growing north of the
Arctic Circle (Larson et al. 2014, 1578–80). The tree line is moving steadily
north, displacing tundra in favour of boreal forest (Larson et al. 2014, 1570,
1580; AMAP 2011, chap. 12). The permafrost is melting, causing the land to
heave and then collapse as it melts and refreezes, changing the biochemical
make up of water in rivers and lakes and allowing greenhouse gases trapped
in the ice to be released, thereby adding to the overall warming eﬀect (Collins
et al. 2013, 1096; Larson et al. 2014, 1573, 1586). In almost every aspect of
the environment in the Barents Region changes are being seen and the rate of
change is likely to increase over the coming years.
There is a resulting threat to human security in the Barents Region and, in
particular, in the Arctic parts of the region. This is partly because of the speed
at which change is occurring and partly because the types of communities
found in the Barents Region (predominantly isolated, indigenous commu-
nities) have fewer adaptive choices than those located elsewhere (Larson et al.
2014, 1593–1596). These communities are well adapted to life in the cold and
their lifestyles have developed to allow them to thrive even in the harshest of
winters. As the temperatures rise, however, they are at risk of ﬂooding from
melting ice and snow, have fewer winter travelling opportunities and are at
increased risk of injury when they venture out on ice. Melting permafrost will
cause damage to vital community buildings in remote villages such as clinics
and schools and will threaten human health though the destruction of village
sanitation and food storage systems (Butler 2016). There is even a risk of
disease from the melting of previously frozen corpses as was recently experi-
enced by the Nenets people in Russia (Larson et al. 2014, 1582–1590; Siberian
Times 2016). The Sami and Nenets peoples who are reliant on reindeer herding
to feed their families and to provide income through the sale of skins and meat
have reported that increasing amounts of winter rain which, unlike snow, freezes
on contact with the ground is making it diﬃcult for reindeer herders to ﬁnd
grazing areas which are not coated in ice (Larson et al. 2014, 1581–1584;
AMAP 2011, chap. 10; Labba 2015).
There is an urgent need to work to prevent future changes in the region and
to ensure that any changes which do occur are kept to a minimum. While
much of the warming experienced in the Arctic is caused by global
40 Sarah Mackie
greenhouse gas emissions, the eﬀect of global warming is ampliﬁed in the
Arctic by the existence of surface black carbon deposits (Arctic Council 2013;
AMAP 2015). Black carbon is an atmospheric particle pollutant which, if it
falls on ice or snow, creates a black or dark patch on the ground which absorbs
more heat than the ice or snow would, further exacerbating the warming of the
Arctic (Arctic Council 2013; AMAP 2015). This particular eﬀect of black
carbon is fairly localised because it falls to earth close to where it is emitted so
carbon produced in or near the Arctic has a greater impact on the Arctic than
carbon emitted elsewhere (Arctic Council 2013; AMAP 2015). Sand et al. dis-
covered that black carbon emitted in the Arctic has a warming eﬀect that is ﬁve
times that of black carbon emissions from lower latitude areas and concluded
that black carbon deposits on snow account for two-thirds of the increase in
surface temperatures in the Arctic (Sand et al. 2013; AMAP 2015, 16).
One of the biggest contributors of black carbon in the Arctic is gas ﬂaring
(Stohl et al. 2013) which is the name given to the practice of burning oﬀ
unwanted hydrocarbon gases in the oil and gas industries. It is estimated that
gas ﬂaring accounts for 66% of the black carbon emitted above 66°N annually
and almost 80% of that emitted above 60°N during the winter when there are
fewer forest ﬁres (Stohl et al. 2013, 8836). This is in stark contrast to the global
ﬁgures where gas ﬂaring accounts for a mere 3% of the total black carbon
emissions (Stohl et al. 2013, 8836). Almost all of the high latitude gas ﬂaring
takes place in the Barents Region and eastern Russia (Stohl et al. 2013, 8836).
While black carbon emissions may not be the ﬁrst priority in the worldwide
ﬁght against climate change, the particular nature of the impact on the Arctic
and the way in which it causes an increase in temperature in the area in which
it is emitted means that it should be a priority for the Barents Region.
Alongside prevention of climate change, there is also a need to consider
how people and communities adapt to the changing circumstances as it is
unlikely that the changes being brought about by climate change can or will be
halted entirely. While indigenous communities have adapted to change in the
past, the fear is that the rate of change expected as a result of climate change,
combined with a lifestyle which is far more ‘circumscribed’ by political, social
and economic situations than it was in the past, will make adaptation diﬃcult
(Nuttall 2007). Plans need to be put in place in order to secure the environ-
ment both for its own sake and for those who rely on it; plans made and
implemented now may limit the temperature rises and also enable mitigation
and adaptation to occur before the situation in the Barents Region reaches
crisis point, preventing the human and environmental tragedies which could be
precipitated by climate change.
3.2 Industrial pollution
The environment of the Barents Region is also threatened by the pollution
that is emitted into the air and water sources by industrial sites situated within
the region. As a result of the proximity of the industrial areas to the borders
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of the countries which form the Barents Region, much of this pollution is
transboundary, causing environmental damage in countries which have no
control over the industrial site emitting the pollution.
3.2.1 Russia
The Kola Peninsula is renowned for its two major smelterworks in Nickle and
Monchegorsk. These smelterworks have traditionally been two of the largest
global emitters of sulphur dioxide (Kashulina et al. 1997). Acid rain, caused
by sulphur dioxide emissions, has had a large environmental impact on the
area surrounding the smelterworks, both in Russia and across the borders in
Norway and Finland, with environmental degradation, including the destruc-
tion of moss cover, damage to trees and forests, the death of ﬁsh and soil
erosion, widely reported (AMAP 2006; Kashulina et al. 1997; Norseth 1994;
Rekacewicz 2005b; Tuovinen et al. 1993). In 1991, the area surrounding the
smelterworks was dubbed ‘one of the world’s worst ecological situations’ and
a ‘technogenic wasteland’ because of the impact of acid rain on the local
environment (Kashulina et al. 1997; Kryuchkov 1990; Pulkkinen 1991). Both
of the smelterworks were designated as ‘Environmental Hot Spots’ and work
has been undertaken to reduce the level of sulphur dioxide emissions (Bam-
bukyak et al. 2013, 25–27). The emission levels at the Nickel smelterworks
have been signiﬁcantly reduced but it remains one of the largest air polluters
in the region and the continued levels of air pollution remain a threat to the
environment (Bambukyak et al. 2013, 25–26). At the Monchegorsk smelter-
works, investment of €122 million has brought the emissions within the
Maximum Allowable Emission levels and is leading to the regeneration of
ﬂora and fauna in the area (Bambukyak et al. 2013, 26–27).
Many of the industrial sites in north west Russia discharge waste water con-
taining pollution in the form of heavy metals and other contaminants into local
streams, rivers and lakes (Bambukyak et al. 2013, 23–24). An example of this is
found at the Apatit phosphate ore mine in the Murmansk region which dis-
charges contaminated water into nearby rivers and lakes (Bambukyak et al. 2013,
28–29). Work undertaken since 2003, including the construction of a mine water
treatment plant, has led to a reduction in the levels of aluminium and ﬂuorine in
the discharged water but the levels of contaminants remain above allowable levels
(Bambukyak et al. 2013, 28–29). Pollution of this kind disrupts the delicately
balanced ecosystems of the rivers and lakes and because contaminated water
carries the pollution downstream the impact can be widespread (Malinovsky
et al. 2002). Many of the contaminants being released are toxic to both ﬂora and
fauna, either directly or through accumulation over time (Moiseenko and
Kudryavtseva 2001). Evidence suggests that both plants and animals are parti-
cularly susceptible to the negative impact of toxins during the polar night as a
result of both the cold and the lack of light meaning that the eﬀect of the water
pollution on the local environment from the industrial sites on the Kola Peninsula
is ampliﬁed during the winter (Lemly 1996; Moiseenko 1999, 37).
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3.2.2 Norway
Industrial pollution is not just a problem in northwest Russia; there have been
recent controversies in the Nordic countries as well. In December 2016, the
Norwegian government upheld a permitting decision allowing a mining
company to open a copper mine in the Nussir and Ulveryggen mountains
in the Kvalsund municipality in the far north of Norway (Klima-og
miljødepartementet 2016). The permit has been controversial because it will
allow the company to dispose of mine tailings in the nearby Reppar Fjord
(Staalesen 2016). Norway is one of only three countries in the world which
allow mining waste to be put into the sea (Nilsen 2016b). The permit issued
in this case will allow up to eight square kilometres of the nearby fjord to be
ﬁlled with mining waste prompting protests from the local Sami community
and environmental groups (Staalesen 2016). The organisations Natur og
Ungdom and Naturvernforbundet issued a joint statement appealing the
decision which said that they ‘fear[ed] that the implementation of the project
will be the largest pollution scandal in Norway’ and highlighted, inter alia, the
risk of heavy metal leaching and the impact of this on Sami reindeer herders
(Natur og Ungdom and Naturvernforbundet 2015). Despite these protests the
Minister for Climate and the Environment upheld the issuing of the permit
(Klima-og miljødepartementet 2016). It is not Norway’s ﬁrst permit allowing
disposal of mining waste in the Arctic Oceans; in the northeastern part of
Norway, another company, Sydvaranger, which mines for iron ore, is allowed
to dispose of mining waste in the waters of the Bøkfjord near the town of
Kirkenes on the Norwegian Russian border (Nilsen 2014).
3.2.3 Sweden
In Sweden, the Blaiken mine located in Västerbotten county is leaking heavy
metals (lead, copper and zinc) into the local environment. Blaiken mine was
an open cast gold, and later zinc, mine which was abandoned by its owners,
ScanMining, in 2007 (Granqvist 2016). The mine is currently leaking heavy
metals into the nearby Lake Storjuktan, destroying the ﬂora and fauna of the
lake (Granqvist 2016, 2014). The company, now bankrupt, had set aside three
million Swedish krona to pay for clean-up but it is estimated that amelioration
will cost the Swedish taxpayer 200 million Swedish krone (Granqvist 2016,
2014). Svärtträsk mine, owned by the same company and located only thirty
kilometres from Blaiken mine, is leaking contaminated water into a nearby
river (Granqvist 2014).
3.2.4 Finland
In Kainuu region, Finland, the Talvivaara mine has proved to be one of the
biggest environmental disasters in Finland. Talvivaara is an open pit mine
located in Sotkamo with deposits of uranium, nickel and zinc among other
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metals. Between 2010 and 2013, the mine suﬀered from three leaks from its
gypsum pools, each discharging uranium, nickel and other heavy metals into
the surrounding rivers and lakes (Bedford 2015). In 2012, a large number of
dead birds were found near one of the mine’s waste ponds and a member of
staﬀ was killed as a result of hydrogen sulphide poisoning (Bedford 2015).
Noxious dust, fumes and water pollution from the mine are estimated to have
spread up to 100km (Bedford 2015). The mining company had acted in
breach of their permit and three senior managers of the company as well as
the bankrupt company itself were prosecuted for environmental crimes (Mines
and Communities 2016).
3.2.5 Impact on human security
When air or water is polluted or when acid rain and other pollutants damage
the land and the forests and erode the soil, there is a resulting eﬀect on
the health of the people who rely on those resources. Air pollution from the
industrial sites in north west Russia has been reported to have caused
respiratory problems and increased mortality rates from cardiovascular and
circulatory diseases as well as cancer (Nieminen et al. 2013; Norseth 1994,
106–107; Pasanen et al. 2012; Revich 1995). Where water sources which are
used for drinking water are polluted, the local community must either ﬁnd
alternative drinking water sources or drink the polluted water and risk any
potential health consequences. Pollution in water can enter the food chain
causing health problems to those who ﬁsh in the lakes and rivers which have
been polluted. For example, the heavy metals that are contaminating waters
in the Kola Peninsula have been linked with human health risks such as neu-
rological defects, cancer, anaemia and damage to bone tissue (Förstner and
Wittmann 2012, 2, 27; Moiseenko and Kudryavtseva 2001). Those who use
the forests and the land for food are also put at risk of illness as a result of
environmental degradation: high levels of contaminants have been found in
potatoes, vegetables, berries and mushrooms which are grown or collected,
and then consumed, by the communities close to the smelterworks on the Kola
Peninsula (Kozlov and Barcan 2000, 514–516). Numerous health problems
have been reported in the local population related to eating contaminated food
(Kozlov and Barcan 2000, 516).
3.3 Nuclear threat
At the time that the Barents Region was ﬁrst created, northwest Russia was
the most heavily nuclearised part of the world, with large numbers of both
military and civilian industrial nuclear reactors as well as many nuclear sub-
marines which formed part of the Russian Northern Fleet (Stokke 1994).
Current and historic nuclear activity in the region, both in Russia and in
Finland, threatens the environment through the destruction or mutation of
the cells of biological organisms resulting in death, radiation sickness, cancer
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and genetic damage in humans, animals and plantlife (US Oﬃce of Technology
Assessment 1995, chap. 3).
3.3.1 Dumping of radioactive waste
Despite the levels of nuclear activity in the east of the Barents Region, the
amount of nuclear pollution currently found in the region is actually fairly
low (AMAP 2016, 37–39, 56; Heininen and Sergerståhl 2002; Salbu et al.
1997). The threat to the environment comes not from the current level of
pollution but from the risk of future radioactive pollution caused by previous
unsafe practices (Heininen and Sergerståhl 2002). Radioactive pollution in
the Barents Sea as measured in both the water and the ﬁsh stocks is actually
lower than in other seas but there is unsecured radioactive material in the
water (Hoel 1994). The Russian Yablokov Report reported that between 1965
and 1993 seventeen nuclear reactors were placed in the Kara Sea (the most
easterly sea in the Barents Region) by the Russians. In at least seven instances,
the radioactive fuel was not removed from the reactor before it was dumped
causing a risk that it could start to leak into the water in the future (Sivintsev
et al. 2000; Yablokov et al. 1993). Likewise, large amounts of low and
medium level radioactive waste were put in the sea protected only by ‘ﬂimsy
metal containers’ which are now in danger of corroding (Yablokov et al. 1993;
Stokke 1994; Sivintsev et al. 2000). These containers are also at risk from oil
and gas exploration as they are lying on the sea ﬂoor, unmarked and
uncharted, and they could easily be pierced by exploratory drilling (Kireeva
and Digges 2014). Lack of funding means that nuclear reactors and nuclear
submarines which are no longer needed cannot be adequately decommis-
sioned and so they, too, are at risk of deteriorating, causing nuclear material
to leak (Heininen and Sergerståhl 2002). While most of the nuclear material
either stored in western Russia or dumped in the seas oﬀ the Russian coast is
currently contained, that containment is not secure and should nuclear mate-
rial start to leak into the water or on to the land, it would pose a huge threat
to the environment.
3.3.2 Maintenance of nuclear facilities
During the Cold War, there was little money for or interest in nuclear safety
standards in the USSR meaning that many of the nuclear installations were of
unsatisfactory quality when there were ﬁrst built and have been poorly main-
tained ever since (Stokke 1994). A culture unconcerned with, or unable to
aﬀord, safety standards has resulted in a catalogue of recorded safety failures
and accidents which have led both to fatalities and nuclear emissions which
have caused, or had the potential to cause, damage to the environment
(Stokke 1994). In 1989, 42 lives were lost and a nuclear reactor and two
nuclear warheads went down when the Komsomólets submarine caught ﬁre
and sank near Bear Island in the Svalbard Archipelago in the Barents Sea.
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The nuclear reactor has never been recovered. Regular monitoring shows that
although there is currently no radiation leaking, if the casings of the reactor
or the weapons were to deteriorate, the surrounding water would become
contaminated (AMAP 2016, 7–8; Høibråten et al. 2003; Høibråten et al.
1997). In 2003, Russian submarine K-159 was being towed to Polyarny in
order to be dismantled when it sank in the Barents Sea, taking with it all of
its nuclear fuel as well as the lives of nine men whose job it was to keep water
out of the already rusting hull during transportation (AMAP 2016, 33–34;
Ponomareva 2008). The submarine was not seaworthy and yet it was allowed
to go to sea with nuclear fuel on board. In April 2015, another nuclear
submarine, the Orel, was being repaired in Arkhangelsk when it caught ﬁre
following faulty welding activity. This was the fourth such ﬁre since 2011 to
occur at shipyards owned by the United Shipbuilding company, raising ques-
tions about safety at the company’s facilities (Digges 2015). While eﬀorts are
being made to reduce the threat of nuclear accidents, there remains much to
do. There are, for example, currently 22,000 ‘spent nuclear fuel elements’
being stored in ‘dilapidated concrete tanks’ at the Andreyeva Bay nuclear
storage facility, situated only 55km from the Norwegian border (Digges 2016;
Nilsen 2016b). The fuel elements were stored under water until an accident
occurred in 1982 and the pool began to leak. The fuel was moved to suppo-
sedly temporary containers but, despite their poor condition, the fuel has
remained in the tanks for over thirty years (Digges 2016; Nilsen 2016b). Work
began in 2017 to remove the fuel elements but the task has been described as
‘the most risky nuclear-safety operation ever to happen in the Russian north’
and is likely to take at least ﬁve years (Nilsen 2016b). Meanwhile, and despite
the internationally funded eﬀort to clear up the damage caused by nuclear
activity in the Barents Region, at least ten new nuclear submarines are being
built in Russia and are due to enter service by 2020 (Digges 2014a).
3.3.3 Nuclear testing
Another source of environmental threat from nuclear activity comes from
nuclear testing. The Soviet Union’s nuclear testing began in 1949 and the ﬁrst
nuclear weapons were tested in the Barents Region in September 1955 when
an underwater detonation was made close to the islands of Novaya Zemlya,
which lie oﬀ the north coast of Russia, between the Barents and the Kara
seas (Balonov 2004). In total, 130 nuclear tests were carried out at Novaya
Zemlya between 1955 and 1990, with tests taking place in the air, on land,
underground and under water (Balonov 2004; Khalturin et al. 2005; Stokke
1994; Yemelyanenkov and Popov 1992). The largest ever hydrogen bomb, a
57 megaton explosion, was tested at Novaya Zemlya in 1961 with dramatic
environmental eﬀects (Khalturin et al. 2005, 18). An observer said after-
wards that the ‘surface of the island has been levelled, swept and licked so
that it looks like a skating rink’ (Adamsky and Smirnov 1994, 3, 19–21;
Suvorov 1989, 117–127).
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The sheer number and size of the tests which took place at Novaya Zemlya
in the second half of the twentieth century and the quantity of nuclear material
released make this the largest contributor to nuclear contamination in the
Arctic (United States Congress, Oﬃce of Technology Assessment 1995, 34).
There is, however, some good news: in 2015 the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Programme found that ‘levels of anthropogenic radionuclides’ in
the Barents Sea were lower than had been recorded between the 1970s and the
1990s and that levels were continuing to fall (AMAP 2016, 56). As long as no
new nuclear tests are carried out, the levels of radionuclides will naturally
continue to fall over time.
3.3.4 Nuclear reactor construction in Finland
In northern Finland, there is a controversial plan in place to build a nuclear
power plant in the Pyhäjoki municipality (World Nuclear Association 2017).
Preliminary construction work on the Hanhikivi plant has begun and an
application for a construction permit, requesting permission to construct a
nuclear power plant, nuclear fuel storage facilities, nuclear waste processing
facilities and interim storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel, was submitted
by the company, Fennovoima, in 2015 (Fennovoima 2015). The company
had hoped to begin construction in 2018 with the power plant due to be
operational by 2024 but the Finnish nuclear safety agency has reported
delays to its decision regarding the safety of the plans (Yle 2017; Fennovoima
2015, 10–11).
In 2015, an Environmental Impact Assessment undertaken by Fennovoima
claimed that ‘the project will have no adverse environmental impacts that
would be unacceptable or could not be mitigated to an acceptable level’
(Fennovoima 2015, 10). Despite this, the plan has been criticised by environ-
mental groups who have concerns about the impact it will have on the envir-
onment (Digges 2014b; Goës 2015). The plant will be located 2km from the
Parhalahti–Syolatinlahti ja Heinikarinlampi Natura 2000 area which is
designated to protect 29 species and 8 habitats (European Environment
Agency 2017; Fennovoima 2015, 64; Natura 2000 2017). The site is also in
the vicinity of a Finnish Important Bird Area and is home to a large quantity
of nesting wetlands species. In addition, there are also a number of nature
conservation areas, particularly seashore meadows, nearby.
The building of any industrial plant in the area would be likely to lead to
biodiversity loss and habitat degradation; a nuclear power plant with the
added risks of exposure to radiation could be disastrous for the environment
(Fennovoima 2015, 74–75; Kahsnitz 2016, 22). More concerning is the pre-
dicted impact on the seawater close to the plant. The plant operators intend
to use seawater as a coolant and to discharge the used water back into the
Bay of Bothnia. It is predicted that this discharge will raise the sea tempera-
ture by up to 10–12°C in the immediate area and up to 5°C in an area up to
0.7km2 around the discharge site (Fennovoima 2015, 68–71). The warm water
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will shorten the period of time for which the sea is frozen during the winter
and will result in thinner and weaker sea ice forming (Fennovoima 2015, 69).
The temperature rise is likely to lead to changes in species distribution,
changes to marine vegetation and bring an end to ice ﬁshing (Fennovoima
2015, 68–71). There is a risk that the seal population could be threatened as
the reduction in sea ice levels will aﬀect their ability to breed and, as the primary
predator in the region, seals will be at the greatest risk of bioaccumulation
(Kahsnitz 2016, 23). Despite Fennovoima’s assurances that the plant will have
only a limited environmental impact, it is clear that there are considerable
environmental concerns associated with the construction of the nuclear power
plant and that the plant could pose a threat to the environmental security of the
area and the broader region (Fennovoima 2015, 10, 62, 85).
3.4 Environmental hot spots
Recognising the threats posed to the environment in the Barents Region, the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council’s Working Group on the Environment identiﬁed
a number of sites which were of greatest concern when considering environ-
mental threats in the region (AMAP 1995). They called these areas ‘hot spots’
and began work to reduce the impact of the pollution caused by these sites
(AMAP 1995). The work was reviewed in 2003 when a new list of 42 ‘hot
spots’ was drawn up (AMAP 2003). The hot spots represent a wide range of
diﬀerent environmental and health threats including industrial air emissions,
discharges of waste water, threats to drinking water supplies, waste management
and other environmental damage (Bambukyak et al. 2013). Work undertaken
to ameliorate the hot spots includes the removal of twenty sunken and aban-
doned ships near Lavina in the Kola Bay and the beginning of work to
remove 18,000 tonnes of metal from the 181 islands of the Franz Joseph Land
archipelago (Mård 2013, 34–37, 42–45). Since 2011, nine of the hot spots
have been excluded from the list because they are considered to have
improved to such an extent that they no longer pose a threat to the environ-
ment (Bambukyak et al. 2013, 13, 18; Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2011,
2013c, 2015). One of the ‘hot spots’ which has been excluded is the stock of
obsolete pesticides in the Republic of Karelia which, as a result of successful
cooperation, were incinerated in Finland as the technology to render them
harmless was not available in Russia (Bambukyak et al. 2013, 18, 55–56).
The work on the identiﬁed ‘hot spots’ has led to signiﬁcant improvements
in the air quality or water quality and recovery of the environment in the
areas around the sites. There is, however, much work still to do: in the fourteen
years since the 42 ‘hot spots’ were ﬁrst identiﬁed it has only been possible to
exclude nine of the sites from the list, with 33 sites still causing concern
(Bambukyak et al. 2013; Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2011, 2013c; Mikaelsson
2015). Additional work is still required on these remaining sites. Furthermore,
the list only included the sites which were the most concerning in 2003; there are
still many more sites within the region which are actively polluting or threatening
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to pollute the environment and work must be undertaken to ameliorate these
sites as well as those which made the list of ‘hot spots’.
4 Conclusion and recommendations
Having discussed the various threats to the environment of the Barents
Region, it is worth considering some of the possible solutions to those threats.
These proposals do not seek to provide all of the answers to the environ-
mental threats identiﬁed but instead give some ideas about action that could
be taken in light of the issues highlighted by this chapter.
Many of the worst sites of pollution within the Barents Region have been
transformed by the work undertaken after their designation as environmental
‘hot spots’. There are, however, many more sites which did not make it on to
the list but which remain an environmental threat. It is important that once
the worst polluters have been dealt with, focus should turn to other polluting
sites. One solution to this would be to expand the environmental ‘hot spots’
programme, either through an increase in the number of sites on the list or by
selecting a new site to replace each site which is eliminated from the list. This
would ensure that work to tackle industrial pollution and nuclear clean up
in the Barents Region will continue. The beneﬁt of a ‘one out, one in’ system
is that it would keep the level of work required to manage the programme and
the overall annual costs, currently ﬁnanced through the Nordic Environ-
mental Financing Corporation, consistent, while continuing and extending
the valuable work undertaken by the project to date.
Despite the claims of its owners, the proposed nuclear power plant in
Pyhäjoki, Finland, is likely to have a considerable impact on the environment,
particularly on the marine environment in the Bay of Bothnia. While Finland’s
commitment to energy sources which do not cause greenhouse gas emissions
is laudable, Finland should be investing in renewable energy sources rather
than building nuclear power plants. Finland has the natural resources to
enable it to move towards renewable energy and it should be directing its time,
ﬁnances and expertise towards energy sources which are less environmentally
harmful and do not put future generations at risk of environmental insecurity.
There is, as always, an urgent need for action on climate change. Despite
acknowledging the threat posed by climate change, the Barents Euro–Arctic
Council has done little to take action on the subject. In December 2013 an
‘Action Plan on Climate Change’ was adopted (Barents Euro-Arctic Council
2013a) but the plan is surprisingly weak, partly because of limited resources
within the Barents cooperation and partly because the council reached the
conclusion that ‘[t]he Barents Region is not a major source of greenhouse gas
emissions’ (Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2013b). The action plan does little
more than recommend that each part of the Barents Region produces its own
climate strategy. Lack of resources is not a good enough reason for the
Barents Region to fail to produce a detailed plan or even a binding agreement
between the Member States on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. A strong,
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region-wide strategy on climate change is required for three reasons: to
encourage the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, to make plans for
adapting to the consequences of climate change in the Arctic, and in order
provide an example for other countries. Climate change ought to be a priority
for all Arctic nations and by not having in place a robust climate plan, the
Barents Region appears to be failing to take the threat suﬃciently seriously.
If the countries of the Barents Region were to focus on reducing their
emissions of black carbon, this would have a direct eﬀect on climate change
in the region. The warming eﬀect of black carbon emissions is localised so
action taken in the Barents Region to reduce emissions would have a direct
eﬀect in reducing local temperature rises. At the very least, the practice of gas
ﬂaring should cease in favour of a process known as ‘recovery and utilisation’
where the gases are collected and reused rather than being ﬂared (AMAP
2015, 33). The problem with this is that the build-up of waste hydrocarbon
gas can be dangerous and ﬂaring is often used as a safety mechanism (AMAP
2015, 33). A solution has been found in Norway where gas ﬂaring is banned
unless it is speciﬁcally required for security reasons (Arctic Council 2013, 8;
Norwegian Act Relating to Petroleum Activities 1996, sec. 4.4). Because of
the eﬀect that black carbon has on increasing the temperature in the Arctic,
this is one area where the countries in the Barents Region can aﬀect the rate
of warming in the Arctic rather than requiring global action. As such, mea-
sures should be taken across the region to reduce and then ban gas ﬂaring
except in instances when it is required for safety.
This chapter deﬁned environmental security as ‘the protection of the natural
environment to ensure the sustainable functioning of ecosystems and biodi-
versity both for the intrinsic value of nature and for the support of the survival,
health and livelihoods of both individuals and communities’. The environmental
issues which have been identiﬁed by this chapter threaten the environmental
security of the Barents Region by damaging habitats, by reducing biodiversity,
by destroying or reducing access to food, clean water and clean air and by
impairing local people’s ability to make a living from the environment. When the
environment becomes polluted or damaged, food sources will become con-
taminated or will disappear, livelihoods which rely on the environment, ranging
from reindeer herding to tourism, will be destroyed, local people will suﬀer from
sickness and disease and traditional ways of life will be threatened. This creates
communities which are not environmentally secure and which are therefore
vulnerable. It is vital that we protect the environment of the Barents Region,
partly because of the inherent value of nature and the environment but also
because without environmental security, there can be no human security.
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2.2 Economic security in the
Barents Region
Anna Petrétei and Dorothée Cambou
This chapter analyses economic security in the Barents Region. Economic
security is one of the indicators for human security (UNDP 1994, 24), and is
intrinsically linked with other human security components.
1 Deﬁnition
Economic security is composed of basic social security, and deﬁned by access
to basic needs infrastructure pertaining to health, education, dwelling, infor-
mation, social protection, and work-related security (ILO 2004). According to
the UN Human Development Report, economic security requires an assured
basic income for individuals, usually from productive and remunerative work
or, as a last resort, from a publicly ﬁnanced safety net. In this sense, the
majority of the world’s population may be deemed as economically insecure
(UNDP 1994, 25). This is mostly due to the unstable world market, increas-
ing job insecurity, and growing unemployment ratio. The situation is even
worse in developing countries, where governments have less means to provide
economic support. The UNDP also identiﬁes disparities in economic oppor-
tunities as one of the emerging threats that constitutes the global framework
of human insecurity (UNDP 1994, 34–35). Thus, economic security is closely
intertwined with job and income security. Income security denotes adequate
actual, perceived, and expected income, either earned or in the form of social
security and other beneﬁts (ILO 2004). For some communities such as local
and indigenous peoples informal income also represents a substantial share of
the income.
Several other factors contributing to income and economic security include:
a satisfying employment rate, an adequate government ﬁnanced social safety
net, and a stable market. Employment rate is deﬁned by the OECD as a
measure of the extent to which available labour resources are being used. It is
the ratio of the employed to the working age population.1 This indicator is
seasonally adjusted and it is measured in terms of thousand persons aged 15
and over, and as a percentage of working age population. Employment rate is
sensitive to economic cycles, and can be signiﬁcantly impacted by existing
government policies and public demographics. This includes the level of
higher education achievable, the income support policies of governments, and
policies that facilitate the employment of women and disadvantaged groups.
Another contributing factor to economic security is the existence of a social
safety net, deﬁned as a collection of services provided by the state or other
institutions such as friendly societies, including cash or food transfers, social
services, such as health clinics; and insurance options (Gentilini & Omamo
2009, 2). Adequate government ﬁnanced social safety nets often include
maternity leave, welfare, unemployment beneﬁt, universal healthcare, pension,
homeless shelters, and sometimes subsidised services such as public transport,
which are meant to prevent individuals from falling into poverty beyond a
certain level. The UNDP suggests that a means of determining whether social
safety is adequately ensured includes measuring homelessness as an indicator
of insecurity (UNDP 1994, 26; UNDP 2016, 55).
When discussing economic security, the stability of the market is an
important indicator to take into account. While it is diﬃcult to appraise the
stability of the market economy, several indicators may provide information
about the economic situation of a country such as its GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) and GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product). GDP embodies the
market value of all products and services produced within a certain period, by
all people and companies in the given country, whereas GRDP is the geo-
graphic breakdown of national GDP, indicating the size and structure of
regional economies and measuring changes to regional economies over time.
Although GDP is one of the most eﬀective ways to measure the economic
development of a country, GDP and GRDP are not good indicators of eco-
nomic security per se. This is because GDP and GRDP are the main indicators
of economic growth. Whereas economic security aims to ensure economic
wellbeing, economic growth is a phenomenon of market productivity and rise
in GDP or GRDP. Hence, as economist Amartya Sen indicates, ‘economic
growth is one aspect of the process of economic development’, but it does not
subsume such development (Sen 1983, 748).
Understanding that economic growth alone cannot properly determine
the security or development of a country, it is therefore necessary to con-
sider other indicators. A more inclusive indicator of economic development
constitutes the human development indicator. The creation of the Human
Development Index (HDI) emphasises that people and their capabilities
should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country.
The HDI is a summary measure of average achievements in three key
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, education, and
a decent standard of living, the latter being measured on the basis of the
GDP per capita. The use of HDI overlaps with other aspects of human
security as well, but in the case of economic security, it serves a more
representative function than economic growth. However, several important
aspects of human development are also not well represented in HDI,
especially as it is diﬃcult to use indicators like GDP per capita to measure
the health of subsistence or mixed economies (AHDR 2004, 17). In this
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regard, HDI can be a valuable tool to assess economic security but certainly
not the only one.
Lastly, addressing economic security requires interdisciplinary actions
across sectors, communities, and political borders in order to ensure a more
comprehensive overview of the matter. In the globalised free market, interaction
between economies is essential and unavoidable, which consequently requires
stable and peaceful political and economic relations across borders. In sum-
mary, economic security is far-reaching, and includes the need to address the
relationships between various security aspects in both contemporary and
future situations.
2 Contextualisation
The Barents Region has considerable economic potential and is exceptionally
rich in natural resources. The economy of the Barents is also strong, with an
overall positive GDP since the beginning of the 21st century (BEAC 2015, 14).
Important drivers of the Barents Region’s economy are forestry, metallurgy,
mining, energy production, ﬁsheries, and tourism. In terms of primary sec-
tors, forestry and mining are important in all parts of the Barents Region,
while ﬁshing and energy (mainly oil and gas) are important in northern
Norway and northwestern Russia. The Barents Region is also an important
source of hydroelectricity and a growing market for wind energy, for both
local use and for export outside the region. Tourism and reindeer husbandry
are also important activities in the region. In some areas, such as northern
Finland, the sector of tourism is an important source of employment, and its
importance is growing in other parts of the region, especially in Norway (BIN
2017). In addition, the secondary workforce sector – processing, production,
and construction – accounts for most work in Fennoscandia and some Russian
areas. In the Nordic part of the Barents area, the services sector is the largest
employer (AMAP 2017).
There are, however, still apparent economic divisions between the Nordic
and Russian parts of the region as the Nordic countries enjoy substantially
higher GDP per capita than Russian regions. In addition, it can be noted that
there is also variation between Barents and non-Barents Regions within the
same country. In the Northern areas of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, per
capita economic growth has generally lagged behind the respective national
averages (AMAP 2017, 11). This is mostly due to less diverse industrial bases
and lower labour market participation (AMAP 2017, 11). In the Russian
Federation on the other hand, the resource-rich Northern regions have the
highest GDP per head compared to the national average (AMAP 2017, 11).
On the other hand, Nordic countries currently enjoy substantially higher
GDP per capita than regions in the Russian Federation.
Yet, the Barents Region has encountered the consequences of economic
recession and looking at GRP is insuﬃcient to assess the reality concerning
the basis for economic livelihoods. In the Barents Region, job creation is
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generally lagging behind the national average and employment creation in the
resources sector has signiﬁcantly decreased since 2008 (BIN 2017). In the Nordic
countries, the biggest job loss between 2008 and 2014 was observed in mining,
quarrying and manufacturing (4,444 jobs), followed by agriculture, forestry,
and ﬁshing (2,270 jobs) (BIN 2017, 45). According to Business Index North
(BIN), ‘job losses in agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing reﬂect the process of
urbanisation in the northern parts of the Nordic area, combined with the
modernisation of the industry’ (BIN 2017,45). On the other hand, this has
resulted in an increased demand for high-skill labour and an increase of job
creation in the real estate, professional, scientiﬁc, and technical sector (1,984
jobs), followed by public administration, defence, and social security since
2008 (BIN 2017, 45). Analysis has also shown that the population in the
Barents Region is generally ageing and becoming more urbanised, which has
important economic and social consequences (AMAP 2017, 6). There is indeed
important variation in unemployment and education rate between urban and
non-urban areas (BEAC 2015, 15).
The level of prosperity also largely diﬀers between the Russian and Nordic
parts of the Barents Region. With the dismantling of the USSR, unem-
ployment has increased, and a wider gap between rich and poor has
appeared in Russia and its Barents Regions (Bahry, 2002; Duhaime and
Caron 2008; Rosstat in Didyk 2012, 148). The poverty rate is reported to be
between 20% and 25%, aﬀecting mostly single parent families and large
families, and individuals with little education and those living in rural areas
(Bahry, 2002; Duhaime and Caron 2008). In all of the regions of the Rus-
sian part of the Barents, the threshold value of the decile ratio, which indi-
cates income inequality, was exceeded to varying degrees between 2003 and
2008 (Didyk 2012, 148). The changing role of the Russian state with the
withdrawal of the government as producer and organiser ‘have redrawn class
boundaries, undermined traditional job guarantees and eroded the old social
safety net’ (Bahry, 2002; Duhaime and Caron 2008). Since the economic
transition, the Russian Barents is also facing demographic challenges caused
by a massive migration from the Arctic regions to the southern regions
(Eikeland & Riabova 2002). Life expectancy is also critically low. According
to 2008 census, ‘in none of the Barents Russian regions did life expectancy
reach the “threshold” level used as a criterion for estimations of sustain-
ability’ and ‘none of the BEAR regions reached the national average level of
life expectancy’ (Didyk 2012, 146). In fact, while all Russian regions of the
Barents have improved their HDI during the period from 2003 to 2008, the
index values are still below the national average and in Murmansk Oblast
and Karelia the values are below the level which is considered the lower
level for developed countries (0.8) (Didyk 2012, 145–146). As indicated by
Duhaime and Caron (2008, 20), ‘the socioeconomic conditions of the “New
Russia”, built on the Soviet ruins, thus reﬂect a greatly weakened social
situation and a redistribution system which cannot even be qualiﬁed as a
rudimentary welfare state’.
Economic security in the Barents Region 61
By contrast, the Nordic countries have achieved some of the most favourable
social conditions for human development in the Arctic Region (Duhaime and
Caron 2008, 18). Poverty rates in Fenno-Scandinavia are lower than elsewhere,
life expectancy and education level are the highest within the circumpolar
Arctic, and infant mortality is the lowest (Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2009, 17–18).
As a result, all three countries are ranked within the top 25 countries in the
world HDI ranking (UN 2017). This is partly due to the social democratic
tradition and the political redistribution of resources through social policies.
All indicators show that redistribution policies have had beneﬁcial eﬀects on
living conditions in the Arctic regions of the Fenno-Scandinavian countries
(Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2009, 17–18). However, all regions of the Barents
area are experiencing an ageing of its population, where the proportions of
adults and elderly increase, while the proportions of children and adolescents
decrease. This process results in a rise in the median age of the population
and an increase in the dependence ratio which ‘indicates growing pressures on
social security and public health systems’ (BIN 2017, 11). This situation can
lead to serious problems in the economic and social sphere and could aﬀect
economic security in this part of the region as well. Furthermore, there are
also income disparities that have been observed between the Sámi and other
inhabitants. While the Sami people are certainly less impoverished than indi-
genous peoples in the Russian parts, it has been observed that the income for
the area where Sami live in Norway is considerably lower than the average
total household income for other northern areas (Glomsrød and Aslaksen
2009, 116–117). Additionally, it is also reported that Sámi living in Finland
‘earn less than other inhabitants of the country and are under-represented on
the job market and over-represented among the unemployed’ (Duhaime and
Caron 2008, 19). Thus, economic security varies between countries, east from
west, and between peoples.
Beyond those diﬀerences, it can be noted that one of the common chal-
lenges faced by the Barents population is the development of sustainable and
environmentally responsible economic activities (BEAC 2015, 16). Whereas
extractive industries play a major role in the economy of the region, the
pristine environment and its renewable resources are major sources of liveli-
hoods for the Barents population in all parts of the region. Both the tourism
industry, which is one of the most important sources of income in the Barents
Region, and local and indigenous communities livelihoods depend on the
sustainable management of the Barents environment. However, an increased
demand for non-renewable resources in nature based activities has exacer-
bated existing conﬂicts between extractive and renewable industries, more
particularly increasing tension on traditional hunting, ﬁshing, and herding by
indigenous peoples (BIN 2017, 8). Finally, the Barents economy is inﬂuenced
by global development, whether through migration, trade, or geopolitical
events (AMAP 2017). Although it is not possible to analyse or predict how
this development may inﬂuence the region in the future, those are elements
that also impact the state of economic security of the Barents population.
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Considering these contexts and issues, the following section assesses diﬀerent
aspects of economic (in)security that challenge the contemporary wellbeing of
the Arctic population, focusing especially on the Barents Region.
3 Assessment
Economic security encapsulates complex and interlinked challenges, which
highlight economic development as a means for achieving a larger sense of
security, sustainability and wellbeing for peoples. This section focuses on some
of the main economic security challenges faced by the population in the
Barents Region. These diverse challenges include an assured access to employ-
ment, education, demography changes, transportation systems, sustainable
development and the impact of mining industries on subsistence economies as
well as the external eﬀects of geopolitical and economic events on the region.
3.1 Unemployment
As already mentioned above, economic indicators reveal diﬀerences across
countries in the Barents Region. One of the relevant indicators is unemployment,
which is also one of the most commonly used tools to measure economic
security. One of the major eﬀects of unemployment is indeed its potential to
drive individuals into poverty.
Unemployment rates vary signiﬁcantly within the Barents Region, generally
with Troms (Norway) having the lowest and Kainuu (Finland) having the
highest ratio. In 2014, Troms had an unemployment rate of 1.6%, while the
ratio was 16.9% in Kainuu. The unemployment rate in other regions were as
follows: 1.9% in Nordland (Norway), 2.4% in Finnmark (Norway), 7% in
Västerbotten (Sweden), 7.7% in Norrbotten (Sweden), 9.7% in Lapland (Fin-
land), 10.2% in Northern Ostrobothnia (Finland), 6.7% in Murmansk
(Russia), 8.1% in Karelia (Russia), 6.2% in Arkhangelsk (Russia), 6.1% in
Komi Republic (Russia), and 6.3% in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (BEAC
2015, 15). Generally, the unemployment rate in the Norwegian part of the
Barents Region was lower than the national average, while in the other three
Barents countries, the unemployment rate in the Barents Region was higher
than in other parts of the countries. As the above ﬁgures show, the unem-
ployment rate in diﬀerent parts of the Barents Region vary from approxi-
mately 1.6% to 16.9%, but there is no great discrepancy in the region overall.
As already mentioned, it has also been observed that the biggest employ-
ment losses which occurred in the Nordic part of the Barents Region concerns
mining, quarrying, and manufacturing, followed by agriculture, forestry, and
ﬁshing (BIN 2017, 38). This trend reﬂects a decline in the employment share
of middle-skilled and middle-waged occupations partly caused by growing
automation in production, job outsourcing, and price competition from
emerging countries, all which aﬀect manufacturing jobs (BIN 2017, 38). Fur-
thermore, there is also a high unemployment rate among young people
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(BEAC 2014, 2). As a consequence, and in order to increase economic
security, an up to date assessment of the labour market situation and needs of
the Barents population is necessary. Further research is also needed on how
to support more favourable employment development in the overall region
and increase new employment opportunities.
3.2 Demographic changes
The Barents Region faces signiﬁcant demographic challenges due to its
increasingly ageing population, and the trend of younger populations leaving
the Barents Region to work in larger cities in the south of the respective
countries (BEAC 2015, 5). Europe in general is currently the oldest continent
with the highest old age dependency ratio, and according to projections it will
remain so until 2060 (EU Commission 2014, 23). The implications of these
demographic changes are even more severe for the Barents Region. The falling
population trend is caused by negative net migration, and declining birth rate.
Young and highly educated people are migrating mostly from peripheral
towns to urban centres in the south. In the past decades the region has
lost thousands of working-age citizens due to a lack of job opportunities,
especially in the Russian regions and in the Kainuu region in Finland
(BEAC 2015, 12).
Since 1990, the population has been declining in the Barents Region,
especially in the Russian part. The greatest population decline is observed in
Murmansk – in 2014, statistics showed a 35.29% decline compared to 1990
(Patchworkbarents in BEAC 2015, 13). In Arkhangelsk Oblast, the population
between 1990 and 2015 changed from 1,575,502 to 1,183,323. The Komi
Republic and the Republic of Karelia also experienced signiﬁcant population
decline within the same period. The population in the Komi Republic changed
from 1,248,891 to 864,424, in the Murmansk Oblast from 1,191,468 to
766,300, whereas in Karelia from 791,719 to 632,500 (Patchworkbarents in
BEAC 2015, 13). In other parts of the Barents Region, the demography
changes have not been as harsh. Within 1990 and 2015, the population of the
region has changed as shown in Table 2.2.1 (indicated in descending order in
terms of population).
Although in some areas (for instance in Northern Ostrobothnia in Finland,
Västerbotten in Sweden, as well as throughout the Norwegian Barents)
statistics showed an increasing population between 1990 and 2014 (Patch-
workbarents in BEAC 2015, 13), the total population in the Barents Region
within that period still showed a decline of at least 20.93% (BEAC 2015,
13). The general decline in population is largely due to the declining popu-
lation in the Russian areas of the Barents Region. Furthermore, even if the
Nordic part of the Barents have experienced a population growth, the
declining population in the age group 0–19 and considerable increase in
population for the age group 65+ may have long term implications for
labour and education (BIN 2017).
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The implications of these demographic changes are also important for
transfer systems and the ratio of economic dependency. For instance, the
Nordic parts of the Barents Region are experiencing an ageing of its population,
where the proportions of adults and elderly increase, while the proportions of
the youth decrease. Population in the age class 0–19 in the Nordic parts of the
Barents decreased by 5.9 % while for the national average as a whole it grew
by 1.9 % in the 2006–2015 period (BIN 2017, 18). Statistics also shows that in
2015 half of this area’s population was older than 41.8 years, while the other
half was younger. However, with a rise in the dependency ratio, there is a
growing pressure on social security and public health systems in the region. In
this context, important political and development measures should be taken,
especially concerning the role of the elderly population as participants in the
Barents economy (BIN 2017, 21).
3.3 Education needs and resources
A lack of access to quality higher education can also manifest in economic
poverty and unemployment, resulting in insuﬃcient economic resources.
Conversely, prior studies indicate that highly educated peoples generally have
better health and have higher employment rates and higher relative earnings
(OECD, 2016 in BIN 2017, 36). Tertiary education also contributes to foster
innovation, increases economic activities and growth, and contributes to the
wellbeing of the population. In the Nordic countries, a growth in tertiary
education has been observed but the percentage of the population aged 20–59
who have successfully completed tertiary studies still lag behind the national
average (BIN 2017). This statistic indicates that policy actions could be envisaged
to improve tertiary education in the Nordic countries.
In addition, it is also necessary to ensure proper primary and secondary
education in the Barents Region. However, ensuring basic and adequate edu-
cation is challenging for communities inhabiting remote areas. The most
Table 2.2.1 Demographic trends in the Barents Region
1990 2015
Northern Ostrobothnia 346,301 406,966
Norrbotten 263,735 249,777
Västerbotten 251,968 262,593
Nordland 239,532 241,682
Lapland 200,674 180,848
Troms 146,594 163,453
Kainuu 96,957 78,388
Finnmark 74,148 75,605
Source: data from Patchworkbarents (BEAC 2015, 13)
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signiﬁcant challenges are the consolidation and closing of small, remote
schools, providing suﬃciently comprehensive education opportunities, as well
as recruiting and retaining teachers in remote communities (Larsen and Fondahl
2015, 351). Shrinking populations in remote parts of the Barents also constitute
a challenge to maintaining access to education services (BIN 2017, 37). Another
important factor includes language instruction, especially with regard to the
eﬀorts to retain traditional languages (i.e. languages other than the dominant
language in a given society, such as for example Sámi languages) and to ensure
that students acquire the national languages of commerce and higher education.
In addition, ﬁnding new ways to use and transmit indigenous knowledge, the
gender pay gap, as well as the continuing underperformance of indigenous stu-
dents across most parts of the North are all relevant social issues that inﬂuence
individuals’ access to economic opportunities (Larsen and Fondahl 2015, 351).
3.4 Transportation and infrastructure
Interaction between citizens, businesses, and other civil society actors is an
important factor for broader economic growth and economic security. In the
Barents Region, this interaction is intrinsically dependant on adequate trans-
portation and infrastructure systems. Moreover due to the fact that population
density in the Barents Region is low, and the main markets for raw materials and
reﬁned products are located outside the region, transport and infrastructure have
signiﬁcant importance in the Barents. The signiﬁcance of transportation is also
reﬂected in other aspects, such as its impact on food costs, business development,
and cultural relationships between peoples and communities.
Speciﬁcally, large quantities of time-sensitive seafood are delivered to both
western and eastern Europe, but transport is also important for other sectors
of the economy. Raw materials and manufactured products from the mining,
metal, and forest industries also need to be transported to Europe for further
processing. Asia and America are also important markets for raw materials
(BEAC Transport Area 2013, 37). Some raw materials and manufactured
products are also traded within the Barents Region. For instance, ore from
Russia and Sweden are transported for processing in Finland, and seafood
from Northern Norway is delivered across the region. However, the largest
intra-Barents ﬂows are transit ﬂows: for instance, half of the farmed salmon
produced in Northern Norway passes through Northern Sweden and/or
Northern Finland on its way to the market. For example, farmed salmon
from Northern Norway is transported by road to Helsinki, where it is made
ready for further transport by plane from Helsinki to Asia for distribution.
Also, iron ore from Northern Sweden transits Northern Norway on its way
to the biggest markets. Oil and gas extracted in the Russian Federation is
transported along the coast of Norway, but mainly through international
waters. Furthermore, there are a number of traﬃc hubs in the region where
re-loading between diﬀerent types of traﬃc can take place. In larger places
there are strategic cargo nodes, which are intermodal, whereas in other
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places there are railway stockyards or port facilities. (BEAC Transport Area
2013, 37–38).
The importance of transportation in the region is therefore evident. The
existence of a strong transportation infrastructure is not only crucial for the
rapidly expanding industries and for the development of remote areas, but
also contributes to economic stability and mobility of labour. However,
interaction between citizens, businesses, and other civil society actors in the
Barents Region is hampered by inadequate transportation and infrastructure
systems (BEAC 2015, 16). While there is relative good transportation in a
North–South direction, the lack of transport infrastructure East–West sig-
niﬁcantly hinders economic development across the borders of the Barents
Region. In order to ensure smooth transportation and border crossings, well-
functioning cross-border cooperation in the Barents Region is consequently
required. More speciﬁcally developing East–West transport infrastructure is a
key to business cooperation in the Barents Region and ‘further extension of
the traﬃc infrastructure eastwards appears to be vital’ (BIN 2017, 93).
3.5 Economic and sustainable development
The economic security and wellbeing of the population depend in part on the
living environment and natural resources of the Barents Region. Regional
development needs to happen in concordance with preserving the environ-
ment, mitigating and adapting to climate change, and fostering good and
healthy living conditions for the people. The attractiveness of the region in
enticing people to live and work in the Barents Region, as well as for the
establishment of businesses, is relevant to subsequent employment opportu-
nities, education, health, culture, the surroundings, nature, and recreational
activities (BEAC 2014, 4).
As a consequence of the growing global need for minerals and other natural
resources, extractive industries are continuously expanding. As the Barents
has already proven to be rich in natural resources, extractive industrial activities
have become important contributors to the national economies of states. The
development of national legislation and mineral strategies reﬂects the interest
of states in the expanding potential of mining industries. For instance, the
vast majority of the iron ore produced in the EU comes from Sweden, and
the Swedish government has expressed its wish to strengthen its position as
the leading mining nation in the EU (Swedish Ministry of Enterprise, Energy
and Communications 2013). Furthermore, Finland is a global pioneer in the
responsible use of minerals, and the country’s legislation is amongst the most
attractive for mining investments worldwide. The Norwegian government
deﬁned its mineral industry as a focal area, stating that it wants the country
to be attractive for mining activities (Norwegian Ministry of Trade and
Industry 2013). The Russian Federation is also exceptionally rich in natural
resources, and subsoil resources signiﬁcantly contribute to the country’s
economy (Pettersson et al. 2015, 247).
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As already mentioned, extractive industries play an important role in the
economy of the region. However, the mining industry and other extractive
development projects may have an adverse impact on the region’s nature and
environment, which may undermine environmental sustainability. While the
reasonable and economic acquisition and use of mineral resources is gaining
more and more signiﬁcance (Dubin´ski 2013, 2), the impact of extractive
industries in the Barents nevertheless constitutes a challenge for the Barents
environment and other economic activities. This is the case with tourism, a
main driver of economic growth in the Nordic countries and an integral part
of the local economy in the Barents Region (AMAP 2017, 12). The con-
struction of mining sites may damage the natural environment near the mine,
which can be problematic as pristine nature is one of the most attractive factors
for the tourism industry in the Barents Region. Ultimately, one of the main
challenges faced by the region is therefore to ensure an adequate balance
between competing interests and actors to ensure that they contribute to
the economic, social, and environmental sustainable development of the
entire population and communities living in the region.
Another challenge faced by the Barents population relates to the revenue
generated by extractive industries and their impact on local population.
Economic beneﬁts from the activities of extractives industries are not always
used for the beneﬁt and interest of the local population. Despite the sig-
niﬁcant revenue generated by extractives industries in the Russian region, the
share of the population living in this part of the region with income below
subsistence level is critically high. In 2008, only in the Nenets Autonomous
Okrug (AO) did the poverty level indicator ‘not exceed the “threshold” level
when estimated in terms of the criteria for sustainable development’. In all
other regions, the poverty level was considered critically high and incompa-
tible with sustainable development (Didyk 2012, 147). Furthermore, although
the poverty level of the Nenets AO is not considered critical, the level of
income inequality is the highest in Russia. This is explained by the inﬂuence
of extractive industries and simultaneous presence of low-income population
living in this region (Didyk 2012, 148). This situation clearly demonstrates the
importance of redistribution policies to alleviate income disparities, across the
Barents, which should evidently been promoted in Russia.
Finally, another challenge concerns the impact of economic development
on the subsistence economies of indigenous peoples. The Barents Region is
home to several indigenous peoples, which also indicates diﬀerent economic
livelihoods. The livelihoods of indigenous peoples typically relate to land,
water, and other natural resources. In the Barents Region, indigenous peoples
have developed highly specialised livelihood strategies and occupations that
include, among others, reindeer herding, hunting, ﬁshing, trapping, shifting
cultivation or gathering food and forest products, and, in some cases, handi-
crafts. They are therefore dependent on the rights to natural resources and the
management of natural resources for their subsistence. Because of indigenous
peoples’ dependence on natural resources, their interest in preserving these
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resources in the long term is signiﬁcant (Skogvang 2013). These livelihoods
are not only a source of food and income for indigenous peoples, but are also
a part of their heritage and culture.
Problematically, indigenous peoples’s traditional livelihoods also compete
with other societal interests (Allard 2006, 15), more particularly the need to
increase economic development via the development of resource extractive
projects. However, the extractive industries in the Barents Region are posing a
real threat to the livelihoods of the indigenous peoples, such as the Sámi and
the Nenets (Anaya 2011, para. 55; Tauli-Corpuz 2016, para. 86). In many
cases, development projects represent a basis for conﬂicts between industries
and the aﬀected indigenous peoples. For instance, an important Sámi protest
took place in Jokkmokk (Sweden) in 2013, when test mining permission was
granted to a British mining company on reindeer grazing lands (Koivurova
et al. 2015, 28). In addition, extractive industries also threaten the traditional
way of life of indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation, such as the
nomadic lifestyle (including hunting, ﬁshing, and reindeer herding) of the
Nenets people (Garipov 2014, 74–75; Anaya 2010).
Behind the impact of extractive industries, arctic indigenous peoples, such
as the Sámi and Nenets, face other challenges due to environmental problems,
for instance pollution and climate change, which seriously aﬀect their rights
to their traditional territories (Heinämäki 2004, 231–233). Ultimately, in
order to ensure sustainable development for all in the Barents Region, policy
actions should recognise and implement the rights of indigenous peoples in
the region in a better fashion. Speciﬁcally, measures to include them in the
decision-making processes concerning the development of their traditional
land and territories should be promoted in order to ensure that their voice
and interests are represented in the governance of their territories (See also
chapter 2.8).
3.6 External inﬂuences of geopolitics and ﬁnancial events
Economic security is also inﬂuenced by economic and geopolitical events.
External economic and foreign policy instability can be responsible for unstable
market and economic relations, which can aﬀect the economic security of
peoples at the local level. The 2008 global economic crisis has certainly
inﬂuenced the Barents market. For instance, the impact on mineral and ore
prices negatively inﬂuenced northern counties in both Sweden and Finland
(BIN 2017, 91). Similarly, the Russian economy has been deeply aﬀected by
the fall of the global oil prices, leading to signiﬁcant revenue shortfalls and
recession in the country. As a result of the recession, Russia is reversing sub-
stantial achievement in poverty reduction. In 2015, the poverty rate in the
country increased from 11.2 to 13.4%, as the poor population increased by
3.1 million to a total of 19.2 million (World Bank Group 2016, 8). In 2016, a
further increase in poverty levels was projected, due to a continuing increase
in unemployment and government’s diﬃculty in enforcing poverty-reduction
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measures (World Bank Group 2016, 8). Thus, the Russian economy faces
important challenges that are both induced by internal and external
phenomena such the global ﬁnancial crisis and lower oil prices. Although it is
not deﬁned how this trend has distinctively aﬀected the Barents Region, there
is no doubt that these developments have also negatively impacted its
population.
In relation to the impact of external events on economic security, the con-
sequences of the Ukrainian crisis on the Russian and Barents economy is
another case in point. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the European
Union responded with a series of sanctions, including asset freezes on key
allies of President Putin, an arms embargo, restrictions on access to capital
markets, and several other targeted measures. Furthermore, these measures
were not limited to, or principally focused on the occupied territory, but were
explicitly adopted as diplomatic tools in response to Russian actions. These
sanctions had consequences for the Barents Region as well.
As a consequence of EU sanctions, Lapland, Northern Ostrobothnia, and
Kainuu experienced a lower demand for paper and shrinking exports to
Russia as well as reduced tourism inﬂows (BIN 2017, 8). Within the Barents
Region, Finland and Norway have been disproportionately aﬀected by Russian
counter-sanctions on agricultural, livestock, and ﬁshery products in comparison
to other European countries (Larrabee et al. 2017, 27). Dairy farms were the
most aﬀected by counter-sanctions, and some were even forced to close down
(Nilsen 2016). In addition, even though tourism in the Russian Barents had
already been declining, the sector witnessed a 3% drop by May 2014, reinforced
by the political crisis (Nilsen 2014). As part of the sanctions, the defence
industry struggled to replace Western arms imports, and energy companies
had to deal with restrictions on energy cooperation with Russia. Furthermore,
stability in business and banking sectors had to be managed due to ﬁnancial
restrictions (Russel 2016, 7–9). Finally, the 2014 crisis and subsequent sanctions
have also had an ‘impact on EU-Russia cooperation in many sectors and have
blocked several of the previously available multilateral ﬁnancing sources to
foster the Barents cooperation’ (BEAC 2015, 7).
In light of this, one important recommendation therefore lies in the need to
enhance and strengthen economic cooperation across borders. Since adminis-
trative and political cooperation between members at the regional level of the
Barents has continued and become stronger after the annexation of Crimea
(Koivurova 2016), it is a primary concern to reinforce economic bonds in the
region, a task that can be channelled via existing institutions. Enhancing the
level of funding both for large scale and small-scale cross-border activities,
and businesses, could also contribute to such a development, especially as ‘the
majority of Barents Regions consider the current level of ﬁnancing insuﬃcient
for their joint activities’ (BEAC 2015, 7). Among other actions, addressing
structural constraints to investment in Russia would also help enhance long-
term growth prospects (World Bank Group 2016, 8) and perhaps alleviate
economic insecurity for the population. Thus, improving economic security
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requires a bundle of measures to be taken at the regional, national, and
international levels.
4 Conclusion
Projections show that the world economy will grow at around 3% per year over
the next ﬁfty years (although according to recent forecasts, this number will go
down) but the OECD projects that the Barents countries will see economic
growth rates below the world average. Nonetheless, all four countries will
roughly double the size of their economies by 2050, with the highest real GDP
growth in Sweden (110%) and the lowest in Russia (93%) (AMAP 2017, 11).
However, the Barents Region is currently facing various challenges in terms of
their economies. This includes demographic changes and outmigration from the
Barents Region, higher unemployment, lack of access to quality higher educa-
tion in remote communities, hindered transportation possibilities, income
inequality, conﬂicts between indigenous and local communities vis-à-vis
expanding mining and energy industries, as well as the collateral eﬀect of the
external events such as the ﬁnancial crisis of the Ukrainian conﬂict.
There is certainly not an all-encompassing solution to these issues. None-
theless, local action plans accompanied by a strong regional co-operation are
required from nation states in order to improve the economic security of
the population. Attractive living environments should also be promoted in the
Barents Region in order to get people to move in, stay, or return to the region
(BEAC 2014, 2). More precisely, there is an increasing need to create new
employment possibilities, since unemployment, especially among young people,
is quite high in some parts of the region. There is also a need to redeﬁne the
role of the elderly as active participants in the Barents economy (BIN 2017, 21).
While access to better primary and secondary education must be improved, it
is also important to support tertiary education in order to stimulate innovation
and economic development in the region. Furthermore, transportation routes
and infrastructure need to be developed throughout the region. Finally,
innovation and industrial development must be enhanced, especially in the ﬁeld
of renewable nature-based industries in order to support sustainable economic
development in the region. However, the beneﬁts of development should
be distributed to the population in a manner that beneﬁts their interests at the
local level and the protection of indigenous peoples’ rights needs also to be
guaranteed – a challenging task that will necessarily require policy and legis-
lative reforms. Lastly, the region would beneﬁt from stronger cooperation and
further funding to support cross borders activities.
Note
1 Employed people are those aged 15 or over who report that they have worked in
gainful employment for at least one hour in the previous week or who had a job but
were absent from work during the reference week. The working age population
refers to people aged 15 to 64.
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2.3 Health security in the Barents Region
Susanna Pääkkölä and Dorothée Cambou
Health security constitutes a fundamental component of human security. The
main goal of the present chapter is to highlight some key challenges to health
and wellbeing in the Barents Region.
1 Deﬁnition
One of the most signiﬁcant human achievements of the 20th century was
progress in health and wellbeing (Commission on Human Security 2003).
‘About a billion people today have average life expectancies of nearly 80
years, twice the average of a century before’. Yet, good health remains
inequitably distributed (Commission on Human Security 2003, 95) and health
security has acquired a renewed salience in the human security discourse
(Elbe 2010, 101).
According to the Commission on Human Security, ‘good health is both
essential and instrumental to achieving human security’ (2003, 96) because
the very purpose of security is protecting human lives (Elbe 2010, 101). In this
regard, health security is linked to unnecessary deaths that can be prevented
by better health behaviour or by reaching people trapped in poverty or con-
ﬂict (Commission on Human Security 2003, 95). The Commission on Human
Security identiﬁes global infectious diseases, poverty-related threats, and vio-
lence and crisis as three major health challenges. However, health is not only
deﬁned the absence of disease or death. According to the Commission on
Human Security, health also includes ‘a state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being’. It integrates mental health and physical heath as well
as subjective psychosocial wellbeing and conﬁdence about the future, which
results in a more holistic approach to disease prevention and health promotion
(Commission on Human Security 2003, 95).
Therefore, assessing health security goes beyond measuring morbidity and
mortality. It includes an assessment of how people perceive their own health
and the trajectory of their lives. The achievement of health security also takes
into account interrelated issues including pre-existing health, work, economic
and family situations. For instance, it takes into consideration that higher
living standards are associated with decreased risks of disease, illness and
injury, better immune functioning, speedier recovery and increased longevity.
It also considers factors that increase life expectancy such as good nutrition,
physical exercise and safe sex. Finally, it also includes psychological wellness
and the capacity for ‘people to exercise choice, pursue social opportunities
and plan for their future’ (Commission on Human Security 2003, 96).
At the international level, there are diﬀerent indicators to evaluate health
security. Under the United Nations Indicators of Sustainable Development
(United Nations 2007, 11), which serves as reference for countries to develop
or revise national indicators of sustainable development, health security is
determined through four core indicators:
1 Under-ﬁve mortality rate (life expectancy at birth and healthy life expec-
tancy at birth),
2 Health care delivery (percentage of population with access to primary
health care facilities, contraceptive prevalence rate and immunisation
against infectious childhood diseases),
3 Nutritional status (nutritional status of children) and
4 Health status and risks (morbidity of major diseases such as HIV/AIDS,
malaria, tuberculosis and prevalence of tobacco use).
While these indicators are helpful in assessing a quantitative perspective of
health security, they are limited in their ability to measure what people think and
feel about their lives. The individual wellbeing of peoples is often expressed in
relative terms, and is also connected to personal judgements of life satisfaction
and feelings ranging from depression to joy. Access to healthcare and services to
promote wellbeing are also nuanced by speciﬁc individual needs associated
with gender, sexual orientation, age, culture and disability. Furthermore, while
health insecurity concerns us all, certain vulnerable groups of people are dis-
proportionally aﬀected. In its report on human security, UNDP highlights that
‘in both developing and industrial countries, the threats to health security are
usually greater for the poorest, people in the rural areas and particularly children’
(UNDP 1994, 28). In this regard, health insecurities are relative and dependent
on the infrastructure and demographics of the region, and therefore must be
contextualised. Finally, in the age of global migration, health concerns are no
longer isolated national issues, but require regional and cross-border considera-
tions. This situation also calls for an assessment of the speciﬁc needs of minorities
and indigenous populations, and communities beyond national majorities.
2 Contextualisation
In the Barents, challenges to healthcare diﬀer substantially in each respective
country.
In both Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Russian part of the region, the
organisation of the health service is aﬀected by the fact that this is a very
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sparsely populated area with long distances, for which reason the health
service provided diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the health service provided in
the more densely populated areas of the countries.
(JWGHS Statistic Working Group 1998)
In addition, population demographics and vital statistics between the three
Nordic countries and Russia vary substantially. Whereas the population in
the Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish parts of the Barents Region share close
similarities, the population in the Russian part diﬀers signiﬁcantly (JWGHS
Statistic Working Group 1998).
In particular, mortality rates vary signiﬁcantly in the Barents Region.
Fennoscandia has the lowest mortality rate in the world, whereas in the Russian
Barents Regions the rates are relatively high. In 2014, mortality rates varied
from around 8% (total deaths) in the North Ostrobothnia/Troms regions to
roughly 14% in Karelia and Arkhangelsk (Emelyanova and Rautio 2016, 7).
In addition, signiﬁcant cross-regional diﬀerences in mortality are shown in the
diﬀerences in life expectancy at birth for males/females. First, life expectancy
for the men living in regions belonging to the Nordic countries is higher than
for those living in Russia. In 1998, it was noted that men from the Nordic
countries could expect to live 12 to 15 years longer than their Russian
counterparts, whereas the women in the Nordic countries could expect to
live around 10 years longer than their Russian counterparts (JWGHS
Statistic Working Group 1998). In addition, ‘in the Norwegian, Swedish and
Finnish regions, women live signiﬁcantly longer than men’ (BEAC 1998).
This data has not seen signiﬁcant changes in the past two decades. In 2014,
it was noted that life expectancy was 63 for women and 76 for men in Karelia,
compared to 80 for men and 83 for women in Vesterbotten (Emelyanova and
Rautio 2016, 7). Finally, the respective regional life expectancies of both men
and women in the Barents Regions (the northern areas of each country) are
slightly lower than the respective national averages in Norway, Sweden and
Finland.
Beyond mortality rates, diseases patterns and causes of death vary across
the region. Twenty years ago,
prostate cancer and cancer of the bladder were most widespread in the
Norwegian and Finnish regions, whereas cancer of the stomach was most
widespread in the Russian regions. The same applies to cancer of the
respiratory organs, which was also very high for the Finnish region.
Cancer of the mouth and esophagus was most prevalent in the Murmansk
and Archangelsk regions.
(JWGHS Statistic Working Group 1998)
In 2016, reported causes of death in Barents Region have changed. Currently,
the most common are cardiovascular diseases (Emelyanova and Rautio 2016, 7).
Russia leads with the highest number of deaths, resulting from general heart
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diseases but also from malignant neoplasms. In comparison, the situation is
diﬀerent in the Troms and Finnmark regions, where respiratory diseases as well
as accidents and violent deaths are the main causes of mortality (Emelyanova
and Rautio 2016, 8). But, these are quite rare in Sweden, where the highest
cause of disease-related death is provoked by cancer, especially lung cancer for
men and breast cancer for woman. A similar situation exists in Finland, where
alcohol poisoning is also a major factor of disease-related deaths (Emelyanova
and Rautio 2016, 8).
In the Barents, indigenous peoples, Sami, Nenets and Vepsians are also the
most vulnerable peoples and face a number of health challenges. For instance,
in Russia, it is noted that ‘Vepsians have poorer health compared to the non-
indigenous people residing in the Barents Russia’ (Emelyanova and Rautio
2016, 9). By comparison, mortality rates of the Sami in Finland are similar to
the national mortality rate. On the other hand, mortality rates were lower in
the 1980s for Sami in Finland, but rates have shifted over the last 30 years
to become similar to the rest of the country and other Barents territories
(Emelyanova and Rautio 2016, 9). More speciﬁcally, ‘cancer rates were espe-
cially low, however they are now equal to the average values in Finland and
Lapland’ (Emelyanova and Rautio 2016, 9). According to Emelyanova and
Rautio, ‘this may be caused by changes in the habits and living environment
of the Sami occurring in the period from 1970s up to nowadays, which are
now similar to the majority of Finnish and western populations’ (Emelyanova
and Rautio 2016, 9). However, further analysis and data are needed in order
to reach any substantial conclusions. Additionally, ‘mortality due to accidents
and violence is also signiﬁcantly higher for the Sami than the national average.
Non-fatal accidents and suicide attempts are also more common for Sami
males’ (Emelyanova and Rautio 2016; Soininen 2015). Finally, indigenous
peoples in the Barents Region are also among peoples who face the highest
number of suicides, especially in Nenets areas where the suicide rate for
Nenets is signiﬁcantly higher than the non-indigenous rate (Sumarokov et al.
2014) These diﬀerences have been partly explained by ‘a lack of a “sense of
indigenous belonging”, lack of cultural identity and problems of resilience’,
being single or divorced, and having lower education (Sumarokov et al. 2014;
Emelyanova and Rautio 2016, 10). The high levels of suicide in the Barents
Region among indigenous peoples are also more broadly reﬂected in global
trends that note ‘indigenous people around the world have the highest suicide
risk of any identiﬁable cultural (or ethnic) group’ (Leenaars 2006).
In the Barents Region, certain climate factors aﬀect the health and
wellbeing of the Barents population diﬀerently than the national popula-
tion. Seasonal statistics for morbidity show for instance ‘that more deaths
occur in the winter (cardiovascular, respiratory, circulatory, and skin dis-
eases), and there are more traumas (frostbite and hypothermia) associated
with cold weather’ (Emelyanova and Rautio 2016, 10). In northern Sweden,
it was also observed that ‘a one-degree increase in temperature has led to a
steep rise in the number of cases of non-lethal, acute myocardial infarction,
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and other heart dysfunctions’ (Messner et al. 2002; Emelyanova and Rautio
2016, 8).
Thus, notwithstanding the marked diﬀerences between the Nordic and
Russian parts of the region, the Barents Region is impacted by unique regio-
nal circumstances that inﬂuence the wellbeing of its population. The cold,
humid and dark ambient environment in the Barents Region can make work
and life more demanding for inhabitants, especially for individuals with
disabilities or existing health issues. Long travel distances in the Barents
Region outside urban areas also increase the costs of health care, disaster
prevention and rescue services. In addition, the impact of environmental
pollution and climate change has been the main focus of recent projects
regarding health security challenges faced by the Arctic population. The
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP 2014) and the EU-
funded research project Arctic Health Risk (ArcRisk 2013) have monitored
health security risks in relation to climate impacts (extreme temperatures,
water scarcity, ﬂooding, sea level rise, droughts, storms and ice and snow
cover changes) and environmental contaminants. In the Barents Region,
there have also been intensive eﬀorts to enhance research and cooperation in
order to address issues related to health and wellbeing in relation to the
impact of the changing environment.
In order to strengthen health and wellbeing in the Barents Region, a
working group on health and social issues has also been created under the
auspices of the Barents cooperation. Established in 1996, the role of the Joint
Working Group on Health and Related Social Issues (JWGHS) is to improve
the public health and social wellbeing of peoples in the Barents Region. The
JWGHS ‘provides a political structure for health and social cooperation, in
which representatives of the national and regional health authorities of the
Barents countries meet twice a year to discuss relevant issues’ (JWGHS
2017c). In its programme, the prioritised areas of intervention include the
prevention and control of communicable diseases and non-communicable
diseases, including work on the reduction of lifestyle-related risk factors,
environmental factors and new emerging risks. Other priorities areas also
concern the strengthening of health systems and social services with relevance
for health in the Barents (JWGHS 2016, 2). These reﬂect the main challenges
faced by the Barents population today and are highlighted in the following
part of this assessment.
3 Assessment
The purpose of this assessment is to highlight several of the speciﬁc and distinct
health security risks that face the Barents population. Speciﬁcally, the analysis
allows focuses on the impact of diﬀerent phenomena that aﬀect the health
and wellbeing of the Barents population such as the impact of the unique
Barents climate and environment, industrial pollution and new environmental,
social and economic changes.
Health security in the Barents Region 79
3.1 Climate conditions and remoteness
The Arctic-Barents Region possesses a unique climate and a speciﬁc environ-
ment, where access to health care in remote areas can be diﬃcult and aﬀect
the wellbeing of its population.
In the Barents Region, cold climate and darkness during the long wintertime
is a challenge for the people living and working in the area. Cold ambient
temperature can expose individuals to signiﬁcant health risks. Cold sensations
can be painful and cold exposure can worsen symptoms of some medical
disorders (Parsons 2003; Rintamäki 2007a; Rintamäki 2007b). Body cooling
under 35°C is associated with the range of physiological responses and dys-
functions (Parsons 2003). Working and surviving in demanding circumstances
in cold, humid and dark ambient environments can require great eﬀort,
especially when a person has existing health problems.
In addition, cold weather and lack of light in wintertime can also have
indirect eﬀects on mood and cognition, which in turn eﬀect the pineal and
thyroid hormones that control psychological factors (Parsons 2003). Finally,
accidental hypothermia, accidents and cold injuries also increase mortality in
cold regions. This is particularly challenging for elderly people, whose thermo-
regulatory mechanisms may be weakened (Mallet 2002, 776). Finally, it can be
noted that the cold ambient temperatures, wind, ice and snow conditions in
the Barents add additional logistic challenges for health care authorities and
rescue services to operate.
The sparsity and spread of populations in the Barents Region also has an
impact on access to healthcare. In the northern parts of the Nordic countries and
the Russian Barents Region, ‘the organisation of the health service is aﬀected by
the fact that this is a very sparsely populated area with long distances’ (BEAC
1998, 8). Consequentially, primary health care treatment in the Barents Region
is predominantly centralised, where specialised treatment is only available
through hospitals in concentrated urban areas (BEAC 1998, 8). This means
that patients must sometimes travel long distance to receive necessary health
care. Conversely, doctors may also travel long distances to visit their patients.
For example, in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region in Siberia, medical
personnel sometimes travel to meet patients living in the tundra region
(Pääkkölä 2013). In addition, emergency response times in remote areas are
longer than in urban areas, and are exacerbated by harsh weather conditions.
Delays in response time can occur when there are longer distances between
hospitals in urban centres and emergencies in remote areas. Access to health
care and emergency services in such remote areas depend directly on trans-
portation capacities: helicopters, ambulances, snowmobiles, boats and ships.
On the other hand, there are solutions to mitigate the regional health
impacts faced by the Barents population. First, the digitalisation of the health
care sector, telehealth services and telemedicine can provide more equitable
access and opportunities for all health care users. The development of portable
equipment, measurement tools and facilities to support such digitalisation can
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also extend good quality e-health services to rural areas. However, training
for emergency responders to use these new tools and methods is necessary in
order to ensure their utility. In addition, while the development of new tech-
nologies, automations, the internet of things, 3D printing and other innova-
tions are enticing, their impact on everyday life in the Barents is still relatively
low. In this regard, it can be argued that more resources need to be allocated
to develop future ICT-based services in relation to healthcare sectors.
Furthermore, cross-border cooperation among the Barents countries is an
important means to solve challenges to healthcare in the region, especially in
securing access to healthcare for communities in remote areas. Today, the
establishment of the Joint Committee on Rescue Cooperation in the Barents
Region
makes it possible to provide assistance more eﬃciently, faster and at
lower operating cost. Under the auspices of this cooperation, direct
access to additional resources and specialised functions in neighbouring
countries can be assured and preparedness and prevention measures can
be co-ordinated.
(BEAC 2017)
Yet, because of many new challenges such as climate change, it is also noted
that Barents representatives should ‘be aware and prepare for the need for
enhanced cooperation in the Barents Region’ (BEAC 2016). Among these
challenges, the impacts of climate change and environmental pollution are
threats that can directly aﬀect the immediate and long-term health of the
Barents population.
3.2 Environmental pollution – regional and transboundary contaminants
Regional and transboundary pollution represents other sources of health
insecurity in the Barents Region. The Arctic, including the Barents, is con-
taminated by chemicals released as a result of both human activities and
natural processes (e.g., AMAP 2011, Sundseth 2015, 3581). These chemicals
reach the Arctic from regional and distant sources via the atmosphere
and via northerly ﬂowing rivers and ocean currents. Long-range transpor-
tation of the chemical contaminants as well as the presence of local con-
taminants cause a risk to the environment and aﬀect human health in the
Barents areas (see also Chapter 2.1). More speciﬁcally, environmental con-
taminants include a number of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)
(AMAP 2004) and mercury (AMAP 2011), which have been proven to aﬀect
human health. In general,
because they can be transported by wind and water, most POPs generated
in one place or country can and do aﬀect people and wildlife far from
where they are used and released. They persist for long periods of time in
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the environment and can accumulate and pass from one species to the
next through the food chain.
(Girard 2010, 404)
Concerning the impact of contaminants on human health, it can generally be
stated that certain environmental pollutants can adversely aﬀect the develop-
ment of the immune system (AMAP 2015, 97). In the Russian Barents,
industrial pollution has also been linked to an increase in mortality caused by
respiratory problems, cardiovascular and circulatory diseases, and cancer
(Nieminen et al. 2013; Norseth 1994, 106–107; Revich 1995). Other studies
have shown that toxic agents and pollutants, such as organochlorine con-
taminants (OC), may have negative eﬀects on human body and even increase
obesity and diabetes (Lee et al. 2007; Longnecker et al. 2001; Longnecker and
Daniels 2001; Kristiansen and Frøyland 2010; Son et al. 2010). The ArcRisk
project (2013) has also studied the impacts of environmental contaminants
and the complex relationships between sources, transport, bioaccumulation
and exposure of contaminants on human health in the Arctic. Its conclusions
indicate that human dietary exposure to harmful contaminants like PCBs,
DDTs and HCHs has decreased lately due to the decrease of contaminants in
environmental levels but also due to changes in dietary habits (AMAP 2014,
10–14). Nevertheless, global emissions of mercury as well as newly emerging
contaminants still pose problems, especially for people living in the coastal
communities (AMAP 2014, 10).
One of the worrying implications of transboundary pollution also concerns
its impact on maternal and child health. Persistent toxic substances like mercury
or like polychlorinated biphenyls and pesticides may threaten the health of
the unborn and children (AMAP 2015). It has been demonstrated that mercury
can aﬀect the reproductive, immune and neurological systems and even the
cardiovascular systems (AMAP 2011, 165). The impact of pollutants on
unborn and newborn health occurs through the passing of Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POPs) in the food chains and breast milk. Breastfeeding is highly
recommended as primary food for infants (WHO, n.d.). However, if the
human milk contaminant burden increases alongside the presence of Arctic
pollutants and toxic chemicals in food chains in ﬁsh or mammals, the practice
of breastfeeding may become a more complex public health issue. In particular,
this could be a major concern among indigenous peoples living in tundra
environment in Russia, far from the other modern food supplies (see also
Chapter 2.4). In this regard, further research and general awareness for the
complexity of the impacts of increasing contaminant burdens in the Arctic
and Barents Region are needed.
Finally, apart from its toxicological risks, the perception and knowledge of
potential risks associated with contaminants in the environment can also
adversely ‘turn people away from traditional/local foods, even when they
represent the most healthy food choice’ (AMAP 2011, 164). As noted in the
2011 AMAP report, ‘this can lead among other things, to a degradation of
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cultural identity, economic stress arising from the high cost of healthy store-
bought foods, and potential nutritional deﬁcits arising from the consumption
of poor quality store-bought foods’. Thus, pollution in the Barents Region
can have a more broad and indirect impact on the health and wellbeing of its
population, especially in regards to communities with speciﬁc traditional
foods such as indigenous communities.
Ultimately, continuous research is needed to understand how environ-
mental pollution aﬀects the health of peoples living in the North, especially in
the Barents-Arctic where more data should be collected to understand the
current impact of pollution on the human health of the population. In any
event, there is a need to reduce contaminant levels and pollution through
local, national, regional and international actions and initiatives (AMAP
2011, 167–169).
3.3 Environmental, economic and social changes
Ecosystem disturbance and changing interactions between wildlife and
humans can lead to the spread of new pathogens. Today, worldwide, there is
an apparent increase in many infectious diseases, including newly circulating
ones. This reﬂects the combined impacts of rapid demographic, environmental,
social, technological and other lifestyle changes that aﬀect both physiological
and mental wellbeing.
3.3.1 Antibiotic resistant microbes and virus
The presence of, and risk posed by, antibiotic resistant microbes in the Arctic
are increasing (European Center for Disease Prevention and Control 2017). In
the Barents Region, biological factors such as mutations in bacteria and the
development of the super bacteria have resulted in the presence of multi-drug
resistant tuberculosis bacteria in Russia and in neighbouring parts of Finland
(Casali et al. 2014, JWGHS 2012). Thus, according to the Joint Working
Group on Health and Related Social Issues (JWGHS), ‘the epidemiological
situation regarding tuberculosis in the Barents Region is rather controversial …
and its threat is increasing …’ (JWGHS 2012, 4).
Speciﬁcally, tuberculosis (TB) incidence in the Nordic countries is among
the lowest in the world, which, however contrasts with Russia, which is clas-
siﬁed as one of the high-priority countries for TB by WHO. In Finland, the
incidence of tuberculosis is low, but the risk of TB resistance is increasing,
especially among foreign nationals. In 2015, all children who contracted TB
were of foreign origin, and other adult patients were reported to be foreign in
105 cases (39%), up by one-ﬁfth year-to-year (Jaakola et al. 2015, 44)
According to Jaakola, ‘the growing numbers of asylum seekers were probably
one of the contributing factors to this trend’ (Jaakola et al. 2015, 5). As a
consequence, Finland has started to carefully check the health of newcomers
as a preventative measure. Although it is unclear how this trend aﬀects more
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speciﬁcally the Barents part of Finland, it is certainly an issue that aﬀects this
part of the country as well.
Unlike Northern Europe, where TB is mostly registered among immigrants
and elderly people, ‘the epidemic process in Russia penetrates into various
population layers, becoming a problem not only of vulnerable groups, but
also of socially advantaged ones’ (JWGHS 2012, 4). Due to this situation,
control over TB has been restored in the country, which has allowed a
stabilisation in TB incidence, prevalence and mortality in the last years, with
a tendency to improve the epidemic situation (JWGHS 2012, 4). None-
theless, the JWGHS has suggested taking measures to prevent the spread of
tuberculosis and HIV&TB co-infection in the Barents Region through
intensive international collaboration and to develop guidelines, standards
and infectious control programs for the Russian part of the Barents Region
(JWGHS 2017a). In addition, and among other measures, the working
group has also been advised ‘to improve the implementation of the existing
plans for infection control’, ‘to introduce earlier and more accurate diag-
nostics of TB and MDR TB’ and ‘to improve capacities of facilities and
institutions’ (JWGHS 2017b).
Another area of signiﬁcant concern in the Barents Region is the Human
Immunodeﬁciency Virus (HIV). In 2013, 6,472 new cases of HIV infection
were reported in eleven territories of the Northwestern Federal District of
Russia. Although the number of case had decreased from 2.1% since 2012, an
increase in the number of new HIV cases was reported in four areas of the
North-western Federal District: Arkhangelsk (by 15.2%), Vologda (by
12.1%), Pskov (by 7.4%) and Murmansk (by 2.8%) regions (JWGHS 2015, 9).
‘Since the beginning of the epidemic in 1989, the number of oﬃcially regis-
tered HIV cases in the NWFD total 102,623. During the same period, 17 283
people have died’ (JWGHS 2015, 15). As the HIV epidemic continues to
spread in the Barents Region of Russia under some notable trends (JWGHS
2015, 15), a better action program is urgently needed to tackle the issue. Yet,
in its 2015 report, the JWGHS indicates that ‘a part of the population still has
improper awareness about HIV/AIDS’ and that ‘the coverage of the harm
reduction programs remains modest’. In addition, there is a lack of funding
for awareness and harm reduction programmes, which constitutes a major
hurdle in addressing the epidemic (2015, 16).
By comparison, the HIV infection rate reported in all three Nordic coun-
tries is relatively stable, and the total number of diagnoses by doctors in
Norway is even in decline (JWGHS 2015). In all cases reported in the Nordic
countries, foreigners and newly arrived migrants represent more than half of
the diagnosed patients (JWGHS 2015, 13). In this regard, the JWGHS has
underlined ‘the importance of developing eﬀorts and methods to reach
migrants, for HIV preventive work, with information and to oﬀer counselling
and testing’ (JWGHS 2015, 15). Overall, prevention programmes and policy
support are needed across the Barents to address the spread of infectious
diseases such as HIV.
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3.3.2 Zoonotic, new and hidden diseases
The apparition of new species in the Arctic, such as new insects also raises
health concerns. New zoonotic diseases may emerge in the Barents Region in
the future (Revich et al. 2012). Many blood-sucking insects can act as vectors
for microbes, and transmit diseases to humans and animals via bites such as
mosquitoes and ﬂies. Rising tick populations in the Barents are an on-going
concern (Evengård and McMichael 2011; Sormunen et al. 2016; Jääskeläinen
et al. 2016). In Russian Karelia it has been reported in 2012 that the incidence
of Tick Borne Encephalitis disease remains high and the incidence in the
republic is two to three time higher than the incidence for the country as a
whole (EpiNorth 2016). Tularemia, another zoonotic disease caused by the
bacteria Francisella tularensis, is also an issue of concern in the northern part
of Finland and the number of human cases of tularemia increased sig-
niﬁcantly in Sweden between 1984–2012 (Rossow 2015; Furberg 2016).
Additionally, temperature changes around the globe are pushing human
pathogens towards the Arctic, raising many new risks for peoples. Previous
studies suggest that the climate change will aﬀect the relationship between
regional climates and allergens, especially on aeroallergens (pollen and mould
spores). Climate change will have impacts on four categories of allergens –
respiratory, contact allergens, plant food allergens, insect allergens (Beggs
2014, 105–113). Increasing temperatures will change the spatial patterns of
parasites including house dust mites (a common allergen in the home) and
birch pollen (Frei and Gassner 2008). Increased rainfalls as well as an
increase in relative humidity indoors might cause diﬃculties in managing
excess water ﬂows in buildings and contribute to the risk of mould growth,
which could impact respiratory health. Studies regarding the eﬀects of climate
change on respiratory health have been restricted to the last two decades,
(Beggs 2014, 105) and there is a great need for this research to continue
globally as well as in the context of the Barents Region.
Climate change is also likely to accelerate the spread of new pathogens
including tropical diseases, which has led researchers to view the longstanding
relationships between climate and disease with new urgency (Institute of
Medicine 2008). Yet, little is known about the impact of climate change and
the risk and distribution of infectious diseases in Arctic regions. According to
Parkinson and Evengård (2009), damage to sanitation infrastructures and
water sources caused by melting permafrost, storm surge or ﬂooding can
adversely aﬀect water quantity and quality, and result in increased rates of
respiratory and skin infections as well as diarrheal diseases caused by bacterial,
viral and parasitic agents. More particularly, climate change can spread illnesses
such as malaria, as rising temperatures push disease-carrying mosquitoes into
new places. The tropical disease malaria, a vector-borne disease caused by the
malaria parasite (Vivax falciparum), was a common endemic disease in Finland
in the 18th and 19th centuries (Hulden and Hulden 2009). However, with
global warming temperature, it is possible that the virus will resurface.
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Finally, hidden diseases such as the bacteria Bacillus anthracis may also
reappear. In fact, Bacillus anthracis resurfaced in 2016 and caused an epi-
demic amongst reindeer in the Yamalo-Nenets region of Siberia in Russia
(BBC News 2016). According to many scientists, the resurfacing of hidden
diseases may increase as icy environments melt and ancient microbes emerge
from the ice and mix their genes with the modern microbial genomes (Katz
2012; Revich et al. 2012).
Thus, the (re)emergence of infectious diseases in the Barents Region
depends on many factors. Suitable conditions for disease transmission may
change with the environment and across time. However, changes in the spatial
patterns of diseases remain hard to estimate, although scientists are currently
studying the spreading patterns of many potential and infectious microbes
that pose health risks both globally and within the Barents Region (e.g.
Revich et al. 2012; Bouma and Pascual 2014).
3.3.3 Risk and disasters
Natural disasters in the Barents are rare. Nevertheless, climate change
increases the uncertainty for future risks. Quick changes in weather conditions
and extreme weather events due to the climate change may create new risks for
the inhabitants in the Siberian tundra and in Fennoscandia (IPCC 2014). The
melting of ice and permafrost will increase the diﬃculty in forecasting future
weather patterns, and may result in increasing incidences of quickly changing
cold ambient temperatures, wind, ice and snow conditions in the Barents.
The uncertainty of climate-related changes to regional weather may make it
more diﬃcult for authorities responsible for regional health care and rescue
services to be prepared in the future. In this respect, strengthening cross-border
cooperation among the Barents countries is important. The Arctic Council is
already promoting search and rescue cooperation between to improve rescue
services in the region. In 2011, it adopted the Search and Rescue Agreement
(formally the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime
Search and Rescue in the Arctic) to coordinate international search and
rescue coverage and response in the Arctic. Although the Barents Region is
included in the Search and Rescue Agreement, regionally the Barents also
organises rescue exercises biannually. The Barents Rescue is a collaborative
exercise organised under the auspices of the Barents Joint Committee on
Rescue Cooperation. It seeks educates people working in rescue services, as well
as local actors in business enterprises and municipalities, and prepares them for
cross-border accidents and emergencies. Both the activities of the Arctic
Council and Barents cooperation are essential to prevent accidents in the
Arctic, as potential emergencies may increase with environmental changes or
developments in the maritime and industrial sectors.
While the impacts of climate change are diﬃcult to assess comprehensively,
extreme weather and environmental changes can have serious impacts on the
health and wellbeing of people living in the Barents, especially because many
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of the residents’ livelihoods are connected to nature. Ultimately, further
research to understand new phenomena and avenues to address potential
changes collaboratively are needed.
3.3.4 Physiological and mental wellbeing
Alongside environmental changes, societal changes linked with the impact of
the market economy and globalisation impacts the human security of peoples
living in the Barents, including their health.
In particular, signiﬁcant changes in diet through the decrease in traditional
food uses and increase in the use of imported food are both factors in
increasing food and health insecurities. Various nutrition related problems
have been observed in the Arctic, and the eﬀects of changing diets on health
are being investigated through scientiﬁc research in many countries worldwide
(AMAP 2011; Sharma et al. 2010). For instance, the incidence of obesity,
increased body weight and chronic diseases including diabetes and cardio-
vascular diseases are growing in the circumpolar Arctic. Obesity is a major
contributor to the global burden of chronic diseases and disabilities and is
closely connected to serious social and psychological disorders aﬀecting all
ages and socioeconomic groups (Hansen et al. 2014). Several factors explain
the increased rate of obesity including biological, genetic and epigenetic factors
and cultural adaptations. Higher indoor temperatures (thermic-neutral tem-
peratures), a lack of physical activity also decrease natural energy expenditure
and can cause a higher risk of obesity. The societal shift towards more readily
available high energy density foods can also contribute to increased rates of
obesity. Furthermore, the shift from traditional to western foods have been
linked to increased rates of obesity in Nenets communities (Hopping et al.
2010; Petrenya et al. 2014).
Furthermore, psychological health also clearly aﬀects mental wellbeing.
The resilience of the people living in the Barents, and the eﬀect of such rapid
changes on the long-term wellbeing of peoples and the human mind is still
unknown. An increased sense of grief and the loss of control can cause problems
in mental health and increase mental illnesses (Evengård and McMichael
2011). Suicide rates in the Northern areas are already relatively high, especially
among indigenous communities, (Evengård and McMichael 2011; Bjerre-
gaard and Larsen 2015; Young et al. 2015) and mental health services are not
always easily accessible. Limited medical services in indigenous languages are
also an obstacle for the use of psychiatric health care services in some areas.
Finally, violence and harassment are also a growing problem in the Arctic
and Barents Region (See also Chapter 2.7 on Personal Security).
4 Conclusion
Health security in the Barents Region is undoubtedly evolving in response to
increasing societal and environmental changes. As discussed in the previous
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sections, globalisation, environmental changes and demographic shifts are
keys factors aﬀecting the health status of the Barents population. Migration,
population aging, urbanisation and changing socio-economic conditions may
also accelerate the emergence of the health problems induced by the changing
climate and increasing extreme weather events (IPCC 2014).
Whereas the health concerns faced by peoples living in the Russian Barents may
diﬀer in scale and nature from those in the Nordic countries, the Barents
population still share similar challenges. Addressing these challenges requires
national and regional cooperation both to study the development of present
and future health risks and to raise awareness among the population. Increased
cooperation, digitalisation and new technological solutions to guarantee
secured and eﬃcient health services for all in the Barents Region are needed.
In addition, holistic understandings and approaches to health security are
required, in order to account for psychological, physiological and psychosocial
wellbeing (Commission on Human Security 2003, 95). Finally, the lack of
comprehensive data and studies concerning the present and future health
issues concerning the Barents Region more speciﬁcally illuminates the need to
enhance research in this ﬁeld in order to improve access and adequate health
care for all in the region.
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2.4 Food security in the Barents Region
Shaun Cormier and Dele Raheem
This chapter addresses food (in)security in the Barents Region. Food insecurity
is interlinked with political, economic, health, environmental, personal, and
community insecurities as indicators of human security.
1 Deﬁnition
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation’s current deﬁnition
describes that, ‘food security exists when all people at all times have physical,
social and economic access to suﬃcient, safe and nutritious food to meet their
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO 1996).
This deﬁnition takes into account the 1994 UNDP Human Development
report that promoted food security as one of the threats to human security
(UNDP 1994). Food security can be better understood through four main
dimensions: availability, accessibility, utilisation and food systems stability.
The availability of food is determined by the physical quantities of food that
are produced, stored, processed, distributed and exchanged (FAO 2008, 20).
Accessibility, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), is a
measure of the ability to secure entitlements, which are those set of resources
(legal, political, economic and social) that an individual requires to obtain
access to food (FAO 2008, 20). Food utilisation refers to the appropriate
nutritional content of the food and ability of the body to use it eﬀectively
(Burke and Lobell 2010: 14); in other words the safety and social value of
food. Food systems stability refers to the overall balance of food supply and is
determined by the temporal availability of and access to food (FAO 2008, 21).
Food systems instability results when one or more of the four components of
food security is uncertain and insecure.
In addition, food security contains terms that describe the values attached
to foods such as local, traditional and store-bought. Local food, as deﬁned by
Duhaime and Bernard (2002, 228), refers to any food produced or harvested
in the environment of a community, regardless of whether it was produced for
subsistence or commercial purposes. Bertozzi (1998) described traditional
foods as a representation of a group; it belongs in a deﬁned space and is part
of a culture, which implies the cooperation of the individuals operating in
that territory (Jordana 2000, 147). Therefore, a traditional product or food is
inherently linked to a territory and must be part of a set of traditions, which
will necessarily ensure its continuity over time (Jordana 2000, 147). On the
other hand, store food or store-bought food are frequently used terms desig-
nated to those foods that are imported to the Arctic-Barents Region
(Duhaime and Bernard 2002, 228).
In the context of the Barents Region, it is important to consider that
traditional food is a vital component of food security, especially for indigenous
populations, for whom traditional foods are closely linked to their cultural
identity and community security. For instance, oral tradition and rituals are
associated with traditional hunting, ﬁshing and gathering of these foods. In
this way, the existing deﬁnition of food security is insuﬃcient in assessing
indigenous relationships to food, as it posits that food security relies entirely
on the assessment of monetary access to foods purchased from markets, but
the value of traditional foods for indigenous peoples exists beyond purely
monetary assessments (Egeland and Harrison 2013, 17). Therefore, a human
security approach to address threats undermining the resilience of diverse
communities in relation to food security was introduced, as human security is
people-centred, comprehensive, context-speciﬁc and prevention-oriented
(FAO 2016, 4). Furthermore, this approach supports food sovereignty and the
ability for locals to take more control of food systems in the Barents Region.
2 Contextualisation
An assessment of food security in the Arctic-Barents context should take note
of the unique natural environment of the region. As discussed in previous
chapters, the Barents Region has more forest, ﬁsh, minerals, oil and gas than
any other region in Europe. This diversity and abundance of resources
explains the existence of conﬂicting priorities between traditional food and
human activities in the region.
Human activities such as ﬁshing, hunting, agriculture, gathering of non-
wood forest products and reindeer herding are common practices that are also
important to the region’s food security; such activities empower people to
utilise local food crops, natural plants, games and ﬁsh. These practices
encourage communal sharing and have historically not been quantiﬁed their
monetary values. Indigenous peoples have practised these activities since the
Middle Ages and non-indigenous peoples who eventually migrated to the
region adopted similar practices from their interactions with indigenous
communities (BEAC 2016).
A substantial seasonal variability has been described in the diet of Sámi
indigenous peoples. Sámi communities in the 1930s–1950s mainly consumed
meat during autumn and winter, but dried meat was also eaten in summer,
particularly by men during work-related migration such as herding, hunting
and rafting (Nilsson 2012, 40). Wild berries such as Rubus chamaemorus
(cloudberry), Vaccinium uliginosum (bilberry), Vaccinium vitis-idaea
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(lingonberry), Rubus idaeus (raspberry), Vaccinium oxycoccus (cranberry),
etc. are widely gathered, and are eaten both fresh or kept preserved during
abundant seasons (Nilsson 2012, 40). Family gardens provide fresh potatoes,
strawberries, blackcurrants, onions and root crops. Mushrooms and herbs
picked from the forest are often part of the traditional meals, but on a much
smaller scale. Reindeer meat is the most prevalent and important meat pro-
duced in the Barents Region; other native animals such as moose, rabbits,
fowl and waterfowl are not as prevalent in meals because of the low number
of wild game to hunt (Muller-Wille 2008, 347).
As societies in the Barents Region become increasingly globalised, food
products are now constantly transported over long distances to remote com-
munities in the region, resulting in rising consequences for food safety and
security.
Globally, food production and agriculture accounts for 70% of all human
water use (UN-Water 2015). Water and sanitation services are crucial in food
processing, but are not well documented in the Arctic-Barents Region (Hennessy
and Bressler 2016, 4). The safety and quality of food begins with the growing
conditions of ingredients, including water. The quality of water provided by dif-
ferent municipalities in the Barents diﬀer greatly between the Nordic countries
and Russia, as the quality of water is not monitored with the same regularity
across the Barents Region. Dudarev et al. (2013) called for an international
collaboration in order to address water security and infectious disease issues, as
they will have impacts on food security. Therefore, it is important to emphasise
the relationship between water and food security in the region.
Traditional foods provide adequate nutrients for people in the Barents
Region; however, these foods can also be a source of pollutants. In order to
ensure that communities can adequately respond to ecological, environmental
and social threats, an assessment of the complex role of traditional foods in
the food security of the Barents Region is necessary
3 Assessment
Food security is threatened by climate change, human activity and globalisation
in all four of its dimensions (FAO 2008, 18). These threats are complex and
often interrelated, and a human security approach requires a holistic assess-
ment. In the following sections, we brieﬂy highlight how these threats play a
role in the food security of the Barents Region.
3.1 Climate change
The rising variance of temperatures and weather patterns associated with climate
change make it diﬃcult to predict the availability, accessibility or stability of
foods at a given time. Seasonal shifts aﬀect the availability of food in the
Arctic-Barents. Traditional foods from the soil, such as berries, shrubs and
vegetables, are dependent on weather, and subject to alteration because of
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abnormal seasonal changes. Hunting game becomes more diﬃcult; migration
patterns adjust to irregular seasonal changes making it diﬃcult to track reindeer,
bowhead whale, ﬁsh and other bird species (FAO 2008). As the availability of
these traditional foods become increasingly unpredictable, the dependency of
communities on store-bought food increases in the Arctic-Barents Region
(Duerden 2004, 207).
The environment is a crucial resource for obtaining access to food in the
Arctic, and climate change could pose challenges to food accessibility.
Attributed to changing weather patterns, the frequent thawing and freezing
of snow in the Arctic has, for instance, hampered the reindeers’ accessibility
to food under the snow. Such outcomes of less access to pastures were
documented in cases where autumn and winter rain-on-snow (ROS) events
have resulted in ice-encrusted pastures and mass starvation of semi-domesticated
reindeer (Rangifer tarandus) and have increased in frequency and intensity
across the northwest Russian Arctic (Forbes et al. 2016, 1). This could be
especially important for reindeer herders, who migrate with their reindeer
during the summer and winter months to ﬁnd appropriate feeding grounds
for the herd. Therefore, in Russia the herds are often monitored closely by
the herders to adapt quickly to the outcomes of climate change (Rees et al.
2008).
Apart from reindeer meat, the Sámi, Veps and Nenets in the Arctic-Barents
Region rely on other traditional foods such as grouse, elk, fresh and saltwater
ﬁsh, and berries; their access to such food is also changing with climate patterns
(Berg 2014, 32). To this degree, climate change threatens the accessibility of
traditional food for all indigenous peoples across the Barents Region.
Food utilisation is related to the nutritional content that the body needs to
survive; traditional foods in the Barents Region are known to be high in protein,
vitamins, oils, natural fats and other essential nutrients. Lack of traditional food
due to limited accessibility and availability could promote further dependency
on store-bought foods with a high intake of sugar, salt and chemical pre-
servatives that can lead to further health issues such cardiovascular diseases,
obesity, diabetes and dental cavities (van Oostdam et al. 2003). There is also
growing evidence to suggest that warming temperatures in the Arctic can
threaten the safety of food, as pathogens tend to thrive in this atmosphere
(Burke and Lobell 2010, 28). This has implications for food safety throughout
the whole food systems process, from hunting to storage, cooking and ingestion.
Meat processing of game in the Arctic-Barents is not in a controlled envir-
onment with packaging and storage facilities, so the risk of pathogens and
bacteria in food can be signiﬁcantly higher (Parkinson and Evengård 2009, 2).
An increase in the presence of bacteria in caught game could also occur if
hunters have to account for additional travel to locate and transport food that
is further away. Furthermore, many of the microbes to which marine mammals
are susceptible are of concern to human health as they can be transferred
between animals and humans (Burek et al. 2008, 132). In addition, the pos-
sibility of invasive species from the south migrating north due to warming
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temperatures can lead to biodiversity loss in the region which will have
adverse eﬀect on the food supply chain (Lassuy and Lewis 2013, 77).
Climate change can inﬂuence the overall stability of the local food system;
today’s globalised economy is highly sophisticated and thus far manages to
supply the Barents Region with accessible and available food. However, this
could change as the food system becomes more costly from the globalised
impacts of climate change. Already, people in the Barents Region face the high
cost of imported foods as they move away from traditional foods to a growing
market-based economy. These changes have an impact on human health, live-
lihood assets, food production and distribution channels, as well as changing
purchasing power and market ﬂows (FAO 2008: iii). Furthermore, if these
challenges persist, crises in food supply are expected to increase in intensity and
duration, due to temporal ﬂuctuations in food resources (Paci et al. 2004, 3).
Chris Paci et al. (2004, 1) described climate change as a real and signiﬁcant
threat to food security of peoples living in the Arctic-Barents Region.
3.2. Human activities and globalisation
As investment in the region grows, human activities also threaten food and
human security. In particular, mining, oil and gas, shipping and tourism all
challenge food security in the Barents.
The timber industry has a signiﬁcant impact on traditional food security,
and sustainable forestry is vital to ensure the continuous promotion of food
availability and accessibility for both local and indigenous communities. The
forests are not only used for herding reindeer but all across the Arctic-Barents,
they are also a great source of traditional foods such as berries, herbs, shrubs,
lichen, moose, reindeer, lynx and wolverine. Both indigenous and non-indigenous
peoples use the land and environment for their traditional hunting, gathering
and cultural practices.
Reindeer husbandry has a special position among indigenous peoples,
especially amongst the Sámi and Nenets in the Barents Region (WGIP 2017).
Herding areas consist of coniferous forests that are heavily exploited by the
forestry industry (AWRH 2016). Logging threatens such practices, as reindeer
are herded to speciﬁc locations in the forest to graze, especially during the winter
months, and depend on the forest for food such as lichen or tree-hanging lichen
(Lawrence and Raitio 2006, 1–2). Because of exploitation, sources of food for
reindeer and the availability of non-wood forest products are becoming
increasingly limited.
Industrial activities and motorised vehicles pose various hazards to nearby
animals and species, leading to a loss in wildlife habitat. Noise can be potentially
disruptive to wildlife, causing nearby species to migrate further, and forcing
hunters to travel a greater distance or ﬁnd new hunting grounds altogether
(Green and Giese 2004, 85). In this way, the availability and accessibility of
traditional foods is threatened. In addition, chemicals and heavy metals
entering the water supply from heavily industrialised areas pose a risk for
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animals and humans alike. In the town of Nikel in Russia, for example,
pollution has had a drastic eﬀect on nearby local wildlife, the environment
and even food sources such as berries and mushrooms (Hansen 2016). The
town’s pollution has been at the top of the environmental agenda of the
Barents Cooperation (Nilsen 2016). Ultimately, the continued utilisation of
contaminated food and water, despite the risks associated with their consump-
tion, pose serious threats to health.
The impact of globalisation and the growing roles of multinational corpora-
tions associated with extractive industries is also a challenge to food security
in the Barents Region. In order to maintain a sustainable Arctic-Barents
Region, these multinational corporations need to ensure their extraction pro-
cedures do not pollute or contaminate the pristine land and water of the
region (Röver 2014, 3). In addition, oil and gas are established industries by
multinational corporations in the Barents Region. Norway and Russia are
world leaders in the exploration and exportation of both products. The World
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has expressed concerns regarding oil and gas
exploration over ineﬀective cleanup methods in instances of oil spills during
industrial oil and gas activities. These activities pollute the water and the land
meant for ﬁshing and farming respectively thus aﬀecting the availability and
utilisation of ﬁsh and crops. Noise pollution from drilling and production
techniques can also be a problem, they can disturb and cause acoustic
damage to ﬁsh and other animals using sound to navigate the ocean for food,
and in turn impact on both the economic and food value of such ﬁsh for the
community (WWF 2016). As mentioned above, changes to the ecosystem
resulting from human activities can aﬀect all four dimensions of food security
in the Barents communities and their waterways.
As the Barents Sea gets warmer, coastal areas used for ﬁshing and hunting
will be negatively impacted by a surge in Arctic shipping. Increasingly
warming sea ice consequently means disruptions to natural mating and
migration patterns for existing marine species, and the displacement of existing
species by newer ones (Bogstad 2015). When ships travel more regularly
through the central Arctic Ocean, they will likely bring new invasive species
to the Arctic as well as to northern ports (Palmer 2013). Shipping is the most
common pathway for marine invasive species, and it is responsible for 69% of
species introductions to marine areas (Palmer 2013). In turn, both humans
and animals that rely on the existing species in the marine ecosystem will be
impacted. Hence, the availability and accessibility dimensions of food security
are negatively aﬀected.
Ampliﬁed traﬃc could also result in an increase in minor discharges from
marine vessels, such as tankers, freighters, ﬁshing boats and coastal ferries.
Although these discharges are currently not readily monitored, their impression
on Arctic ecosystems may be substantial nonetheless (Nuttall 2000, 1). If
people consume ﬁsh that have been exposed to these minor discharges, they
face health-related risks, and therefore ampliﬁed traﬃc is a threat related to
food utilisation for coastal communities in the Barents Region.
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Tourism is a growing industry in the Barents Region, and similar to
increased shipping, tourist ferries and ships carry the risk of vessel accidents,
spills and pollution discharge, which could have major consequences for the
Arctic-Barents environment. As previously mentioned the noise from motorised
vehicles such as helicopters, snowmobiles and planes for recreational purposes
disturbs animals and can have a negative impact on the availability and
accessibility dimensions of food security.
Overall, a surge in tourism means a rise in garbage and waste, exclusively
in an area where decomposition is slow and waste remains visible on top of
the permafrost in many areas (Huntington et al. 2001, 102, box 36). This
garbage and waste might eventually end up in rivers; when eaten by ﬁsh they
enter the food chain, which results in unsafe foods. When humans eat this
food is can result in poor health.
In the Arctic-Barents Regions, sports ﬁshing and hunting have also gained
popularity amongst tourists, but it frequently puts pressure on resources and
leads to conﬂicts between local and visiting hunters (Snyder 2007, 15). There
can also be a conﬂict of interest between biological diversity and cultural
diversity, as exempliﬁed in the case of State governments and the indigenous
Sámi communities on salmon ﬁshing (Ween and Colombi 2013, 479). For cen-
turies, the Sámi people have both earned a living and passed on cultural tradi-
tions through salmon ﬁshing in the Tana River at the Finnish-Norwegian
border. They traditionally rely on drift net and weir ﬁshery, which have been
severely restricted by new proposals from the State governments of Norway and
Finland to protect salmon extinction (Johansen et al. 2008, 30). As a result, this
conﬂict represents a threat to both Sámi cultural identity and food security.
The overall food system stability in the Barents Region is threatened by
human activity, and there is a need for collaborative approaches from all
stakeholders in the region to address such threats.
3.3 Environmental pollution
Contaminants can have a severe impact on the health of the environment,
animals and people in the region. Contaminants and pollutants are entering
the Arctic-Barents Region at an ever-alarming rate due to climate change,
increased human activity, globalisation and environmental pollution. Pollu-
tants are transported to the Arctic via long-range atmospheric currents, the
marine environment, freshwater/terrestrial routes, and have bio-accumulated
in the food chains of individuals and communities living there (AMAP 1998
in Kuhnlein and Chan 2000, 597). Despite the fact that traditional foods are
noted as an excellent source of nutrients such as vitamin A, iron, poly-
unsaturated fatty acids, minerals and energy, they also contribute to good
social, spiritual and physical health; they are also the primary source of persis-
tent organic pollutants (POPs) and metals (AMAP 2009, 19).
The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) warned that
exposure to environmental contaminants through the traditional diet remains
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one of the greatest risks to human health in the Arctic (AMAP 2015, 21).
Traditional food systems in northern Europe have shown high levels of lead
and cadmium in plant ash, ﬁsh, sea mammals, birds, water and soil levels
(Kuhnlein and Chan 2000, 605).
Exposure to pollutants extends to humans through the consumption of
traditional foods, and can have negative impacts on food utilisation. The
consumption of certain environmental pollutants can adversely aﬀect the
development of the immune system (AMAP 2015, 97). The AMAP 2009
Report on Health explained that, ‘diet is the single most important predictor
of contaminant exposure in the Arctic populations’. The daily decision for
people choosing between what is safe and nutritious can be a daunting task.
Henceforth, there is a clear concern about contaminants, cultural values and
the availability of traditionally hunted species due to climate change, which
all play a role in inﬂuencing the types of traditional foods consumed, the
frequency of their consumption and the exposure of Arctic-Barents populations
to contaminants (AMAP 2009, 19).
Traditional food in the Arctic-Barents includes beliefs about food health
beneﬁts and spiritual provisioning, use of food for its educational value, eco-
nomic beneﬁts and place in the social fabric of community life (Kuhnlein and
Chan 2000, 617). Many researchers have noted the change in diet away from
traditional foods of meat and ﬁsh towards a more market-based diet
(Haraldson 1962; Kozlov et al. 2008, and Nilsson 2012, 12–13). The reasons
for this change has been associated with the lack of or lower quantities of
traditional food resources and increased commercially produced market foods
(Kuhnlein and Chan 2000, 598). This trend was observed in Sámi commu-
nities, and, with the warmer climate becoming less comfortable to them, has
aﬀected their livelihoods and health (Nuttall et al. 2005, 679).
According to AMAP, the changes in food sources can be inﬂuential in the
nutritional quality, density and food security of indigenous and non-indigenous
peoples (AMAP 2009, 21). The report further stated that, nutritionally
speaking, the problem is not with the imported food itself, but rather the
widespread replacement of traditional food by a diet that is high in sugar and
other foods with low nutrient density (AMAP 2009, 21). A shift away from
traditional foods, towards store-bought or market-based foods, threatens the
nutritional value and health beneﬁts from these foods; it also leads to scarcity
and threats regarding traditional seeds, knowledge on plant foods that are
used as medicines, food animals and the cultural practices associated with
their protection and survival (Egeland and Harrison 2013, 20). In fact, con-
sumption of market-based foods has been linked to an increase in obesity,
diabetes and cardiovascular disease in many Arctic-Barents communities
(McAuley and Knopper 2011, 1). Unlike traditional wildlife foods, however,
market food sources are monitored for contaminants through domestic policies
and international trade laws; to this extent, there is some assurance that food
species and ingredients are safe for consumption (Kuhnlein and Chan 2000,
616). In such cases, imported or market foods can provide some level of
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increased availability, accessibility and safer utilisation of food as suitable
alternatives in some cases. Overall, the eﬀects of globalisation limit the capacity
of local communities to take active roles in promoting their traditional foods
and ensuring food security.
4 Conclusions
Food security in the Barents Region has been relatively under-researched,
making it diﬃcult for policy makers to accurately assess and address the
needs of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in the region.
It is clear that the impacts of climate change, coupled with human activities
and globalisation, penetrate every aspect of life for people in the Barents
Region. These changes are occurring at a rapid pace, and impact human
security and related intertwined securities such as health, social, economic
and community. Therefore, a food system that responds to the threats posed
by climate change, human industrial activities and globalisation is required in
order to ensure food security in the region. Changes to livelihood patterns
have aﬀected how foods are produced, processed, distributed and consumed.
There is a need to collect and monitor data on food consumption patterns
progressively, from both traditional and imported food products, to determine
the potential health consequences from contaminants. Duhaime and Bernard
(2002, 37) suggested the development of scenarios to provide decision makers
with the information and data required to orient their decisions towards the
sustainability of economic systems, the sustainable exploitation of resources,
the optimisation of social health conditions, and the preservation of community
food security. In addition, ensuring food security in the Barents Region will
require adopting eﬀective and speciﬁc actions at individual, household, regional
and national levels. Strategies should place an emphasis on transforming the
agriculture and food systems to mitigate climate change.
The complex and interrelated nature of existing threats in the Barents
Region requires an innovative approach to determining solutions for food
security. Two ways by which potential solutions can be provided in the future
include the need for a better cross-border collaboration and knowledge shar-
ing amongst the stakeholders. Secondly, opportunities for food business
enterprises in the region that will encourage a ‘niche’ that add value to these
traditional foods.
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2.5 Water security in the Barents Region
Antonia Sohns
Water security permeates all dimensions of security. Equally, biophysical
processes, infrastructure, and the dynamic characteristics of political and
ﬁnancial institutions determine water security. This chapter examines water
security in the Barents Region and highlights the reciprocal and changing
relationship between water security and the diverse dimensions of human
security.
1 Deﬁnition
The United Nations (UN) deﬁnes water security as:
the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate
quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human
well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection
against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving
ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability.
(UN-Water 2013, 1)
While other deﬁnitions of water security vary depending on scale and context,
at its essence, water security is understood as the need to balance human
water use with water-related ecosystem use (Srinivasan et al. 2017; Wheater
2014; Y. Hossain et al. 2016). The UN deﬁnition highlights the four key
dimensions of water security that have been detailed in the Arctic context:
water availability, water access, utility of water for livelihood and household
needs, and future water resource stability (Daley et al. 2014; Penn 2016).
Water security is thus recognised as a deﬁning principle of human health and
wellbeing (O’Brien and Leichenko 2007; Harper et al. 2011).
The availability of water is determined by assessing the quantity and quality
of water that is produced, stored, processed and distributed. Water managers
consider a range of factors to determine water availability, from hydrologic
conditions and ecological water demands to water use across sectors and
water quality indicators. Accessibility, according to the UN, is measured by
the percentage of the population with access to 20 litres of drinking water per
day that do not contain biological or chemical agents detrimental to health,
and are located within a convenient distance from a person’s home (UNDP
2000). In rural areas, which describes many Arctic communities, the UN
deﬁnes a reasonable distance from a home as one that does not require a
person to spend a disproportionate amount of time fetching water to meet
their needs (UNDP 2000).
Utility is understood as water resources that are suﬃcient to meet house-
hold and livelihood needs and individual preference (Penn 2016; Loring
et al. 2016). The utility dimension of water security also captures the risk of
water-related disasters, such as extreme weather and ﬂooding in the Barents
Region, which may diminish water’s usefulness in meeting livelihood needs
or damage infrastructure (BEAC 2012). Stability captures the dynamic
nature of water, and emphasises that water security is a process, not a state
or condition (Penn et al. 2016). Indeed stability is the interaction between
utility, access and availability. Future water resource stability is therefore
concerned with the sustainable consumption of water supplies over time and
water’s temporal features, such as seasonal variation, which aﬀect its form
and availability.
These four dimensions are also applicable in deﬁning water security in the
Barents Region. The concept of water security must be contextualised in the
context of indigenous rights to resources, and the traditional water beliefs and
practices of the Sami, Nenets and Veps. States in the Barents Region have
agreed to cooperate in good faith with indigenous populations, and obtain
their consent prior to development, use, or exploration of their water resources
(Lávdegoddi 2012). The transformative processes of climate change aﬀect the
relationship between water and people in the Arctic. It is becoming ever more
important to understand the multiple, interacting factors across diﬀerent
geographic, social, jurisdictional and temporal scales (O’Brien et al. 2007;
O’Brien and Leichenko 2007).
2 Contextualisation
The freshwater that ﬂows North atop the North American and Eurasian
landmasses and permafrost into the Arctic Ocean accounts for 10 per cent of
the total ﬂow from the world’s rivers (CliC et al. 2016; Marino et al. 2009). In
the Barents Region, these rivers create unique freshwater ecosystems, such as
grasslands, wetlands, glaciers, ice sheets and frozen tundra that support
diverse species of plants and animals. The more than ﬁve million people in
the Barents Region depend on these seasonal and changing freshwater
resources for survival and for their livelihoods.
Much of the Arctic environment is an arid or semi-arid landscape, with
little annual rainfall. An exception to the polar desert environment is the
Atlantic sector of the Arctic between Greenland and Scandinavia, which
receives more rain from the Gulf Stream (NSIDC 2016). Due to the cold, dry
environment freshwater resources are limited in time and place (Alessa et al.
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2010). Arctic communities have therefore developed local water sources
over thousands of years, such as rivers, ice, snowmelt and lakes and water
storage strategies to cope with water’s seasonality and changing state
(Goldhar et al. 2013). Arctic populations also depend on municipally sup-
plied water delivered by truck or pipe depending on local water availability
and context. In the Barents Region, populations rely on piped water supply
in cities and also continue to use traditional sources to improve water
security due to water system failure, sociocultural perceptions of freshwater,
and necessity along herding routes (Alessa et al. 2008b; Alessa et al. 2010;
BEAC 2012).
Within each Arctic nation’s boundaries there are signiﬁcant regional diﬀer-
ences in water security. Local disparities in access and availability are often
obscured by national data (Hennessy and Bressler 2016; Dudarev et al.
2013a). Although there is a lack of data for the Barents Region, to illustrate
regional inequalities in water services across the Arctic a 2006 study revealed
that 99 per cent of Nunavik, Canada has access to hot running water, com-
pared to only 49 per cent access in Central Chukotka, Russia (Hennessy and
Bressler 2016; Poppel and Kruse 2006).
While water access is nearly universal in certain locations, such as the
Barents Region, it may be unsafe to drink due to poor water quality, water-
borne pathogens or contamination (Hennessy and Bressler 2016; Nilsson et
al. 2013b). For example, in the Russian city Nikel, heavy metal emissions and
dioxin pollution from the Norilsk nickel plant impaired water quality and led
to food safety warnings for certain regional lakes (Inari and Torvinen 2015).
These statistics illuminate the insecurities that Arctic populations face in
obtaining water of suﬃcient quantity and quality. This is particularly true in
the Barents Region where populations are regularly exposed to pollutants
from resource development such as mining (BEAC 2010).
An assessment of water security in the Barents Region and Arctic context
should account for its unique local characteristics, such as history and socio-
economic trends. These concomitant factors are dynamic. As the dimensions
of water security evolve and change over time, they are coupled with biophy-
sical exposures, such as climate change and seasonality of water resources,
which may heighten exposure to biophysical threats (O’Brien and Leichenko
2007). The exposure a community experiences may be compounded by the
results of political process and changing economic trends.
In the Barents Region, most of the Nordic area has widespread water
puriﬁcation systems and maintains control of industrial emissions to prevent
water contamination, however Troms County in Norway and Västerbotten
County in Sweden experience pollution from forestry, agricultural runoﬀ and
sewage (BEAC 2010). Compared to the Nordic area, the Russian Barents
Region is exposed to severe water insecurity due to unstandardised water
protocols, unregulated water quality and poor water supply systems (BEAC
2012; Emelyanova and Rautio 2016). In the Murmansk region, where there is
signiﬁcant mining of copper-ore, nickel and other rare metals, municipal
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water systems typically only chlorinate drinking water, which may leave
harmful, naturally occurring contaminants in the source water (Rautio et al.
2017; BEAC 2012). Indeed, Dudarev et al. found that in up to 51 per cent of
drinking water in the northwestern part of the Russian Arctic there were
very high levels of chemical contamination (Dudarev et al. 2013a). Cities
like Kirovsk, Zapolarny and Nikel, were found to have elevated levels of
hazardous pollutants such as aluminium and nickel, and water tested in the
Petchenga region had high levels of strontium and barium (Rautio et al.
2017). Most of these water security threats are related to industrial emissions
(BEAC 2012).
Insuﬃcient water management, irregular water monitoring and inconsistent
and old technology impact the health and wellbeing of the people in the
Barents Region (Mueller et al. 2016). For example, the water system in
Arkhangelsk Oblast has a leakage rate of 30 per cent during transport of
water to customers (BEAC 2010). The aged infrastructure in the Russian
Barents Region is representative of the deﬁcient water systems in Russia
at-large where more than 27 per cent of water pipes from reservoirs lack
water puriﬁcation facilities and 16 per cent are not equipped with disinfection
systems (Dudarev et al. 2013b).
In northern Russian territories, the shortage of good quality drinking water,
poor sanitation, unhygienic conditions, decentralised water systems and waste
handling have plagued communities (Dudarev et al. 2013a). Such conditions
have led to a higher incidence of bacterial dysentery in Yakutia, Taimyr and
Chukotka compared to the national average (Dudarev et al. 2013b). Despite
identiﬁed water concerns in Russia, there is no standard protocol to assess
water security and researchers have called for a full reform of the Russian
water industry (Dudarev et al. 2013a).
Across the Barents Region, further assessment of the quality and quantity
of groundwater is vital to maintaining a sustainable use of water resources
and the health of populations, as 95 per cent of North Ostrobothnia County
relies on groundwater (BEAC 2010). In several areas of the Barents Region,
groundwater quality studies to measure concentrations of heavy metals and
pesticides have not been conducted (BEAC 2010). Water security therefore
varies depending on the community, and its unique physical, cultural, poli-
tical and economic characteristics (Alessa et al. 2010; Goldhar et al. 2013).
Without improved water management and water monitoring, Arctic ecosys-
tems and communities will be challenged by the changing climate and
hydrologic cycle.
3 Assessment
Climate change, human activity and globalisation exacerbate water security
across its four dimensions. These challenges are complex and interconnected.
The following sections examine some of the impacts these threats have on
water resources and future water security in the Barents Region.
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3.1 Climate change
The impacts of climate change are manifesting in the Arctic at a startling
pace and profoundly aﬀecting freshwater resources and ecosystems. From the
small intermittent streams to the intricate networks of shallow ponds and
marshes, the Arctic’s land and waterscapes are mutable and morphing in the
warming north. The changing climate is aﬀecting the stability of water
resources and water availability for ecosystems and human populations
(McClelland et al. 2004; Prowse et al. 2015; Bintanja and Andry 2017).
Climate impacts on the hydrological regime will aﬀect the volume and
seasonality of precipitation and river discharge (Dankers and Middelkoop
2008). With the onset of climate change in the Barents Region, river discharge
will increase in all seasons except late spring and early summer (Dankers and
Middelkoop 2008; Mueller et al. 2016). These changes alter the availability,
utility and long-term stability of water supplies by aﬀecting turbidity, introdu-
cing new contaminants and mobilising existing pollutants in the environment.
Water availability and utility may be additionally limited due to warmer
temperatures and the spread of new species and waterborne pathogens
(Martin et al. 2009; Ford et al. 2014; Harper et al. 2011; Harper et al. 2015).
Already, the incidence of waterborne diseases in the general population in the
Russian Arctic, Siberia and the Far East is very high (Dudarev et al. 2013a).
Communities have observed a gradual drying of lakes and marshes due to
higher temperatures, therefore reducing available water supply (White et al.
2007a; Ford and Smit 2004; Martin et al. 2009). The warming temperatures
in the Volga and Komi are thawing the land and increasing available water by
ﬁve per cent, whereas in northern Fennoscandia water in the soil is disappearing
(Roderfeld et al. 2008). The majority of changes to soil moisture will take place
by 2050, therefore having uncertain yet imminent impacts on the water available
to communities across the Barents Region (Roderfeld et al. 2008).
Climatic shifts have increased variability of water resources across temporal
and spatial scales and produced new interactions between groundwater and
surface water as permafrost thaws (Loring 2010; Martin et al. 2009; Prowse et
al. 2007; D. White et al. 2007a). For the people in the Barents Region, the
snow season will be shortened by two months and snowmelt will occur earlier
(Dankers and Middelkoop 2008; Roderfeld et al. 2008). More precipitation is
projected to fall as rain instead of snow, and precipitation is predicted to
increase across the Barents Region, thus aﬀecting water supply (Dankers and
Middelkoop 2008). Despite more rain and river discharge, heightened varia-
bility of the hydrological cycle due to warming temperatures may dry out
tundra habitat, alter the timing of spring ﬂooding, and threaten water security
(Roderfeld et al. 2008; BEAC 2012).
Water access provided by built infrastructure, including water pipes, was-
tewater lagoons, and puriﬁcation systems is being rendered inoperable as they
warp in the Earth’s active layer. Protective berms that contain wastewater
lagoons will be weakened with the thawing ground. This change will
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compromise wastewater treatment methods in the Arctic, and potentially
contaminate drinking water resources with raw sewage (Martin et al. 2009).
Climate change has an impact on water utility, which includes water
hazards and vulnerabilities. Storms have damaged and disrupted water and
sanitation systems through coastal erosion and storm surge (Brubaker et al.
2011; Thomas et al. 2013). Freshwater supplies in lowland and coastal areas
are susceptible to saltwater intrusion from worsening storm surge and rising
seas. Such hydrologic changes shift vital chemistry and characteristics of the
environment, potentially jeopardising ecosystem services. In the Komi
Republic, ﬂooding and deluges have waterlogged the land and threatened
homes, power lines and bridges (BEAC 2010). Flooding and the destructive
nature of water are of increasing concern across the Barents Region.
The changing stability of Arctic freshwater systems greatly inﬂuences human
wellbeing. Variable water supplies have serious health consequences for Arctic
populations. In the Russian Arctic, poor quality water supplies and a lack of
centralised water systems results in an increased incidence of hepatitis A,
giardiasis, shigellosis, among other infectious and parasitic diseases (Dudarev
et al. 2013a). Despite the proven beneﬁts of suﬃcient water supplies on
human health, health interventions often neglect speciﬁc water quality and
domestic water supply standards (Daley et al. 2014). Water variability also
aﬀects physical health (Goldhar et al. 2013; Daley et al. 2014). Due to the
hardship of collecting water, snow and ice, men experience chronic back and
shoulder pain (Goldhar et al. 2013; Sarkar et al. 2015) Limited water supply
and the fear of water insecurity additionally increase mental stress in individuals
(Sarkar et al. 2015).
3.2 Human activities and globalisation
As the Arctic warms, human activity is changing as well. Dynamic shifts such
as demographic trends, globalisation, mining, resource development and
shipping are increasing water insecurity in the Barents Region. In particular,
the mining industry is growing and its impacts on water resources are wide-
spread. Mining operations contaminate local water resources with tailings
and waste, thereby reducing local water availability and utility (BEAC 2012;
Sandlos and Keeling 2016). Leaks during mining operations, such as in the
Terrafame mine in Sotkamo, eastern Finland and in Russia by Norilsk Nickel
have resulted in signiﬁcant contamination of surface and groundwater with
elevated levels of metals including nickel, uranium, aluminium and copper
(News 2017; AFP 2016).
Abandoned mines also leach toxic waste into the environment and con-
taminate water resources, adversely impacting human health (Sandlos and
Keeling 2016). In Västerbotten County some industrial sites risk con-
taminating water bodies with heavy metals (BEAC 2010). With the onset of
climate change, more extreme weather will challenge existing mining opera-
tions and may result in more leaks. These water releases pollute nearby water
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resources and threaten the health of those who rely on local water supplies
(Pearce et al. 2011).
Additionally, a less predictable water supply may impair the energy industry
and its operations. Changing seasonal precipitation patterns and higher
temperatures will limit water availability for operations and will reduce
recovery rates further. In many cases, mining is heavily dependent on local
water supplies and increased water scarcity can threaten a mine’s rate of pro-
duction, its dust suppression ability and mine drainage. Despite the risks and
potential climate impacts, mining operations and regulations have remained
largely unchanged. Some mining operators have expressed concern regarding
the lack of adaptation planning for mining operations due to uncertainty
around climate change impacts (Pearce et al. 2011; Ford et al. 2010).
In the case of power generation, extreme weather will impact the planning
and operation of energy systems (Snorrason and Jonsdottir 2005). Hydropower
will be especially aﬀected by climate change as precipitation regimes and
temperatures shift, thereby altering the annual inﬂow of water and the seasonal
distribution of water (Golombek et al. 2012). Such variations impact the
reliability of hydropower to supply electricity due to ﬂuctuating water levels in
the reservoirs (Golombek et al. 2012; Rodriguez et al. 2013). It is predicted
that increased precipitation and river runoﬀ will beneﬁt electricity production
from hydropower (Lehner et al. 2005; O’Brien et al. 2004). However, as river
discharge is anticipated to increase by more than 25 per cent in some areas of
the Barents Region by 2020, the runoﬀ may increase the magnitude of
ﬂooding and therefore damage dam infrastructure (Lehner et al. 2005;
O’Brien et al. 2004). Such changes to the hydrologic cycle will not only
impact hydropower, but may threaten water quantity and quality for mining,
industrial use and power generation (Instanes et al. 2016).
Continued growth of the forestry, oil and gas industries in the Barents
Region will additionally challenge freshwater supplies as industry places
increasing pressure on water resources for operations. There is global interest in
winning mining contracts in the Barents Region. For example, China’s state oil
company, China National Petroleum Corp, is negotiating a joint exploration
of oil resources in the Barents and Pechora Seas with Rosneft, owned by the
Russian Government (Larsen and Fondahl 2015). Additionally, changing the
land for development, such as through clear-cutting and ditching in forestry
in Västerbotten County, mobilises phosphorous and severely diminishes
freshwater quality (BEAC 2010). Gas extraction similarly appropriates new
land for exploration and development and degrades freshwater resources. On
the Yamal Peninsula, development and land use change has impaired water
resources to such an extent that water sources may not be able to support
tundra nomadism in the future, and herders risk being socially and culturally
alienated from the land (Forbes et al. 2009).
Demographic shifts are an additional stress on water security in the Barents
Region. Across the Arctic there has been a continued movement towards
urban centres, while the smaller settlements are declining in number and size
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(Larsen and Fondahl 2015). The growing populations in the Nordic side of
the Barents Region increases pressure on local and regional freshwater
resources and systems (Medeiros et al. 2016; Instanes et al. 2016; K. Hossain
2016). On the Russian side of the Barents Region, populations have been
declining since the disintegration of the Soviet Union (AMAP 2017). Shifting
demographics and seasonal ﬂuxes of workers puts additional stress on existing
water infrastructure. Additionally, new Arctic shipping routes will bring an
inﬂux of tourists. The ships and people may transport new species and
damage water resources and freshwater ecosystems in the Barents Region
(Larsen and Fondahl 2015; BEAC 2010). Other indirect eﬀects that impair
freshwater resources and environments are trash disposal as well as road and
infrastructure development (Forbes et al. 2009).
As pollution compromises water resources, cascading impacts across sectors
emerge. Forbes et al. (2009) document how degraded water sources due to
development result in a loss of ﬁsh, and degraded vegetation and soils. Such
changes heighten food insecurity for reindeer herders on the Yamal Peninsula
(Forbes et al. 2009). These stresses are comparable to other regions around
the Arctic, such as Alaska, Canada and Greenland, which are experiencing
increasing pressures from resource development and globalisation.
4 Conclusions
Arctic freshwater systems are challenged by aging and insuﬃcient infrastructure,
impaired freshwater resources, ecosystem degradation, industrial development,
climate change and demographic shifts that are occurring concomitantly (Forbes
et al. 2009). Collectively, these factors determine the water security and health of
Arctic communities (Nilsson et al. 2013a). To mitigate the impact of these
changes on freshwater resources and the water security of the Barents Region,
it is vital to increase research on all aspects of water security.
In the Barents Region, there is a great need for more data regarding
hydrological characteristics of Arctic rivers and watersheds, and for improved
measurement of precipitation (Dankers and Middelkoop 2008). Groundwater
assessments and studies should also be conducted to determine the quantity
and quality of groundwater resources and to establish a baseline. Measureable
quantitative indicators of water security should be implemented and monitored
in the Arctic regions over time (Nilsson et al. 2013b).
More robust water governance will improve water security of populations
and protect water resources (Dudarev et al. 2013b; Hennessy and Bressler
2016). Due to the international context of the Barents Region, coordinating
research and databases will improve regional water security. Consistent lan-
guage and indicators should be established to measure water security across
localities and contexts. The absence of integrated policymaking across sectors
in Arctic regions, and by extension the Barents Region, demands urgent
attention. Tradeoﬀs and opportunities between resources should be recog-
nised and reﬂected in policy. Due to the changing state of the Arctic and the
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reciprocal vulnerabilities that communities and existing industries will experi-
ence, it is vital that Arctic water governance frameworks consider cross-
sectoral stressors that will have a lasting impact on water resources today and
into the future.
For long-lasting and inclusive water management in the Barents Region,
diverse perspectives from around the region must be incorporated into the
framework. It is important that strategies to adapt to climate change at all
levels of governance are based on understanding the determinants of water
security and cultural factors (Nilsson et al. 2013b; Alessa et al. 2008b). There
is also a pressing need to identify the implications of freshwater trends on
Arctic peoples and their ability to maintain control over water resources with
the onset of these imminent changes (Goldhar et al. 2014). More research is
needed regarding the impacts of climate change on local freshwater resources,
to understand how communities are adapting water and sanitation systems to
the warming and changing environment (Cook and Bakker 2012; Alessa et al.
2008b; Alessa et al. 2008a).
With continued research and implementation of strong local and regional
freshwater policies, the Barents Region will be able to enhance its water
security. In doing so, the Barents Region will be able to improve the health
and livelihoods of communities, protect valuable ecosystems and ensure the
long-term viability of resource development.
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2.6 Energy security in the Barents Region
A focus on societal perspectives
Hanna Lempinen and Dorothée Cambou
This chapter discusses the issue of energy security within the broader frame-
work of societal security in the Barents Region. As a ‘master resource’
(Strauss, Rupp and Love 2013, 11), energy penetrates and crosscuts all aspects
of the broadly understood human security: economic, food, health, environ-
mental, personal, community and political security dimensions and concerns
(cf. UNDP 1994). However, societal aspects of energy security remain largely
understudied and are often overlooked in energy-related debates and decision-
making, including in the context of the Barents Region.
1 Deﬁnition: the many faces of energy security
There is a wealth of literature discussing the deﬁnition of energy security,
although the issue of energy remained absent from the 2004 UNDP Report
concerning human security. Today, most debates regarding energy security
take place through terms which
denote unimpeded access or no planned interruptions to sources of
energy, not relying on a limited number of energy sources, not being tied
to a particular geographic region for energy sources, abundant energy
resources, an energy supply which can withstand external shocks, and/or
some form of energy self-suﬃciency.
(Chester 2010, 887)
Traditionally, much of this discussion has revolved around the ways in
which these themes play out on the state level in the context of securing ‘the
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an aﬀordable price’ (IEA
2017). However, along with expanding understandings of ‘security’ in the
broader ﬁeld of security studies, questions such as security for whom; security
for what values; and security from what threat(s) have also entered the stages
of energy-related security theorising (cf. Cherp and Jewell 2014).
Indeed, what needs to be acknowledged is the instrumental role that energy
has in securing other functions and goals (Scrase and Ockwell 2010): it is not
only fundamental to maintaining all political, economic and societal life
(Aalto and Westphal 2007, 5; also Prontera 2009, 9), but also a prerequisite to
development of any kind, and essential for everyday activities, quality of life
and human survival (Rüdiger 2008, vii; Hemsath 2010, 8; WCED 1987, 141).
Echoing the principles of the human security approach, the General Assembly
in its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development also emphasised the interplay
between sustainable development and energy as it envisages a ‘world free of
poverty, hunger, disease and want … free of fear and violence…with equitable
and universal access to quality education, health care and social protection…
and where there is universal access to aﬀordable, reliable and sustainable
energy’ (UN General Assembly 2015). Thus, energy is a core component of
human development and wellbeing and cannot be relegated to the spheres of
high politics and market transactions nor to the domains of technology and
science (cf. Lempinen 2017; Strauss, Rupp and Love 2013). Instead, the all-
encompassing nature of energy (security) concerns only underline the impor-
tance of engaging lay voices and non-specialist perspectives in the processes of
deﬁning what energy security entails (cf. Ciutâ 2010, 125).
In an attempt to accommodate the foundational importance that energy
has for states, societies and communities, some additional dimensions or
aspects of energy security have been suggested. Among the most institutio-
nalised deﬁnitions is the model of the ‘four A’s’ (cf. e.g. Kruyt et al. 2009),
which adds the dimensions of accessibility and acceptability to the normally
included availability and aﬀordability. Out of these, acceptability refers to the
awareness over the environmental and societal externalities inevitably associated
with all and any energy solutions: meanwhile, accessibility points towards
acknowledging the political, economic and technological barriers that might
hinder (cost-eﬀective) access to existing energy resources (Fischhendler and
Nathan 2014, 153). Bradshaw’s (2012) understanding of contemporary energy
security is closely related with the four A’s and emphasises the resource
geographic, institutional, ﬁnancial and ecological dimensions that together
constitute the energy security concern. Out of these, the three former inte-
grate the components of availability, aﬀordability and accessibility, while the
latter explicitly adds considerations of ecological and environmental
acceptability to the list.
The emphases on the societal and environmental aspects and impacts
associated with the energy concern have not emerged in a societal void. There
has been a ‘growing criticism of cultural ignorance with which many energy
implementation projects are handled’ (Bastholm and Henning 2014, 1; see
also Strauss 2011) and associated concerns over societal acceptance of energy
production have received increasing public attention (Mitchell et al. 2011). In
a similar manner, the question of accessibility – more often than not con-
ceptualised in state-centric terms – has also become viewed through a more
societally attuned lens. Borrowing from the emerging literature on energy
justice, questions of access both to energy resources themselves as well as to
the beneﬁts derived from their extraction have gradually become included in
the domains of energy security debates (cf. Fuller and MacCauley 2016).
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As if this conceptual complexity were not enough, the task of deﬁning
energy security is only further complicated by the diversity of energy itself:
indeed, what ‘energy’ actually refers to is seldom explicated or explained
(cf. Littleﬁeld 2013, 779; Rupp 2013). In order to engage in any meaningful
discussion about the energy security situation in the Barents Region, it is
therefore necessary to acknowledge the diversity of energy in terms of diﬀerent
energy sources ranging from renewables to non-renewables as well as the
speciﬁc concerns associated with energy production, transportation and
consumption.
Together, the above remarks highlight the inevitably contextual nature of
the ‘polysemic’ (Chester 2010, 887) notion of energy security. Since ‘nothing
exists that is not energy, or aﬀected by energy’ (Ciutâ 2010, 125), there is a
risk that without proper deﬁnition and an explicit context, the concept of
energy security becomes ‘empty’ in a sense that it means the ‘security of
everything […] everywhere […] against everything’ (ibid., 136; italics in original).
In this chapter, the required contextualisation is done within the geographical
context of the Barents as well as through a focus on the societal aspects that
energy security might entail for the peoples, communities and societies within
the region.
2 Energy security concerns in the Barents Region
As a part of the broader Arctic region, the Barents has become to be deﬁned
mainly in terms of its estimated massive energy endowments and the role they
are expected to have in feeding the ‘resource-starved world’ (Holm 2015, xv).
An estimated fourth of the world’s remaining hydrocarbon resources are
located in the Arctic region, and most of them are expected to be found from
the high seas surrounding the Barents (USGS 2009). Indeed, while marine areas
are not included in the oﬃcial deﬁnition of the Barents Region, in the speciﬁc
context of energy they are included in the regional energyscape (cf. Lempinen
2017, 76).
Much like in the context of the broader Arctic, the word ‘energy’ has
become synonymous with the production of oil and gas exports for global
markets, and this is true in the Barents Region, which has a long history as a
resource exporter (cf. Tennberg et al. 2012, 15–18). The regional energy
landscape is, however, signiﬁcantly more diverse than oil and gas production
and transportation. Parts of the region are wealthy in terms of their renewable
energy endowments: energy sources such as wind, hydro, tidal, wave, solar and
biomass are utilised in and around the region to a varying degree, as is peat
energy (cf. Lempinen 2017, 91; Banul 2012). In eﬀect, there are also major
diﬀerences between the energy supply structures in the diﬀerent parts of the
Barents Region. In general, fossil fuels constitute a major energy source in all
Barents parts but only dominate in the energy mix of the Russian parts. In
Sweden and Norway, hydroelectric energy represents the primary energy
source (CENTEK AB 2010). In addition, renewable fuels (biomass and urban
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waste) are important energy sources in Sweden but not in the Norwegian or
Russian parts. The signiﬁcance of nuclear energy and related concerns cannot
be downplayed, either: the Murmansk oblast relies heavily on nuclear energy,
and Finland has commissioned the construction of a new nuclear power plant
in the municipality of Pyhäjoki.
What this production-oriented storyline to a great extent overlooks is that
the Barents Region is also a home to around ﬁve million local and indigenous
inhabitants (BEAC 2016). As in many other parts of the Arctic, long dis-
tances and cold climate place some of the residents of the Barents Region
amongst the highest per capita energy consumers worldwide (Rasmussen and
Roto 2011, 151). The extensive presence of energy-intensive heavy industries
only further contributes to the high demand of energy in the region
(Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2006, 12). As a result, regional concerns associated
with energy eﬃciency and saving are also acutely important in the overall energy
security puzzle of the Barents Region (cf. Hirvaskari and Gerashchenko 2015;
also Hemsath 2010, 11, 24).
3 Assessing regional energy security
Against this background, assessing the energy security situation in the Barents
Region must equally include the diversity of the Barents as a geographical,
political and sociocultural region, as well as the diversity of energy in its own
right. Considering that the dimensions and deﬁnitions of energy security are
still debated, this assessment adopts an approach that combines two of the
deﬁnitions mentioned above. The deﬁnitions of Kruyt et al. (2009) and Brad-
shaw (2012) deal with energy security in the region through the integrated and
overlapping components of availability; aﬀordability; environmental aspects;
and acceptability of energy-related decisions and measures in the region. In
addition, energy security concerns speciﬁcally relating to indigenous people
within the region are brieﬂy addressed in a separate, dedicated sub-section.
3.1 Availability
While the concerns of energy availability in the context of energy security
have traditionally been conceptualised in state level terms, the importance of
reliable everyday energy supplies cannot be underestimated at the level of
societies, communities and everyday life. The everyday activities and quality
of life in the Barents Region are heavily dependent on – or even ‘dictated by’
(Hemsath 2010, 8) – the reliable and uninterrupted availability of heat, fuel
and electricity. However, this reliability cannot be taken for granted in all
parts of the region. In some parts of the Barents, especially in Russia, the
unreliable and out-of-date energy infrastructure frequently contributes to
delivery disruptions (cf. Lempinen 2017, 92), and the otherwise reliable
transmission systems in other parts of the Barents remain vulnerable to
unexpected events such as natural disasters (cf. Tennberg and Vola 2014).
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As such, both the dependence on long distance transports as well as the
overdependence on single energy source pose threats for the availability of energy
supplies (Hemsath 2010, 24). However, limitations related to the regional energy
infrastructure, as well as the material qualities of diﬀerent energy sources that
the existing energy systems have been designed to utilise, make the diversiﬁ-
cation of energy supplies in the region a burdensome task (cf. ibid., 9; Lähde
2015; Bridge 2011). While oil and gas still remain the dominant sources of
energy, the use of renewable energy is increasingly solicited at the local,
national and international levels. In fact, the Barents Region is rich in
renewable energy resources, especially its Nordic part, where energy systems
have a long tradition of using eﬃcient water, bio-energy, wind and geothermal
energy (NORDEN 2010, 11). The Nordic states also have signiﬁcant potential
to increase their production and use of renewable energy, while in Russia, the
government has also begun to encourage work on energy eﬃciency and the
development of renewable energy sources since the adoption of the Federal
Law in 2009 ‘On energy saving and energy eﬃciency improvements’.
However, the required transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy has
progressed much further in the Nordic countries than in the Russian parts of
the Barents (CENTEK AB 2010). Despite its potential, several barriers still
prevents most cities and municipalities in Russia from increasing their energy
eﬃciency and use of renewables. The low price for fossil fuels (CENTEK AB
2010) as well as the lack of awareness, capacities and skills in Russian muni-
cipalities in regards to the possibilities and beneﬁts of energy eﬃciency and
renewables constitute major hurdles limiting the development of renewable
(Barents Euro-Arctic Energy Working Group 2011). Processes related to the
planning and approval of projects also generally limit opportunities for
development in the area of renewables. This is notably the case in the area of
wind power development projects (NORDEN 2010, 12), which nevertheless
continue to ﬂourish in the Nordic countries. Ultimately, increasing the avail-
ability of renewable energy in the Barents Region therefore requires new
technologies, investments, and policy solutions.
3.2 Aﬀordability
Despite designations of the broader Arctic as the world’s new energy province,
parts of the Arctic Barents Region are still plagued by energy poverty, despite
their tremendous energy wealth. While deﬁnitions of energy poverty vary, in
its most classical articulations it is deﬁned as a state where more than ten
percent of a person’s or a household’s income is spent on energy and fuel (cf.
Boardman 1991). In more qualitative terms, energy poverty has been brieﬂy
deﬁned as inadequate access, aﬀordability, reliability and safety of energy
resources for consumption (cf. Bazillian et al. 2014, 219–220).
Regardless of the deﬁnition adopted, the issue of energy poverty remains a
timely concern also for the Barents Region and some of its residents and
communities. While in many areas and for many communities energy-related
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costs do not play a deﬁning role on the everyday level, some ﬁndings from the
broader Arctic indicate that especially in remote rural communities the high
costs of transportation fuels have an impact on subsistence lifestyles and the
viability of communities that depend on them (Hemsath 2010). Despite the
advantages created by motorised transportation, the dependence of most
rural and indigenous inhabitants in the Arctic communities on available and
aﬀordable fuel to hunt, ﬁsh and gather reindeer undermine their subsistence
livelihoods and their capacity to meet their dietary and cultural needs.
However, only considering the theme of aﬀordability in the context of rural
and/or indigenous communities is not adequate in covering the whole spectrum
of issues related to the economic aspect of regional energy security. The
aﬀordability component of energy security intertwines the explicit issue of
energy into a broader societal whole. Besides the potential of uncontrollable
ﬂuctuations in energy commodity pricing (Hemsath 2010, 24), changes in
micro- and macroeconomic situations in the region inﬂuence the ability of
individuals and households to aﬀord their energy needs (for economic conditions
in the Barents Region c.f. Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2008, 11–26). Amongst
other things, changes in employment situation, health status or family relations,
reforms or cuts in national social security schemes and growing societal
inequality can dramatically inﬂuence the aﬀordability situation at a household
level in otherwise energy aﬄuent communities.
3.3 Environmental aspects
Environmental considerations related to energy production, transportation,
and consumption also constitute a large component of the overall energy
security situation in the Barents Region from the societal perspective. Many
of the ‘environmental hot spots’ monitored under the Barents cooperation are
linked either to the heat and power generation sector, or to handling oil spills
and oil or coal mining waste (cf. BEAC 2017, see also chapter 1 on environ-
mental security for further details). In addition to the environmental and
climate impacts of energy production, heat and power generation themselves,
the risks of spills and leaks associated with the processes of production and
transportation pose environment-related energy security threats and chal-
lenges. Potential oil spills – both on- and oﬀshore – could have detrimental
impacts on the lives and livelihoods within an environmentally sensitive
region, such as the Barents (PAME 2009, 136–138; Hemsath 2010, 20–21).
It is important to consider, however, that there is no ‘problem-free’ means
of producing energy that comes without environmental externalities of some
kind. Additionally, renewable energy solutions are accompanied by a range of
issues to consider, depending equally on the energy source in question as well as
the siting of the development project. However, the environmental aspects
and impacts of renewable energy alternatives continue to be underestimated
and downplayed (for a brief summary see Fischhendler et al. 2015, 198).
While recent discussions revolve around wind power developments (Dai et al.
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2015, 911), the development of hydropower has also been and continues to be
a source of local environmental conﬂict in some parts of the region (cf. e.g.
Strauss 2011, Suopajärvi 2001).
In addition, nuclear energy – a prominent impetus for political cooperation
in the Barents Region (cf. BEAC 1993) – continues to pose its own, fundamental
concerns in the region. As the existing nuclear reactors in the Kola Peninsula
are running on overtime (cf. AMAP 2015, 67) and the construction of a new
nuclear power plant has begun in the Finnish Barents (Fennovoima 2017),
nuclear energy production in the region will continue for several decades to
come. Alongside the existing risks associated with nuclear power plants,
potential accidents from ﬂoating nuclear power plants or nuclear powered
icebreakers, radioactive waste dumped into the Barents and Kara seas during
the Soviet times (AMAP 2015, 5–7, 67) as well as issues related to the handling
and storage of nuclear waste, continue to pose radiation safety concerns (ibid.,
21–33). Furthermore, incidents or accidents in nuclear power plants located
outside the geographic borders of the Barents can potentially still have reper-
cussions within the region (see Chapter 1 on environmental security).
One crucial aspect relates to the dominant role of oil and gas production to
global climate concerns. While climate change remains to a great extent
absent from northern energy-related debates (cf. Norgaard 2011; Lempinen
2017, 170–171; Tynkkynen and Tynkkynen, forthcoming), the hydrocarbon-
dependent global energy system is the single biggest source of anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions (Bradshaw 2010, 275). At the same time, climate
change ‘is the most pervasive and powerful driver of change’ (Arctic Council
2016, viii) in the circumpolar north, including the Barents Region, within
which fossil fuel based energy is equally produced and consumed in large
quantities. In this context, the climate and environmental impacts of regional
household energy consumption exemplify a case where the northern residents
are not only the referent object of energy security, but whose everyday choices
and practices also place them in the position of global energy (in)security
providers.
3.4 Acceptability
The acceptability dimension of energy security is heavily involved in weighing
the potential gains of energy-related decisions and measures against the
harm that they may cause. While much of the discussion over energy activities
and their impacts in the broader Arctic revolve around the special challenges
faced by the indigenous populations in the region, the position of local, non-
indigenous populations as well as the impacts to communities and societies
residing outside the Arctic region also contribute to overall concerns (cf.
Lempinen 2017, 123–127).
Reports and assessments dealing with the broader Arctic have identiﬁed the
pervasive and profound ways in which Arctic energy projects penetrate and
impact all aspects of northern societies. The impacts of northern energy
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activities range from macro and microeconomic eﬀects to inﬂuencing demo-
graphy, health, education and training. In addition, they have the potential to
impact governance, cultural integrity, contact with nature, and the subsequent
interactive eﬀects arising from their intersections (AMAP 2010). As a con-
sequence, no community or society in the Barents Region is immune to the
inﬂuence of regional energy-related developments.
What constitutes an impact, however, is not as straightforward as it might
initially appear. The notion of impact is perspectival in the sense that experi-
enced impacts might not directly reﬂect the (f)actual and measurable out-
comes observed. Instead, the perceptions and impressions of the aﬀected
individuals and communities are always formed in the interplay of their per-
sonal histories and ‘real-world’ developments (Del Río and Burguillo 2008,
1328–1329; Whitton et al. 2015). Furthermore, communities are both diﬀerent
between each other as well as internally heterogeneous. This means that very
diﬀerent views about the energy (security) situation as well as about the
ongoing developments might exist both between diﬀerent communities as well
as within one community.
From the perspective of acceptability, the discussion above relates directly
to the ethics and morals of the allocation of costs and beneﬁts of energy-related
developments in the region (cf. MacCauley et al. 2016) as well as to the issue of
local access to the resources produced in the region for the needs of the global
markets. Historically, the positive and negative impacts of Arctic energy pro-
jects have been unevenly distributed amongst aﬀected communities, between
the project operators, and the producing regions (cf. Hemsath 2010, 23;
Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2006, 16; AMAP 2010). The acceptability of energy-
related developments also converges with broader societal security through
the conﬂict potential that is embedded in any energy-related project relating
to elements of experienced injustice and inequality. If the social license to
operate (cf. e.g. Gehman, Lefsrud and Fast 2017, Hall 2014) is not secured
from the impacted communities, this potential, in turn, can actualise in the
form of social unrest both in localised contexts within the region as well as
anywhere within networks of global society (Hemsath 2010, 24; Mitchell
et al. 2001).
3.5 Energy security and indigenous peoples of the Barents Region
Although the impacts of energy production are broad and play a role in the lives
of all inhabitants of the region, indigenous peoples have disproportionately
suﬀered from the eﬀects of energy development and production of energy
resources. In addition, the production of coal and uranium mining, oil and
gas extraction, nuclear power, hydropower and wind development are bountiful
in the Barents Region, and indigenous peoples are among those who beneﬁt
least from these developments. As discussed in the chapter concerning com-
munity security, indigenous peoples have historically been deprived of access
to their traditional land and resources, and despite current progress still suﬀer
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from the consequences of colonisation and assimilation policies. Land and
territories where indigenous communities live are often resource rich and
serve as the location from which companies extract resources.
Today, the development of energy projects from resources on indigenous
lands continues to threaten their traditional livelihoods. In the Nordic coun-
tries, the Sami way of life, especially in relation to reindeer husbandry, is
threatened signiﬁcantly by competing land uses, often promoted by the gov-
ernments themselves through natural resource extraction or renewable energy
projects (Anaya 2011, 15–21). In Finland for instance, logging activities con-
tinue to pose a threat to the Sami livelihoods, in particular to reindeer herding
activities. Speciﬁcally, this is due to the lack of consideration for the protec-
tion of the rights of the Sami people to land and natural resources (Anaya
2011, para. 59). This situation is also comparable to the case of the Sami
people living in Norway and Sweden.
Although the recognition of the rights of the Sami people in Norway has
improved since the adoption of the Consultation Agreement and the Finnmark
Act in 2005, the Sami Parliament of Norway continues to indicate that the
Sami people still face a lack of involvement and authority in the decision-
making processes aﬀecting their lands and resources. In this regard, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR 2013) expressed
its concerns that Norway’s ‘measures for the preservation and promotion of
Sami culture do not suﬃciently guarantee the right of the Sami people to
enjoy their traditional means of livelihood (art. 15)’ and recommended that
Norway should ‘take steps to preserve and promote the traditional means of
livelihood of the Sami people, such as reindeer-grazing and ﬁshing’. In addition,
Sami representatives have also suggested that the implementation of the 2009
Mineral Act ‘remains particularly challenging in relation to energy develop-
ment projects and reindeer husbandry’, a statement also supported by the UN
General Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples who concluded in
2016 that the 2009 Mineral Act ‘does not meet international standards’
(Tauli-Corpuz 2016, para. 20–29). In particular, what has been held proble-
matic ‘is the lack of speciﬁc consultation or consent requirements with respect
to the particular Sami communities that will be directly aﬀected by the pro-
posed measures’ as well as ‘the absence of provisions for beneﬁt-sharing
with Sami communities when mines are located on traditional Sami lands’
(Tauli-Corpuz 2016, para. 29–31). As a result, the Rapporteur indicated in
her conclusion that ‘the Minerals Act raises doubts about the State’s ability to
respect, protect and fulﬁll human rights in the context of extractive activities’
in Norway (para. 32).
The situation of the Sami people in Sweden has also raised many issues.
The current Mining Act does not contain any provisions to accommodate any
special rights relevant to Sami people, and existing mining policies do not
appear to be suﬃcient in protecting Sami interests and rights over lands
aﬀected by mining activities. In her 2016 report, Tauli-Corpuz also concluded
that the Swedish regulatory framework does not adequately recognise and
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protect Sami rights in accordance with international human rights standards
(para. 48). In particular, the fact that the environmental code does not require
any social impact assessment in order for an exploitation concession to be
granted and does not preclude mining activities if negative eﬀects on Sami
culture and ways of life are found is considered problematic. Furthermore, the
mineral ordinance stipulates that the Sami Parliament has the right to be
informed and to express an opinion for exploitation permits, but the regula-
tion does not entail a right to withhold consent to the granting of the permit.
This is in contravention to the duty of the state to consult indigenous repre-
sentatives in order to obtain their consent, as enshrined under the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
There is also much controversy in the Nordic countries regarding
proposed wind energy projects and conﬂicts between Sami communities,
governments and industry. Wind energy projects, which are increasing in the
northern parts of the Nordic countries to meet renewable energy targets in
response to global warming, can cause signiﬁcant impacts on reindeer
husbandry. For instance, the construction of wind turbines can aﬀect the
migration patterns of reindeer (Skarin et al. 2015) and consequently under-
mine the traditional livelihoods of Sami communities. In his 2011 report, the
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Anaya also raised
concerns against the impact of sustainable energy projects, speciﬁcally a
potential windmill construction boom in northern Norway, which severely
aﬀect reindeer calving grounds (Anaya 2011,17). As a result, indigenous
populations not only face the impacts of climate change (ILO 2016; Galloway
McLean et al. 2009), but also must endure the externalities associated with
mitigation solutions. This situates their communities as experiencing greater
risk, considering their cultural rights and livelihoods are also at stake (see
also chapter on community security). This situation has triggered a number
of court cases both in Sweden and Norway between wind energy companies
and Sami reindeer herders (NRK 2016; Umeå Court 2015, 2016), which
question the compatibility of renewable energy projects and the human rights
of the Sami people.
In Russia, Nenets communities face negative economic, social and cultural
impacts from the increasing appropriation and reduction of traditional lands
used for husbandry, sacred sites and ﬁshing grounds, as a result of oil and
gas development projects. According to the BEAC Working Group for Indi-
genous Peoples, national and international corporations establish activities in
areas inhabited by indigenous peoples without involving them in development
strategies or planning. In addition, regional administrations often prioritise
the development of central areas, at the expense of indigenous communities
who live in remote parts of the region (Barents Euro-Arctic Energy Working
Group 2017, 12). In this regard, the capacity of energy development projects
to meet local communities’ needs remains in question. Simultaneously, local
communities continue to suﬀer from a lack of aﬀordable energy and endure
the negative eﬀects of its production.
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Thus, the survival of indigenous communities relies heavily upon the capacity
of the government to balance competing interests in the use of land and
territories. However, while the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples’
has made progress in the Barents in recent years, it does not appear to be
suﬃcient in ensuring the protection of their rights in accordance with inter-
national standards. As a result, there is an urgent need to ensure that the
production and use of energy not only meets the needs of indigenous com-
munities but also does not compromise their survival and distinctive
livelihoods.
4 Conclusion and recommendations
Energy security is a ‘highly context dependent’ concept (Kruyt et al. 2009,
2166) whose operationalisation requires a detailed and precise deﬁnition. As
such, deﬁning energy security within the Barents Region depends not only the
energy resource in question but also from the interests, aspirations and
experiences of the individuals, families and communities that are aﬀected by
or dependent on the energy-related events, decisions and developments. The
complexity and diversity of this deﬁnition is seldom fully accounted for in
the processes of planning and decision-making in the context of energy in the
Barents Region. In turn, this has direct implications on the energy security
situation as it is experienced by communities – both indigenous and
non-indigenous – within the culturally and politically diverse region.
In order to better account for the societal dimensions of energy security, the
diversity within environmental externalities associated with energy production
need to be acknowledged and addressed. In addition, to better account for the
social impacts of energy extraction and infrastructure projects, the manner in
which social impact assessments of energy extraction and infrastructure
projects – both renewable and non-renewable – are implemented should be
improved. In the broader context of extractive industries in the Barents
Region, it has been observed that social impact assessments are normally
conducted as one-time pre-project assessments in general (cf. Suopajärvi
2015, Kokko et al. 2013). This is done rather than to use them as tools for
actually ‘analyzing, monitoring and managing the social consequences of
development’ (Vanclay 2003, 6) throughout the diﬀerent phases of the energy
project. Conducted as they are now, social impact assessments reveal little
about the actual impacts of projects on the communities and living environ-
ments of the region, as they currently map only the expectations that the
consulted individuals and communities attach to the expected development
project (cf. Suopajärvi 2015). Furthermore, eﬀorts should be made to ensure a
more balanced representation within consulted communities (cf. Suopajärvi
2013; Strauss 2011, 51).
In the context of energy production, there is also a need to improve
renewable sources. In this regard, it is important for all countries to improve
and harmonise regulation and policy actions in order to allow the expansion
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of renewable regionally. More particularly, it is suggested that the four
Barents governments should agree on carrying out coordinated actions in
the domain. This would include, for instance, exchanges of statistical data,
joint research and development projects, exchanges of experiences between
actors, and ﬁnancial support for public institutions responsible for the pro-
motion of energy eﬃciency and renewable use of energy (CENTEK AB
2010). Ultimately, increasing the use of renewable resources therefore
requires increased regional cooperation at the technological, political,
ﬁnancial and legislative levels.
Alongside issues associated with energy production, more attention should
be devoted to local consumption and related concerns. The cold climate, long
distances and dependence on energy imports pose signiﬁcant energy security
risks for local communities whose livelihoods, cultural practices and survival
depend on the reliability and aﬀordability of electricity, heat and fuel. Measures
need to be taken to improve the reliability and safety of existing energy infra-
structure and to reduce dependencies on energy imports through a diversiﬁcation
of energy sources and, where possible, through the decentralisation of energy
production. Improving energy eﬃciency and energy saving are also key com-
ponents of the security of regional energy supplies, as are the measures to
address the environmental impacts of energy consumption.
Finally, energy security must also take into account indigenous peoples’
rights. The Barents governments, together with indigenous representatives,
should consolidate indigenous rights to land and resources to avoid conﬂicts
between energy production and indigenous way of life. At the same time, they
should ensure that measure to promote renewable energy development, such as
wind projects, do not adversely aﬀect Sami livelihoods. Indigenous decision-
making authority and participation in the development of energy project
should therefore be improved and consolidated.
However, considering the instrumental and pervasive role of energy across
all sectors and all aspects of societal life, a consideration of energy security
solely in the explicit context of physical energy sources and production would
remain fundamentally inadequate. While regional energy production poses
certain threats and challenges within the region, it can also be perceived both
as an important contributor to the regional economy and societal wellbeing.
It can also be perceived as a source of revenue for states, whose transfer
payments heavily support some parts of the northern regions (cf. AHDR
2004, 75; World Bank 2015; on the ‘megatrend’ of Arctic renewable energy cf.
Rasmussen and Roto 2011, 149–168). As such, northern residents are not
only dependent on energy itself, but in many instances also from the revenues
derived by the states from energy production.
Furthermore, the linkages between fossil fuel production and consumption
to climate change should not be overlooked. Climate change remains a major
threat to northern cultures, communities and societies, and yet some parts
of the Barents Region are heavily involved in and economically dependent on
the hydrocarbon industry, which directly contributes to the acceleration of
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climate change. This profound intertwinement between energy and broader
society underlines the urgent need to reconsider the relationships between the
global energy system and societal security as a broader whole.
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2.7 Personal security in the Barents
Region1
Tahnee Prior and Patrick Ciaschi
This analysis addresses personal security in the context of the Barents Region.
Personal security is one indicator of human security, linked to other forms of
insecurity: political, economic, health, food, environmental and community.
1 Deﬁnition
Security remains incomplete, unless addressed at all levels. Personal security is
one dimension of human security, encompassing both an individual freedom
from fear and freedom from want (United Nations Development Programme
1994). The 1994 Human Development Report regards personal security –
security from physical violence – as vital for individuals across national con-
texts. As outlined under the Human Development Report, threats to personal
security include: threats from the state, like physical torture; threats from
other states manifesting as byproducts of war; groupist threats, such as eth-
nically charged tensions; threats from individuals or non-state actors, such as
gang and street violence; threats directed against women, such as rape or
domestic violence; and threats directed at children like child abuse, which are
based on their vulnerability and dependence.
Personal security, as outlined above, should be a priority for all states.
By deﬁnition, the term conjures up the very narrative of ‘social contract’,
construction between states and their constituent citizenries. In exchange
for obedience and servitude, new citizens of sovereign states are granted
security from outside harm or strife. Today, under the aegis of global liberal
governance, the notion of a sovereign state’s failure to protect its citizens
from human rights violations, ethnocide, genocide and extra-judicial killings
can have economic and legal repercussions at the global scale (Muggah
2012).
Compared to other securitisation categories, personal security is a cross-
categorical concern (Gasper and Gomez 2015). And it cannot be distilled into
a single deﬁnition or metric. Individuals and groups respond, adapt and
resist, making personal security (as an indicator of welfare and stability) dif-
ﬁcult to fully measure. In the context of the circumpolar Arctic and the
Barents Region, in particular, personal security poses a number of statistical
and technical dilemmas which may pose barriers to eﬀective policy-making
and monitoring across the dimensions outlined above.
Moreover, like the concept of human security, personal security is dynamic
and diverse depending on the threshold of the individual and concerns multiple
overlapping processes of securitisation. It captures both real and perceived
threats to individuals (the experiential scale) and the trials and tribulations of
localised life. It is thus experienced and framed diﬀerently by diﬀerent groups.
Threats to personal security emerge in sub-national contexts of gender
inequality or extreme poverty, and do not map onto statist legal conceptions
so neatly. Due to the subjective quality of personal security, the collection of
data pertaining to personal security is scarce and at times outright problematic
(Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Muggah 2012).
To many critics, the concept is overused, full of ‘hot air’ (Paris 2001), and
void of empirical groundedness. Nevertheless, the concept still holds heuristic
value due to its polemical and highly politicised use. It also touches on the
delicate subject matter of state and non-state actors’ ‘responsibility to protect’,
and the thorny, yet evolving, deﬁnition of who are the legitimate actors of care
and welfare in global politics.
2 Contextualisation
The Arctic is changing at an unprecedented rate (see for example Arctic
Council and Stockholm Environment Institute 2016; Rosen 2017). While tra-
ditional security issues, like war and conﬂict, may not be a source of tension
in the region, non-traditional security issues pose signiﬁcant challenges for its
inhabitants. Across the circumpolar north, including the Barents Region,
personal security is increasingly threatened by climate change, developments
in resource extraction, and in- and out-migration.
In this chapter, we focus on three particular dimensions of personal (in)
security: suicide, domestic violence, migration and mobility. In exploring
some of these areas, we place a focus on two groups in particular: women and
indigenous peoples. While other marginalised groups – such as children, dis-
abled persons, the elderly, racial and ethnic minorities, as well as sexual
minorities – experience personal insecurity as well, indigenous peoples and
women provide a compelling case; making the complexity of various socio-
cultural distinctions and power dimensions particularly visible. One becomes
acutely aware of a dearth of data, despite political commitment to both
groups in the Barents Region.
In its 1994 Human Development Report (United Nations Development
Programme 1994, 22), the United Nations highlighted that women generally
experience the worst personal threats to security, arguing that ‘personal
insecurity shadows [women] from cradle to grave.’ Women face ongoing dis-
advantages in their access to economic and social resources in both developing
and developed countries (United Nations Development Programme 2007;
Nilsson et al. 2004). These resources include access to land, ﬁnancing, new
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technology, bargaining power, social capital and training in climate adaptation
and disaster risk reduction (Prior et al. 2013; United Nations Development
Programme 2011). Indigenous peoples, too, bear the brunt of personal inse-
curity, yet are not taken seriously as securitising actors. Claims and interests
by indigenous communities, such as the Nenets or Sámi, particularly in the
realm of environmental or social security, are not always articulated vis-à-vis
the language of securitisation (Greaves 2016). As such, their claims are
missed, or ignored.
Although all circumpolar states, aside from Russia, maintain a high level of
development, this does not necessarily guarantee a high level of gender or
racial equality, too (Lahey et al. 2014). In the northern regions of the eight
Arctic states, including the Barents Region, there is also a clear diﬀerence in
human development and gender equality. Human development, gender
inequality and aboriginal human development indices, produced by the United
Nations, rank states based on a composite statistic that includes (among others)
life expectancy, education and labour market participation.
Studies isolating economic development as an indicator of a country’s level
of human security elide gender or racial inequality from their analyses.
Formal rights also do not necessarily guarantee that indigenous women will
not continue to face systematic violations, deepened exclusionary and dis-
criminatory practices along gendered and ethnic lines, both within their own
peoples and in Arctic society generally.
To avoid such pitfalls in our assessment, we apply an intersectional lens to
the three dimensions below: suicide, domestic violence, migration and mobi-
lity. An intersectional lens accounts for historical, social and political context
and recognises the unique experience of the individual (see Aylward 2011). In
doing so, it illuminates a combination of multifarious oppressions which
combine to produce a unique and distinct form of discrimination (Eaton 1994,
229). In the context of the Barents Region, an intersectional lens highlights
substantial diversity in people’s lived experiences.
Governance institutions in the Barents Region, like the Barents Euro-Arctic
Council (BEAC), recognised the importance and intersection of gender equality
and minority rights early on in Arctic cooperation. At the ﬁrst meeting of the
Barents Forum, in Kirkenes in 1997, and the ﬁrst conference, in Alta in 1999,
gender equality was on the agenda (Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2009). The
2007 Joint communiqué of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, too, highlighted
the importance of ‘gender equality in the Barents Region and the strength-
ening of women’s, including indigenous women’s, employment opportunities,
entrepreneurship and public representation’ (Barents Euro-Arctic Council
2007). At the 2013 Barents Summit – the 20th Anniversary of the BEAC –
Prime Ministers and other high-level representatives signed a declaration
which highlighted the importance of gender equality as key to ‘economic
activity, growth, and prosperity’ (Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2013). Finally,
in its 2015 Joint communiqué, XV session, the BEAC recognised that ‘a
balanced integration of the economic, social and environmental dimensions
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and respect for democratic values, non-discrimination, gender equality and the
rights of minorities, incl. indigenous peoples, are prerequisites for dynamic,
inclusive and sustainable regional development’ (Barents Euro-Arctic Council
2015). An analysis of the implementation of such discourse, however, remains
to be undertaken. And by incorporating an intersectional lens to our analysis,
we are able to locate dimensions of personal security, and how they diﬀer from
scaled up forms of societal or communal security, for instance.
3 Assessment
In this section, we focus on three dimensions – suicide, domestic violence,
migration and mobility – which can help us pin-point the evolving tensions
and conﬂicts related to personal insecurity as they arise in the Arctic and the
Barents Region, more speciﬁcally (Greaves 2016; Hoogensen 2014). They can
also aid in the elucidation of new social relations emerging out of a new reality
in the region: increased border security and refugee movement.
3.1 Suicide
The gendered dimensions of personal security aﬀect both men and women. The
changing role of men in the Arctic – attributed by some to a loss of identity, self-
worth, social tension, issues of power and control – is having a clear impact
on societal security as a whole. As noted in the Arctic Human Development
Report (Nilsson et al. 2004, 195), ‘economic, identity, and personal insecu-
rities intertwine to create a climate whereby a person’s own coping strategies
no longer suﬃce to combat these insecurities.’ High rates of suicide among
men, with high rates of attempts by women, and violence against women in
the Arctic cannot be divorced from historical trauma resulting from coloni-
sation, cultural assimilation or residential schools which is passed down from
generation to generation (Larsen et al. 2015, 333; Nilsson et al. 2004, 195).
The Barents Region is no exception. Health statistic indicators dating back
to 1998 indicated that suicide was much more prevalent among Russian than
Nordic men (NOMESCO 1998). Women also exhibited signiﬁcantly higher
rates of suicide when compared to those living in the same state, but south of
the Arctic Circle. Suicide rates among young Finnish women, in particular,
were considerably higher when compared to other parts of the Nordic Barents
Region (NOMESCO 1998). However, the dearth of aggregate and up-to-date
data on suicide rates in the Barents Region makes it diﬃcult to develop
comprehensive baselines for the region, as well as assess and compare personal
security within and across this context. This can have signiﬁcant implications
for policy-making.
However, research by Sumarokov et al. (2014) found high rates of suicide in
Nenets Autonmous Okrug between 2002–2012, with suicide rates at 49.2 (per
100,000 person-years) in the non-indigenous population and 79.8 (per 100,000
person-years) among the Nenets population. Substantially higher suicide rates
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among the indigenous Nenets population were attributed to a ‘lack of ‘a sense of
indigenous belonging’, lack of cultural identity and problems of resilience, being
single or divorced, and having lower education’ (Emelyanova and Rautio 2016).
In their 2015 study of cultural meaning(s) of suicide among indigenous Sámi of
Sweden, Stoor et al. (2015) further provide evidence that:
[the suicides] are strongly associated with reindeer-herding (…) and with
identity, also. (…) if you are faced with a choice between to abandon your
own identity – that is your life really – to do something else, maybe there
won’t be much left of yourself.
Their work relates such suicidality to issues of inequality and identity strug-
gle, as well a means of strengthening identity, whereby the act itself falls
within socio-cultural normativity, engaging the individuals at hand ‘in a ﬁght
for their Sámi identity’ (Stoor et al. 2015).
For both indigenous and non-indigenous Nenets populations, males
showed higher suicide rates than females (Sumarokov et al. 2014). Suicide rates
in the rural areas of the Komi republic are particularly gendered, with male
suicides outstripping female suicides by nine to one (Emelyanova and Rautio
2016). Based on an amalgamation of three studies, Young et al. (2015) provide
that suicide rates among Sámi were equal (ratio 1.27 to 1.27) among males and
females in northern Norway; and higher among males than females in northern
Sweden (1.17 to 0.76) and Finland (1.78 to 1.26). To the knowledge of the
authors, data on the suicide rates of the Veps remains missing.
3.2 Domestic violence
All Barents states are party to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women. In 1992, the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women adopted general
recommendation 19 on violence against women; to ‘act to protect women
against violence of any kind occurring within the family, at the work place or
in any other area of social life’ (United Nations and Committee on Economic
2008). Under Article 5(b) of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Barents states also undertake to
guarantee ‘The right to security of person and protection by the State against
violence or bodily harm, whether inﬂicted by government oﬃcials or by any
individual group or institution’ (United Nations et al. 1985). Moreover, under
Article 1(a) of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and com-
bating violence against women and domestic violence, Norway, Finland and
Sweden have agreed to ‘protect women against all forms of violence, and
prevent, prosecute and eliminate violence against women and domestic violence’
(Council of Europe 2015).
Violence against women – directly and indirectly, through its eﬀect on
others – serves as a paradigmatic example of personal security within the
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broader paradigm of human security (Bunch 2004, 32). Existing research
provides evidence of ongoing and potential threats to the roles of indigenous
and non-indigenous women in community adaptation and in shaping change
in the circumpolar Arctic (Arctic Council and Stockholm Environment Institute
2016). Structural impediments – racial, social and economic – and a spectrum of
violence – beating, murder, sexual and emotional abuse – aﬀect circumpolar
women (Ministry of Social Aﬀairs and Health 2002) and can also increase
women’s personal insecurity (Nilsson et al. 2004). A failure to provide adequate
resources for women in the circumpolar Arctic is linked to health inequality, low
income, high housing costs, homelessness, human traﬃcking and prostitution
(Nakray 2013; Nilsson et al. 2004, 201).
Gender-based violence, in particular, highlights the extent to which structure
and agency cannot be divorced from personal security (Nilsson et al. 2004,
195). In the Barents Region, rape and domestic violence are threats to personal
security primarily directed against women. The rate of domestic violence
experienced by women in Finland and Russia, on a national level, remains
high (Nilsson et al. 2004; Piispa 2003; UN Women 2013). For instance, in its
concluding observations of the Seventh Periodic Report of the Russian Federa-
tion, the Human Right Committee to the International Covenant Civil and
Political Rights noted the following with regard to domestic violence (United
Nations, Human Rights Committee, and Russia 2015):
The Committee is concerned about the increase by 20 per cent in the
number of reported cases of domestic violence aﬀecting women and
children since 2010 and about the slow progress in adopting the draft
federal act on the prevention of domestic violence. It also notes with
concern the lack of due diligence of law enforcement oﬃcers in registering
and investigating domestic violence cases, and that support services for
victims, including the number of psychological and educational centres
and shelters, are insuﬃcient.
(Arts. 2, 3, 7, 24 and 26)
Likewise, Sweden and Norway, have – what can be considered – an unchar-
acteristically high proportion of ‘intimate partner violence’ (IPV) (Gracia and
Merlo 2016) which runs paradoxically counter to their solidiﬁed rankings as
two of the top countries under the Gender Gap Index.
Again, research on gender-based violence in the Arctic, and the Barents
Region in particular, remains underdeveloped (Nilsson et al. 2004, 195). The
development of crisis centres across the Barents Region, in response to
domestic violence, represents a partial solution to the issues at hand (Saarinen
and Carey-Bélanger 2004; Stuvøy 2014). However, cultural and linguistic
understandings of what constitutes a ‘crisis’ in northwestern Russia (e.g.
Murmansk) diﬀer in other areas of the Barents Region (Stuvøy 2014). Crisis
centres in the Russian part of the Barents Region, for instance, understand
domestic violence as a relational phenomenon, a local human security issue
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which cannot be divorced from other issues of insecurity (Hoogensen 2014).
Since this understanding is at odds with the western funding models that
support these centres, the identiﬁcation and administration of crises, and
personal security, is inevitably shifted. Moreover, in the context of indigenous
women, violence may not be lesser or larger in extent – although it is (Nordic
Council of Ministers 2011) – but its consequences are diﬀerent in magnitude,
potentially including the loss of traditional livelihoods and cultural practices
(Østby 2006; UAA Justice Center 2015).
Historically, groups such as the Sámi in Norway have had their cultural
deﬁnitions of the domestic altered as a result of what Bremmer (2012) calls
‘Norwegianisation’ ideologies in the post-WWII era. These ideologies recon-
ﬁgured conceptions and demands on labour, property entitlement and tradi-
tional roles of women in Sámi society. Equal partnership found in the social
life and livelihoods of Sámi society was in many cases eroded in favour of the
Sámi woman as the caretaker of the domestic domain and a passive subject of
political, economic and social life. Kuokkanen (2006), likewise, sees current
forms of domestic violence and gender inequalities in the household as founded
upon Christian and Laestadianism conversions and colonisations over the
time period of generations, which have redeﬁned the very essence of Sámi
women and created a moral hierarchy predicated upon gendered categories.
While changes in the domestic sphere are part and parcel of the longue durée
violence of colonisation, Kuokkanen’s (2014) later work also reminds us that
externalising violence – as a reﬂection of the victimhood or loss of status of
indigenous men – denies agency and condones the behaviour perpetrators,
thereby failing to ‘account for the internalisation of patriarchy, which perpe-
tuates the colonial construction of indigenous women as second-class citizens
and subordinate members of their communities.’ With such intersectional
analysis, it becomes evident that domestic violence evolves and intersects with
power structures that are nascent, latent and inculcated over the course of
generations and thus cannot simply be attributed to one causal source.
3.3 Migration and mobility
Situations of personal (in)security lead to various forms of escape and migration,
forced or voluntary in nature. The structural and personal experience of
migration conditions livelihoods and is indicative of larger scale shifts in
politics and immigration policy alike. Migration is a global governance concern,
given the increased movement and displacement of millions of people globally
(Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2016). Migra-
tion, in its various forms, comes with its own sets of byproducts: permanent
loss of home, formal and informal economies, diasporas, the changing social
and cultural landscape of communities and fundamental changes in how a
‘people’ is constituted. Each of these aforementioned eﬀects of migration (as
an ongoing fact of human life) generate numerous uncertainties for personal
security which transcend the migratory experience. In this section, we focus
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on three subcategories of the migration and mobility umbrella with direct
implications on personal security in the Barents Region: 1) in- and out-
migration; 2) human traﬃcking; and 3) the ongoing global refugee crisis.
3.3.1 In- and out-migration
Generally, the circumpolar Arctic (Nilsson et al. 2004) and the Barents
Region are home to more men than women. Some Barents communities are
also witnessing gender disparities in migration and growing sex-ratio imbalances
in population (Emelyanova and Rautio 2016; Autti and Hyry-Beihammer
2014). Historically, the ratio of men to women has been disproportionate,
with more men living in the region. The same holds true in Arctic indigenous
communities, where the number of men outstrips the number of women. This
is, in large part, due to the out-migration of young females and the in-migration
of men for employment in northern extractive and ﬁshing industries (Larsen
et al. 2015, 50). While the Nordic states remain closer to the global gender
ratio average, the number of women exceeds the number of men in the Russian
Arctic (990 men per 1000 women) (Larsen et al. 2015, 69–70).2 Such a gender
disparity is met with concern across the circumpolar north. Some, like Maria
Stenberg, Swedish member of the Nordic Council Citizen’s and Consumer
Rights Committee, have argued that ‘[u]nless we get a united political grip on
[women’s out-migration] there is a great risk that the Arctic will become des-
titute of women.’ The AMAP Adaptations Actions for a Changing Arctic:
Barents Overview Report (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
2017, 22), too, points to unbalanced out-migration, based on gender, from the
region’s rural areas. Further Barents-speciﬁc data is unknown to the authors.
Out-migration is often attributed to ‘a complex of individual and struc-
tural push and pull factors’; fewer opportunities for higher education and
employment; structural changes in traditional industries (ﬁshing, herding
and farming); structural discrimination; unattractiveness of traditional
gender roles for men and women; and gender-based violence (Ingolfsdottir
2011; Nilsson et al. 2004; Sloan 2006; Klishin 2014). Economic development in
the region focuses on highly gendered labour markets with incentivisation for
male dominated professions: mining, transportation, forestry, and the energy
industry (BIPE 2017).
In the face of uneven distribution of capital, women migrants are challenging
culturally and gender dominant migration categories – such as the ‘economic
migrant’ – by making the ‘personal’ (marriage, family) into a cross-border
political and social phenomenon of concern (Guild 2013). Personal security,
on the one hand, is predicated on robust and stable employment opportunities
in circumpolar labour markets, but is simultaneously leading to the evolution
of women’s migration strategies. A ‘welfare gap’ – a lack of social security in
sending countries as a signiﬁcant push factor in migration – (Godzimirski and
Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2005), combined with gender inequality, is
leading to sustained survivalist forms of migratory practices on the part of
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female migrants. The out-migration of ‘Russian brides’3 in the Arctic, is but
one example of the individual forms of migration taken by women to circumvent
depreciating, yet male dominated, local employment markets (Dudzinska
et al. 2015; Godzimirski and Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2005).
3.3.2 Human traﬃcking
Demographic shifts with youth emigration and aging populations (BEAC Ad
Hoc et al. 2013) in combination with growing extractive and international
shipping industries is linked to the underbellies and dark sides of uneven
labour markets and human traﬃcking (Behr et al. 2013). Human traﬃcking,
in particular, evokes imagery of informal and illicit economies where women
are victims of coercive and forced out-migration. While indicative of certain
realities, human traﬃcking – composed of sex traﬃcking, migrant sex work,
child traﬃcking and general labour exploitation – is a complex industry that
coordinates various actors, institutions, legal boundaries and borders which
perpetuate and impede its practice, simultaneously.
Like domestic violence, human traﬃcking is an ongoing international con-
cern and conversation in the Barents Region (Oﬃce of the Under Secretary
for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights 2016). The Barents
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) has, at times, actively pursued the issue of traf-
ﬁcking in the region. The BEAC’s Task Force for anti-traﬃcking launched as
a result of the 2003 Kirkenes Declaration, which emphasised the need for a
concerted eﬀort to stop traﬃcking in human beings in the Barents Region
(Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2003). The task force was terminated in 2006
with the reasoning that the length and geographical scope of human traﬃck-
ing routes were better addressed by the Council of Baltic Sea States (Swedish
Ministry of Justice 2006; Barents Euro-Arctic Council 2003). Outcomes of
such conversations include the establishment of the ‘Nordic Model’, which
criminalises and aims to prevent sex traﬃcking in the Barents Region and the
Nordic states more generally. With gender equality and anti-exploitative
foundations as the model’s lynchpin, the states of the Barents Region repre-
sent leaders on the anti-traﬃcking front and the model has been deemed
successful on multiple fronts (Skarhed 2010). Nevertheless, traﬃcking and
prostitution have not been eradicated. Analyses argue that, despite the intro-
duction of anti-prostitution laws in Sweden in 1999, both traﬃcking and
prostitution economies in the country remain relatively stable. In many cases,
they have merely been ‘invisiblised’ (Skilbrei and Holmstrom 2016), which
points to the multi-faceted problem at hand: legal parameters and crackdowns
divert rather than quell the traﬃcking of women and children.
3.3.3 Global refugee crisis
The Barents Region is also an interesting case for the study of in-migration,
or the politics and dynamics of problematised migration forms (i.e. asylum
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seeking and irregular migration), because there are neither coherent rules, nor
a common policy, for migrants to the region (Yeasmin 2013). From a state
and transnational perspective on migration governance, the Barents Region
poses a number of multi-faceted challenges. Bilateral agreements are in place
to facilitate migration between Barents states (i.e. visa-free travel for Russian
and Norwegian nationals). These agreements are relatively cooperative and
reﬂective of embedded interdependency within the region. The refugee crisis
presents a set of perceived and real problems that change these established
relationships and conventions with regards to cross-border migration in the
High North. Refugee ‘crises’ are most notably framed through discourses of
fear, and existential threat towards receiving communities (Huysmans 2008).
Subsequently, mechanisms for contemporary migration management are
either built to control and deter, or granted legitimacy (through plebiscite and
referenda) to detain and deport migrants en masse. Contrary to the ‘Fortress
Europe’ belief, Nordic states are known as traditional resettlement states
(Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway). Nevertheless, when we com-
pare and contrast the resettlement history across the Barents Region, the
narrative is quite diﬀerent.
At the policy-level, Russia represents an anomaly in the region’s more-
inclusionary, at least at the level of policy, refugee resettlement track record.
Between 2015–2016, roughly 7,000 Syrian citizens have been settled in Russia,
and around 5,000 asylum seekers have crossed the Russia–Norway border
compared to over 100,000 resettled in Sweden (Chulkovskaya 2016). Aggre-
gate statistics for the Barents Region remain unknown to the authors at this
time. Still, these ﬁgures do not reﬂect the turbulences of migratory routes and
journeys, however, and do not account for human rights violations: everyday
forms of exclusion, intolerance, racism and xenophobia which occur even
once refugees are settled in ‘inclusive’ societies.
In 2016, the Norwegian government, headed by the Progress Party, decided
to build a fence on the Russian border, to ostensibly curb border crossings
(Osborne 2016). This action is leading to border tensions between Norway
and Russia, which is regarded as a migrant transit country in this context
(Osborne 2016). Meanwhile, the Finnish government has instituted a new
legal technology of border interdiction: the designated country of origin list
(DCO), or ‘safe country’ list. Asylum seeking deterrence is the aim across all:
to block the alternative Russian passage into the EU. In 2016, Iraqi, Afghani
and Somali nationals were returned to their country of origin, which were
considered ‘safe’ again (Gutteridge 2016).
Regional migration governance, in the context of the global refugee crisis,
has been proven ill equipped to manage the ﬂows of people, especially as the
Syrian conﬂict continues. Even though multiple states have adjacent, or con-
tiguous, borders with one another, there are no formal multilateral agreements.
There is also little to no harmonised representation of migrants in the region
(see Yeasmin 2013), which mirrors how the global governance of migration,
and international law towards migration speciﬁcally, has ‘substance but lacks
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architecture’ (Aleinikoﬀ 2007). Yet, special economic zones, between sub-
regions (think Pomor Zone), exist or are currently in progress. These zones
span cross-border territories with their own forms of local visa-free travel.4
Under increased border controls in the region, these treaties may soon be in
jeopardy, due to changing logics or bureaucratic approaches in dealing with
documentation and border registrations in this region. More importantly,
given the lack of synchronisation on the parts of border regimes, migration
routes through Russia and the other Barents states may prove to be more
diﬃcult and dangerous for current and future asylum seekers.
On a societal level, the socio-political frame of refugee inﬂux in these rather
isolated regions may elevate a discourse of insecurity and shift conceptions of
inclusion, tolerance and acceptance. In turn, these sentiments and politicisations
could potentially turn into fodder within the public sphere for re-evaluating
speciﬁc distribution and welfare regimes that refugees rely upon. While per-
sonal security here is not as immediate, the eﬀects of ill-equipped resettlement
practices and integration models can lead to the discursive construction of
‘bogus refugees’ through the perceived marginalisations of tax-paying citizens.
In her (theoretical and empirical) work on anti-immigrant rhetoric in Finland,
for instance, Yeasmin (2016) points to a lack of studies that examine the
interaction of this construction with positive liberal attitudes toward interna-
tional investment and immigration. It remains to be seen whether or not shifts
in right wing policy and public reactions towards further refugee resettlement
will have a negative impact on personal conceptions of security on the part of
individual citizenries.
4 Conclusion
Attempts by state and non-state actors alike to alleviate, and in some cases
eliminate, threats to personal security in the Barents Region have proven dif-
ﬁcult to fully assess. Direct causal links are diﬃcult to make, data is often
scarce, and intersectional and inter-generational lenses are often left unused.
These factors all have profound impacts on individuals across spectrums of
categorisation, producing the conditions of and for insecurity.
In the context of suicide prevention, for instance, additional studies are
required to better understand the complex linkages between personal inse-
curity and identity. As the work of Stoor et al. (2015) provides, suicidality can
create a sense of belonging for some. An often-found obstacle is a lack of
knowledge of Sámi culture among health personnel in the Barents Region, a
barrier to be broken.
Remedial action, too, does not foster immediate positive eﬀects. Gender
inequality is not immediately remedied by injections of economic incentives
into labour markets (see section on in- and out-migration). Crises centres,
seeking to remedy domestic violence, are also faced with cross-cultural gov-
ernance challenges (see section on domestic violence). Colonisation and the
impact of national state modernisation processes over the centuries are also
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signiﬁcant factors in the curtailment of gender equalities and the rise of both
suicide and domestic violence in indigenous societies. First steps toward truth
and reconciliation in Finland, beginning in 2017, provide an opportunity for
conversations on ongoing inter-generational trauma and indigenous-state
relations to take place. An intersectional approach to this discussion would
point to entrenched patriarchal structures, as well.
As Bromﬁeld (2008) makes clear, all Barents states have a notable problem
with human traﬃcking. Despite progressive policies implemented for the
protection of non-citizens in cases of human traﬃcking, the forced migration of
women or their labour exploitation remains (see section on human traﬃcking).
Sweden is often upheld as a model country, where its Aliens Act provides
temporary residence permits to victims of traﬃcking as of 2007. Still, the
challenge of human traﬃcking remains. Instead of policies of enforcement
and policing, which divert or invisibilise even further traﬃcking routes and
economies, improved data collection could eﬀectively point to gaps in law and
policy.
In a time of real and perceived crisis (see section on global refugee crisis),
bilateral small border traﬃc deals within Barents sub-regions can be aﬀected
by divergent refugee regimes in place. An inﬂux of migrants from outside the
region also raises sociological concerns pertaining to integration, multi-ethnic
socialisation and religious pluralism; and political concerns on how non-Arctic
nationals may alter community life in the North, from a local to a regional
scale. The refugee crisis, both discursively and materially, generates new sites
of politics in need of both research and policy innovation. Academics have
conjured up policy recommendations, and normative frameworks for more
eﬃcient, multilateral and embedded mechanisms of migration governance at
large (Betts 2011, 2012; Ghosh 2003; Holliﬁeld 2004). While research on
trans-regionalist migration within the Arctic – from one Arctic state or city or
district to another – is long-standing; research on refugee movement and
irregular migration to the Arctic from non-Arctic states and the role of such
migrants in the Barents Region, in particular, remains an immanent ﬁeld of
study. Still, with the necessary research and data in hand, the Barents Region
could serve as a case where forms of meso-level multi-lateral institutions for
refugee integration, might be resolved.
While research initiatives like Nordforsk’s ‘BIPE: Barents International
Political Economy: Governance and Gender in Development’ (2010–2012)
and Arctic Council Sustainable Development Working Group’s ‘Gender and
Equality in the Arctic – Current Realities and Future Challenges’ (2015)
exist, our assessment points to areas where current work remains insuﬃcient.
For instance, sex-disaggregated data and gender-sensitive policies are necessary
to protect women’s rights to personal security (CEDAW 2009). Yet research
and data on gender-based violence remain underdeveloped (Nilsson et al.
2004, 195). Current indicators – from the 2004 and 2014 Arctic Human
Development Reports to the Arctic Social Indicators – cannot provide com-
prehensive gender analysis. Nevertheless, these reports recognise gaps in the
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development and wellbeing between genders call for gender-disaggregated
data, to improve our ability to read a range of other indicators – from food
and water to energy security (see Arctic Council and Stockholm Environment
Institute 2016, 175; Larsen et al. 2015, 493). Such data would provide a more
nuanced understanding of the region’s adaptive and transformative capacity,
while providing more eﬀective policies tailored to the intersectionality of the
Barents’ population. What is more, the inclusion of data on women and
indigenous peoples in the Barents Region in UN-level data would allow for
the development of more comprehensive baselines (Arctic Council and
Stockholm Environment Institute 2016, 175; Lahey et al. 2014).
A focus on personal security, in this regard, sheds light on how multiple
social, cultural, political and economic areas overlap and aﬀect individual
livelihoods. As a result, the complexity of these bridged dimensions provide
opportunities for more eﬀective policy creation, and potential multi-layered
solutions yet to be considered.
Notes
1 Portions of this paper will be re-published in a forthcoming publication by Tahnee
Prior, titled ‘Digital Storytelling: A Bottom-Up Approach to Gender & Human
Security in the Barents Region?’ as a part of an ongoing project, Human Security as
a promotional tool for societal security in the Arctic. See: www.husarctic.org/.
2 Russia, more generally, has one of the lowest male gender ratios in the world due to
high mortality rates and longer female life expectancy (Larsen et al. 2015, 69–70).
This ratio is also visible in the Chukotka, where the gender ratio of 105 males per
100 females is even higher than the national ratio.
3 Finnmark, Norway has a signiﬁcant population of Russian women from Mur-
mansk. 65% of the Russian national migrants in Norway self-identify as female.
4 Travel permits – part of small border traﬃc agreements (SBTs) – are granted to the
residents of the sub-regions comprising the industrial and special economic zones,
but are limited to those residents.
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2.8 Community security of indigenous
peoples in the Barents Region
Giuseppe Amatulli and Joëlle Klein
This chapter addresses community security in the context of the Barents
Region. Community security is one indicator that forms the broad concept of
human security, and is closely interrelated with other aspects of human
security, including environmental, political, economic, health and personal
security. Given the geographic signiﬁcance of indigenous groups in the
northernmost part of the Barents Region, and the unique threats and oppor-
tunities that existing global challenges such as globalisation and climate
change pose for northern communities, this chapter will focus predominantly
on community security as it relates to indigenous Sámi, Nenets and Veps
peoples.
1 Deﬁnition
Community security aims to address threats to groups of people that result in
the loss of collective relationships and values, or exacerbate tensions between
communities that lead to sectarian and ethnic violence. The UNDP deﬁnes
community security as ‘the capacity of people to derive their security through
being active members of a group’ (UNDP 2009, 13). The collective belonging
that comes from participation and identiﬁcation within a community can
serve as a source of values and traditions to support individual wellbeing, and
is thereby vital to the promotion of cultural identity (UNDP 1994, 31).
Moreover, it is useful to underline that the term ‘community’ does not refer
only to the individuals that form it, but also to other actors (such as civil
society organisations and local authorities) that may play a key role in
ensuring the vitality of a speciﬁc community living in a certain area (UNDP
2009, 15–16).
In this context, community security is directly linked to the realisation of
human rights, which seek to ensure states and international actors meet their
obligations to respect, protect and preserve the rights of individuals and
communities. Furthermore, in communities where ethnic violence, terrorism
or militarised armed force are not present, community security focuses on the
social cohesion and positionality of marginalised or vulnerable groups within
a group, or the positionality of a community in the dominant governance and
social structures. Under Human Rights law, minorities are guaranteed a form
of community security through Article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). At the time of its drafting, indigenous
peoples were considered minorities under this framework. Therefore, the pro-
visions outlined in Article 27 are also applicable to indigenous peoples. Article
27 of the ICCPR stipulates:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right,
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own
language.
(UN General Assembly 1966)
The provisions enshrined in the above-mentioned article clearly indicate that
states should not interfere with the rights that minorities are entitled to enjoy.
According to the General Comment No. 31 issued by the UN Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC), the treaty monitoring body under the ICCPR, negative
obligations require states to abstain from violating the rights enshrined in the
Convention. In addition, states must prove the need for enacting any restric-
tions on the enjoyment of certain rights, and can only take such actions in the
pursuit of legitimate aims (UNHRC 2004). Nevertheless, both positive and
negative obligations must be considered. To this degree, General Comment
No. 23 issued by the UNHRC has provided a comprehensive explanation of
the provisions of Article 27. General Comment No. 23 establishes that negatives
states’ obligations are not suﬃcient to guarantee the individual and collective
rights of minorities, and therefore require positive actions on the part of the
states. Speciﬁcally, in order to protect and ensure the rights of a certain
community, positive legal measures are required, with the aim of guaranteeing
the real and eﬀective participation of community members in decision-
making on issues that impact them (UNHRC 1994, para. 6.2, 7). The positive
obligations that a state must implement to ensure the enjoyment of rights
enshrined in the ICCPR are not limited to the actions of states’ agents, but
also include protection against violations that private persons or an entity can
commit. The legal obligations concerning the individual and collective rights
of indigenous peoples have also been speciﬁed under ILO Convention 169
(ILO 1989), a treaty that has only been ratiﬁed by Norway in the Barents
countries, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
adopted by an overwhelming vote of 163 states at the UN General Assembly
in 2007, but for which Russia has abstained to vote.
However, community security is not exclusively deﬁned through legal collec-
tive rights, and requires deﬁnition through the framework of human security.
The principles of human security necessitate a people-centered approach, and
therefore the deﬁnition of community security in relation to indigenous
populations must also inherently be self-articulated (UNTFHS 2016, 6). In
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stakeholder reports to the UN Human Rights Council presented by the Sámi
Parliament and other indigenous groups, issues pertaining to language pre-
servation, education in native languages and the impact of human activities
on livelihood are articulated as issues vital to community security (HRC 2015,
8–10; HRC 2013, 10–11; HRC 2014, 8–10; HRC 2017, 6–8). Furthermore, the
regional community security goals articulated by the Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (hereafter WGIP)
specify ‘The overall goal for the indigenous peoples’ cooperation in the
Barents Euro-Arctic Region is to secure indigenous peoples’ rights, foundation
for trade, society, culture and language … [and secure] solid health- and living
conditions, as well as cultural continuity’ (WGIP 2017, 7). Therefore, a
regional and community-based understanding of the protection of community
security in the Barents includes ensuring that the development and preservation
of collective indigenous identity, livelihood, language and culture is self-
determined, protected within national borders or in transnational contexts,
and respected by other actors and authorities.
Furthermore, other minorities identiﬁed by gender, sexual orientation, (dis)
ability, age and class exist within (and are important aspects of) the compo-
sition and security of indigenous communities. The broad scope reﬂected in
deﬁning community security therefore requires a narrowing in order to assess
aspects of security unique to the Barents Region. In this regard, community
security can be understood to include both an ‘external component’, and an
‘internal component’, which diﬀerentiates cooperation and security in the
relationships between indigenous communities and other minorities, from the
relationships between indigenous communities and local, regional and
national state authorities (WGIP 2017, 6). The external component is linked
with the protection of the community’s ability to develop and promote its
culture and traditions, and maintain and protect its collective rights. This is
connected to the concept of self-determination, which seeks to preserve the
autonomy of a community to participate in decision-making on issues that
aﬀect them. The internal component is linked to social cohesion within and
between communities, addressing the presence of minorities within minorities,
and the individual pressures and threats faced by community members by
their own or co-existing communities. The latter component intersects with
the concept of personal security, as discussed in Chapter 2.7, and additionally,
analysis on the security of double minorities in the Barents Region would
require a more in-depth and comprehensive study beyond the scope of this
book. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the ‘external components’ to analyse
and discuss threats to indigenous community security in the Barents Region.
2 Contextualisation
The geographic boundaries of the Barents Region predominantly include the
homelands of indigenous peoples. While diverse communities inhabit the
Barents Region, only three are formally recognised as indigenous peoples by
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their respective national governments. In the Nordic countries, the Sámi are
recognised within the national framework of Finland, Norway and Sweden.
In the Russian Federation, only the Nenets, Veps and Sámi are recognised as
indigenous peoples, notwithstanding the presence of other indigenous com-
munities living the Russian Federation (such as the Komi and Pomors)
(Barentsinfo 2017).
An assessment of the regional conditions of indigenous peoples living in
the Barents needs to account for the considerable dissimilarities between the
Northwest part of Russia and the Nordic countries. Such diﬀerences include
the unique linguistic, cultural, political, economic and livelihood traditions
amongst minorities and indigenous groups inhabiting the region (Zimmer-
bauer 2013, 94). Furthermore, the federal legal deﬁnition of indigenous
peoples in Russia diﬀers from the deﬁnition utilised in the Nordic countries.
In Russia, indigenous peoples are recognised in part by their population size;
groups with less than 50000 people are deﬁned as ‘indigenous numerically
small peoples,’ and non-Russian groups with more than 50000 peoples are not
able to claim such status (Barentsinfo 2017).
Indigenous representation in the Nordic countries includes more formalised
status in political institutions, Sámediggis (Sámi Parliaments), while Russian
indigenous representation does not include formal political organisations, and
any advocacy must be conducted through non-governmental organisations
(Mörkenstam 2016, 9–13; Vinding and Mikkelsen 2016, 43–44; Rohr 2014, 9)
This can be problematic for the protection of collective and individual human
rights, as indigenous non-proﬁt organisations in Russia have been directly
threatened by ‘foreign agent’ laws requiring additional registration and doc-
umentation procedures if they receive funding from a foreign source (HRW
2017). Courts can leverage hefty ﬁnes on non-proﬁts if they are unable to
comply, which has resulted in the closure or restricted activity of many organi-
sations including ten civil society and indigenous organisations in the Russian
Barents Region (The Independent Barents Observer 2017; HRW 2017).
Many indigenous populations in Russia do not receive the federal status of
‘indigenous numerically small peoples,’ which limits the protections of indi-
genous rights for such communities. Indeed, without recognition, they cannot
establish local democratic self-governance to protect and promote their speciﬁc
interests and rights. Moreover, local governance fosters increased autonomy,
and provides a more legitimate basis for inhabitants to control community
development, which increases the sense of belonging amongst individuals in a
speciﬁc community (Tennberg 2012, 135–136).
Komi peoples are not recognised as indigenous peoples within the Russian
national framework, although the legislation of the Komi Republic grants
them the status of indigenous peoples (Barentsinfo 2017). The Komi live
across the Komi Republic, the Murmansk Oblak, the Arkhangelsk Oblak and
the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Komi peoples have historically faced dis-
crimination based on their identity, which, in conjunction with policies from
the Soviet era, has led to unequal education achievement levels between Komi
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and Russians in the Komi Republic (Barentsinfo 2017). Other minorities
including the Pomors and Karelians are not recognised as indigenous groups
in the Barents, but face similar ethnic discrimination.
Veps peoples are recognised as indigenous people in the Russian legislation
as of March 2000. The majority of Veps live in remote villages in the south of
the Republic of Karelia and in the Volodga and Leningrad Oblasts. According
to the last census before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of Veps
has decreased from 12000 Veps in 1989 to less than 6000 in 2010 (Barentsinfo
2017). In this regard, it is important to note that in twenty years (from 1989
to 2010), the Veps have witnessed a population decline of about 50%. Further-
more, according to the 2002 census, only 37.5% considered Veps as their
native language (Barentsinfo 2017). The Veps language is considered a vital
component of the promotion of their cultural identity, and to this degree, the
decreasing population in conjunction with a reduced number of native
speakers underlines the insecurity surrounding their cultural preservation in
the long-term.
The Nenets inhabit diverse areas of northern Russia, but are predominantly
located in the Komi Republic, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Arkhangelsk
Oblast and Murmansk Oblast. According to the 2010 census, Nenets people
constitute the biggest indigenous group living in Russia, with a population of
around 44640 people (Rohr 2014). Although this represents a general increase
since 2002, Nenets inhabiting the European tundra in the Barents Region
have continued to experience population decline and out-migration (Nymand
Larsen 2014, 56). They also face considerable community challenges, such as
the disappearance of the Nenets language, unemployment and inadequate
access to healthcare and services (Barentsinfo 2017). Furthermore, suicide
and low life expectancies are also prevalent, and the mortality rate among
Nenets is almost four times higher in comparison to the average in Russia (JS 3
2012, 8; Barentsinfo 2017). In terms of economic opportunities and livelihood,
unemployment remains high amongst indigenous peoples of the Yamal Nenets
Okrug at 24.5%, and the incomes of indigenous peoples in Russia are well
below the Russian national average (JS 3 2012, 8; Barentsinfo 2017).
For Sámi and Nenets living in the Barents, traditional livelihoods such as
reindeer herding and ﬁshing practices are a vital component of their cultural
and indigenous identity (Kaiser et al. 2013, 3; WGIP 2017, 10). Generally,
collective reindeer herding (which implies cooperation in relation to collective
ownership) is the main form of herding practised by in the Barents, and is
inherently trans-boundary in nature. Such practices are a predominant source
of income for many indigenous peoples in the Barents; in the last decades,
reindeer herders have started to produce and sell reindeer meat and products in
the global market, and demand has increased the potential to derive income
from such business, especially for the Russian Barents (WGIP 2017, 10).
Notwithstanding such developments, insecurities still impact herding liveli-
hoods, as herding is disrupted by changing weather patterns and other human
activities such as mining. In addition to this, the conﬂuence of natural
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resource use and exploitation with the out-migration and dwindling interest
of young generations in traditional lifestyles in favour of more economically
stable employment poses a serious risk for the survival of reindeer herding
practices in the area (Barentsinfo 2017).
The Sámi are the only recognised indigenous people in the European
Union and their homeland, Sápmi, is located in the northernmost part of
Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Russian Kola Peninsula. Approximately
50000–65000 Sámi live in Norway: 20000 in Sweden; around 8000 in Finland
and almost 2000 in the Peninsula of Kola (Vinding and Mikkelsen 2016, 29).
The Sámi are recognised as indigenous peoples in the Constitution of Finland,
peoples in Sweden, and have been granted speciﬁc rights in the Norwegian
Constitution. Concerning the Russian national framework, the Sámi are
recognised under the status of ‘indigenous numerically small peoples’. In each
Nordic country, there are diﬀerent statutory assemblies to represent the Sámi,
and these parliaments or Sámediggis, additionally appoint representatives to
the trans-boundary Sámi Parliamentary Council (SPC). The SPC is the co-
operational body for the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian Sámi Parliaments.
It is open also to Russian Sámi organisations, but given the lack of an elected
body representing the Sámi in the Russian Federation, two Russian Sámi
organisations have instead been made permanent representatives in the SPC
(Sámediggi, 2017a). In the Russian Federation, the Sámi are represented by
the Russian Association of Indigenous People of the North (RAIPON),
which has the same features of the Sámi Parliamentary Council.
Regarding the positionality of Sámi rights in the international arena, only
Norway has ratiﬁed the ILO Convention No. 169 (Convention concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries), while Sweden and
Finland continue to address the issue of ratiﬁcation on the parliamentary
level. Despite this, all the three Nordic countries voted in favour of the adoption
of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter
UNDRIP) in 2007. Moreover, all Barents countries have ratiﬁed the ICCPR;
therefore, Sámi people at a minimum receive protections articulated for
minorities, under article 27 of the Convention. Furthermore, the governments
of the Nordic states are in the process of adopting the Nordic Sámi Conven-
tion, which would strengthen and enhance the recognised rights of Sámi
people, especially in a cross-border cooperation context in the northernmost
areas of Finland, Norway and Sweden (Cambou 2018, Koivurova 2008). One
of the main goals of the Convention is to address challenges regarding Sámi
rights in the context of providing a comprehensive framework to regulate the
legal relationships between the Sámi and the three Nordic countries (Koivurova
2008, 104). Among the objectives of the Convention, there is a duty to enable
Sámi people to exercise the right to self-determination, safeguard and develop
their languages, culture and traditional livelihoods; respect Sámi people’s con-
ceptions of legal traditions, customs and law. Important provisions regarding
language preservation, such as the right to produce media and receive educa-
tion in Sámi language, and safeguards for Sámi rights to land and water, and
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the protection of Sámi traditional livelihoods, are included in the Convention
(Draft Nordic Sámi Treaty 2017).
The international positionality of the Sámi and other indigenous peoples in
the Russian Federation, however, remains much more limited. Article 27 of the
ICCPR remains the only provision to which indigenous peoples living in Russia
can appeal to for a recognition of their rights and, as explained above, was
primarily conceived to protect minorities. There are no other provisions that
indigenous peoples of Russia can appeal to, given that the Federation did not
ratify ILO Convention No. 169, abstained during the vote for the adoption of
the UNDRIP in 2007, and is not involved in the draft of the Nordic Sámi
Convention. In the particular case of the draft Nordic Sámi Convention,
the Expert Committee strongly supported that the three Nordic countries
cooperate with Russia in order to include the Russian Sámi (Cambou 2018,
Koivurova 2008, 109). This can be seen as an attempt to extend the validity of
the Convention to the Russian Sámi, but without involving the Russian
State into the negotiations. The Committee’s hesitance to involve Russia in
the process is grounded both in Russia’s abstention from the adoption of the
UNDRIP, as well as the diversity of indigenous peoples present in Russia; it
would have been diﬃcult to take part in an international convention for
Russian Sámi, while leaving other indigenous groups without any speciﬁc
protections (Koivurova 2008, 108–109).
As previously discussed, indigenous community security is broadly
articulated in the human rights framework at the international level through
the UNDRIP, ILO C169, the draft Nordic Sámi Convention and other
human rights documents. However, in order to address aspects of indigenous
community security speciﬁc to the Barents Region, further contextualisation
within regional structures is necessary. The Working Group of Indigenous
People (WGIP), which holds advisory status to the Barents Euro-Arctic
Council (BEAC) and the Barents Regional Council (BRC), is composed of
representatives from the national indigenous populations of each Barents
states. In the Nordic countries, representatives are appointed by the Sámi
Parliamentary Council, while representatives of the Sámi, Nenets and Veps
in Russia are appointed by the Sámi Congress, Yasavey and Vepsian Cultural
Society, respectively (WGIP 2017, 4). Together, the WGIP developed the
2016–2018 Action Plan for Indigenous Peoples in the Barents Euro-Arctic
Region (BEAR). The Action Plan deﬁnes current priorities in the develop-
ment of indigenous peoples’ communities and societies in the region, and
identiﬁes areas for cooperation between indigenous communities and states
to promote such interests (WGIP 2017, 3). Although the legal signiﬁcance of
the Action Plan is minimal, the document is a regional and self-articulated
representation of the threats and priorities present in indigenous commu-
nities in the Barents. It is used in this chapter to guide the assessment of
indigenous community security in the Barents Region, as it serves to reﬂect
indigenous voices on community security, and preserve the principle of a
people-centred approach.
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3 Assessment
Historically, indigenous peoples in the Barents have faced discrimination and
inequality through the imposition of state assimilation processes, and the
impacts and eﬀects are still visible in the insecurity of communities today.
Cultural preservation through education, knowledge sharing and language
are still complex and insecure for indigenous communities in modern con-
texts. Furthermore, environmental pressures triggered by human activities and
resulting from climate change also threaten the traditional land-use and
environmental practices of indigenous peoples in the region. Ultimately,
securing the adequate participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making
and legislation is fundamental to articulating indigenous rights and achieving
community security. Although communities have identiﬁed more speciﬁc
priorities in the realm of economic, environmental and personal security,
these elements are discussed more broadly in other chapters.
3.1 Cultural preservation as the core of indigenous community security
In the Action Plan, it is recognised that the indigenous peoples of the Barents’
(the Nenets, Sami and Veps) ‘way of living, [their] culture, and languages have
historical roots in the area, and future development must take this into
account’ (WGIP 2017, 6). In the past century, indigenous communities in the
Barents have faced discrimination and cultural assimilation, through the
enforcement of harsh state assimilation policies. In Norway, Norwegianisa-
tion became an oﬃcial policy at the end of the 19th century, and sought to
assimilate Sámi into Norwegian society through the erasure of non-Norwegian
cultural practices and identiﬁcation (Joona 2012, 58; Minde 2005, 6). In
addition to this, after the Second World War, the compulsory education and
the aﬃrmation of the welfare state had a signiﬁcant role in the assimilation of
Sámi people within the Norwegian state (Cambou 2016, 300–301). The impact
of these policies increased formal and informal discrimination against the
Sámi, and drastically reduced the number of people willing to identify as
Sámi, or able to speak a Sámi language. Such policies were prevalent across
the Barents, with similar policies in Sweden, Finland and the Soviet Union
attempting to integrate Sámi, Nenets and Veps into the national population
and dominant culture (Minde 2005, 11-ss.).
In recognition of the impact that assimilation policies had on the existing
culture and identity of Sámi, there was a shift in the national public policy in
addressing Sámi issues in the 1960s. Additionally, the inclusion of indigenous
peoples in the international arena in the late 1990s has resulted in increased
awareness, advocacy and rights protections for indigenous communities. To
this degree, the history of cultural assimilation has led to a prioritisation of
the right to cultural preservation as the key element underlying indigenous
community security. As the Action Plan denotes, ‘[Barents indigenous peoples’]
cultures are closely attached to primary industries, the nature, their languages,
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traditions and history through solidarity, socialization and identity’ (WGIP
2017, 13). However, despite achievements Regarding the realisation of civil,
economic and social rights of indigenous communities in the Barents are not
comprehensive, as indigenous identities were still consistently deﬁned by state
actors with the inﬂuence of prejudices and stigmatisations that were present in
the mainstream society (Pikkarainen and Brodin 2008, 21).
Furthermore, the preservation of indigenous culture through language and
education practices is a priority and challenge for communities in the Barents
Region. As is noted in the Action Plan ‘[e]ducation is the key to transmission
of indigenous languages…[a] satisfying level on indigenous peoples’ educational
institutions is a central point for further development of the competence level
among indigenous peoples’ (WGIP 2017, 11). Speciﬁcally, the realisation of
the rights of indigenous peoples to receive education in their native language
is a serious problem (WGIP 2012, 12). Access and availability of resources to
support education and teaching programs in native languages remain the
greatest barrier to the realisation of such rights (Anaya 2012, 21–22). Indeed,
local authorities have expressed that often no suitable teachers are available to
provide quality education in indigenous languages, due to a lack of available
and qualiﬁed candidates (Anaya 2012, 19; Council of Europe 2017).
3.2 Indigenous language and education
In the Barents Region, the preservation of indigenous languages varies
between Russia and the Nordic countries. In the Nordic countries, several Sámi
languages exist; the most commonly spoken are Inari Sámi, Skolt Sámi and
North Sámi (Sámediggi, 2017b). According to the provisions enshrined in the
Sámi language Acts of the three Nordic states, Sámi peoples are entitled to
receive education in a Sámi language at school and, moreover, they are entitled
to address the public administration and to go to court using their native
language (Chelstowska 2009, 19). Despite this, Inari and Skolt Sámi languages
in conjunction with smaller Sami languages such as Lule and Southern Sámi
are still classiﬁed as languages in danger of extinction (Anaya 2012, 19).
Furthermore, an additional challenge is the development of curriculum in
state funded schools that includes and incorporates Sámi history and culture
into mainstream education (Anaya 2012, 18–19).
The situation regarding indigenous rights to language preservation is
extremely delicate in the Russian part of the Barents, where assimilation
policies and the lack of implemented legislation on language preservation
have been complicit in the extinction and slow disappearance of languages.
The majority of Russian Sámi people live in the Murmansk Oblast and the
Kola Peninsula where Skolt Sámi, Ter Sámi, Kildin Sámi and Akkala Sámi
are the most common indigenous languages. Among others, Akkala and Ter
Sámi languages have almost disappeared; indeed, Ter Sámi is now only
spoken by two people worldwide. This is the result of a general lack of proper
policy, and Russia’s unwillingness to ratify international documents on the
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protection of indigenous languages. While all three Nordic countries have
ratiﬁed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Russia
has not. In addition, the Russian Constitution includes only vague provisions
on the necessity to guarantee linguistic rights; but to date, no speciﬁc language
acts have been conceived to properly ensure the linguistic rights of indigenous
and minority groups living in the Russian Federation (Chelstowska 2009, 21).
Although the Sámi, Nenets, Veps and Komi languages have no oﬃcial
recognition, there has been a signiﬁcant shift in public services in the last
decades, especially in comparison to harsh assimilatory policies of the Soviet
era. In the past, curriculum was available only in Russian, while today there
are a limited number of schools in which Sámi, Nenets and Komi are the
primary language of instruction until the fourth grade (Barentsinfo 2017).
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Veps Cultural Society
was established, with a primary aim to increase knowledge of the Veps lan-
guage (Kolga 2001). Their main activities included the publication of books
in Veps, which are used in schools oﬀering Veps curricula in the Republic of
Karelia. Furthermore, radio broadcasts in Sámi, Komi and Veps languages
exist, in addition to few newspapers and magazines in Kildin Sámi, Nenets,
Komi and Veps languages (Barentsinfo 2017). However, general educational
materials contain limited information about indigenous culture and history
and, in addition to this, the language is seldom used at home (Chelstowska
2009, 25). The primary use of national languages at home and at school, in
addition to a lack of adequate educational materials concerning indigenous
history and culture, is a prevalent concern across all indigenous communities
in the Barents Region. To this degree, it can be recognised that many languages
vanished or are vanishing due to national policies that do not take into con-
sideration the linguistic rights of indigenous peoples (Pikkarainen and Brodin
2008, 24–25).
Furthermore, indigenous peoples who speciﬁcally claim their linguistic
rights are often seen with prejudice by the authorities. In particular, indigen-
ous peoples face discrimination and prejudice within healthcare systems;
which are often related with their linguistic rights, or due to inaccessible or a
lack of culturally appropriate services (CERD 2013, 29–30; CERD 2015, 27–
28). In the Nordic Sápmi, parents express having experienced discrimination
through their interactions with doctors, nurses and therapists, in regards to
their children utilising a Sámi language in order to communicate with family
members (Pikkarainen and Brodin 2008, 30). Furthermore, studies have
found that children face teasing and social discrimination because they speak
a Sámi language as their mother tongue, instead of the dominant national
language (Pikkarainen and Brodin 2008). Additionally, elderly indigenous
peoples also face linguistic discrimination, which, in conjunction with their
histories of trauma from past assimilation policies, create a nuanced need for
culturally and linguistically appropriate services. Municipalities in which Sámi
are present are required to oﬀer eldercare services (entirely or partially) in a
Sámi language, as there are still communities of elderly Sámi that exclusively
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utilise a Sámi language to communicate with others. As in education, the
greatest barrier to meeting such needs is the availability of qualiﬁed candidates
and employees, but additionally municipalities lack the political will to protect
the use of Sámi languages within the Sámi eldercare sector (Pikkarainen and
Brodin 2008, 31).
Indigenous peoples of the Barents also face discrimination in labour and
employment sectors. On diﬀerent occasions, notwithstanding university
degrees in social or natural sciences for example, indigenous peoples have
been advised to look for a job in the tourism sector, due to their ethnic origin
(Pikkarainen and Brodin 2008, 31–32). In addition to the perceived commer-
cialisation of their culture and essentialisation of their value to society as a
subject for touristic consumption, indigenous people experience a social
environment that does not seriously consider their competences, resulting in a
perpetuation of negative perceptions regarding the appropriateness of certain
types of work for indigenous communities (Pikkarainen and Brodin 2008, 32).
In conclusion, indigenous peoples living in the Barents continue to experience
linguistic and ethnic discrimination, and by extension, the lack of appropriate
protections for education and linguistic rights continue to exist as threats to
community security.
3.3 Land and natural resource rights
Discrimination against indigenous peoples in the Barents and the trauma of
assimilation processes are also connected to the right to utilise traditional
land and resources. Indigenous community security in the Barents Region is
inherently linked to land and natural resource rights, ‘the economic develop-
ment of the region must increase the participation of the indigenous peoples
in the ﬁelds of protection and development of their own communities…[sic]
[and is] decisive for the survival of the indigenous peoples’ communities’
(WGIP 2017, 10). Historically, indigenous people have been excluded from
any kind of participation in decision-making, which has led to contemporary
disputes with states and companies seeking to govern or utilise the existing
natural resources present on traditional lands. Indeed,
The fundamental root source of conﬂict between indigenous peoples, on
the one hand, and States and non-indigenous entities and individuals,
on the other, is their diﬀering views as to which actor possesses valid title
to the land and resources located in territories traditionally occupied by
indigenous groups.
(Economic and Social Council 2004, 5)
Currently, resource related conﬂicts between states, indigenous groups, and
non-indigenous groups are an inﬂuential factor in shaping the local politics of
natural resource management and land rights in the Barents Region. For
example, in Finland recent ﬁshing quotas and licensing regulations agreed
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upon by Finland and Norway around the Teno River region have spurned
protests by Sámi peoples and ﬁshermen (YLE 2017). In Norway, protests
against mining activities and wind farms have increased, as Sámi reindeer
herders and ﬁshermen are increasingly concerned about the impacts of such
activities on herding districts and water quality (Vinding and Mikkelsen 2016,
32). Similarly, in Sweden, Sámi rights to traditional ﬁshing and hunting
practices have been challenged, and state permission and support for mining
companies have raised concerns among Sámi activists over the protection of
their traditional lands and practices (Vinding and Mikkelsen 2016, 34). In
Russia, amendments to the existing land codes have enabled diamond and
gold mining activities to increase, without a meaningful attempt to acquire
the consent of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, oil and liquid natural gas
(LNG) projects threaten traditional ﬁshing practices, and the reindeer herding
livelihoods of Nenets on the Yamal Peninsula, which further underscore the
lack of indigenous rights provided and protected in the Russian legal framework
(Vinding and Mikkelsen 2016, 47–48; Rohr 2014).
According to the provisions established in the UNDRIP, indigenous peoples
are entitled to maintain traditional practices on occupied lands and waters
(article 25); they have the right to use, develop and control the lands, terri-
tories and resources that they have been using since time immemorial (article
26), and they are entitled to determine and develop speciﬁc strategies for the
development of their lands (article 32). All the activities that take place on
indigenous lands and impact indigenous traditional lifestyles and livelihoods
require the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (hereafter FPIC) of the relevant
indigenous group. As established in the Convention, the need for FPIC from
indigenous groups is established in several cases, including: relocation (article 10);
undue expropriation of their lands and resources (article 11–28); before
adopting any legislative measure that can impact them (article 19); before the
approval of any project that can impact their lands (article 32), and in cases
where hazardous materials are to be deposited on indigenous lands (article
29). The importance of these rights is central to the community security of
indigenous groups in the Barents, and articulated in the Action Plan as ‘[the]
transfer of knowledge and competence regarding political work and interna-
tional legislation regarding indigenous peoples’ rights is a priority of the
WGIP during the Action Plan period’ (WGIP 2017, 13).
In the Barents Region, indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of land and natural
resources rights depends on the existing national legislation in each of the
Barents states. Until the 1960s, it was generally accepted that at the moment of
annexation, states automatically gained possession of ‘ownerless lands’. States
justiﬁed their sovereignty over these lands under the principle of ‘terra nullis’,
which applies to territories that had never been subject to any kind of sover-
eignty, or where previous sovereigns had, implicitly or explicitly, forsaken
sovereignty (Joona 2012, 66; Gilbert 2006). This was problematic, as it negated
the existence and agency of indigenous peoples inhabiting such territories and
therefore resulted in the governance of such lands by sovereign states without
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indigenous consent, consultation or participation. In the contemporary political
sphere, this would amount to a violation of the right to self-determination,
and disregard for FPIC in dealing with indigenous rights to land and resources.
The main institutions conceived to enhance the self-determination of Sámi
peoples in the Barents are the three Sámi Parliaments of Norway, Finland
and Sweden. Although this does not overtly include Russian indigenous groups,
these institutions serve as important models in building and strengthening
indigenous self-governance and participation in decision-making across the
Barents Region, especially on local cultural and governance issues. However,
their level of involvement in decision-making and their real power to inﬂuence
policymakers at the State level is still limited and diﬀers between the diﬀerent
national legislations (see also Chapter 2.9 on political security).
Speciﬁcally, in Finland the Sámi Parliament is limited to decision-making
that concerns Sámi culture and language; while it is not involved in matters
related with the use of natural resources and the right to land (Anaya 2012, 11).
Nevertheless, the Finnish government is working on the ratiﬁcation of ILO
C169 and Finland does oﬃcially recognise Sámi as indigenous people in the
Finnish Constitution (Constitution of Finland 1999, Chapter 2, section 17),
and many national laws (like the Finnish Mining Act and the Finnish Reindeer
Husbandry Act) to ensure that their rights are protected and safeguarded.
The same situation is present in Sweden, where the Sámi Parliament is
involved in minor matters, and the Swedish Government is considering
assessments on the possibility of ratifying ILO C169. Nevertheless, in national
legislation, Sámi rights are safeguarded through speciﬁc Acts like the Swedish
Reindeer Herding Act and the Swedish Minerals’ Act, and such laws still lack
speciﬁc provisions on the inclusion of Sámi people in consultation processes.
On the contrary, Norway remains the only Barents state that has ratiﬁed ILO
C169, and more recently signed a consultation agreement with the Norwegian
Sámi Parliament. Notwithstanding the importance of such an agreement,
such consultation does not necessarily guarantee the inclusion of Sámi in all
decision-making. Indeed, the Sámi Parliaments have reported that on many
occasions, governments have failed to start consultations prior to making and
implementing decisions, and begun consultations after decisions have already
been made (Anaya 2012, 11–12). The situation is more diﬃcult for the Sámi,
Nenets and Veps peoples living in Russia, given that the Federation has shown
little possibilities to ratify the ILO C169, or to adopt speciﬁc provisions in order
to safeguard the rights to land and natural resources of those indigenous peoples
living within its national boundaries. The Russian Federation’s tendency to
ignore the rights of indigenous peoples was reconﬁrmed during the vote to
adopt the UNDRIP, when Russia abstained (Koivurova 2008, 108–109).
The historic and unique relationship that indigenous peoples have to their
lands unites community wellbeing to the welfare of the land and environment.
As a result, the exploitation of natural resources directly impacts the ability of
a community to determine the future of its culture (WGIP 2012, 11–12). In
particular, land-based activities (such as reindeer-herding) form an integral
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part of indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihoods, and as discussed brieﬂy
above, has led to conﬂicts with other stakeholders on many occasions (WGIP
2012, 5–7). The lack of indigenous involvement in decision-making, especially
in cases of trans-national corporations carrying out exploitation processes in
indigenous areas, has resulted in the need to abandon considerable portions
of land in the Nenets tundra, or to the loss of lands that Sámi and Komi
peoples used for reindeer herding or ﬁshing in the Kola Peninsula (WGIP
2012, 13). To this degree, the rights of indigenous peoples in the Barents
Region still require critical attention. Indigenous participation and support
for self-determination in decision-making processes, especially concerning
land and natural resource rights, need to be further enhanced. Within the
BEAC, the Action Plan promotes ‘Veps, Nenets, and Sami representation on
all levels in decision-making processes’ (WGIP 2017, 13). Ultimately, an
increased recognition of indigenous rights at national and international levels is
necessary, and community security relies on the positionality and representation
of indigenous groups in decision-making processes.
4 Conclusions and recommendations
Ensuring community security for indigenous peoples living in the Barents
Region is signiﬁcantly dependent on their ability to participate in decision-
making processes, and the articulation of indigenous security in the Barents
needs to be people-centred. To this degree, it is clear that the foundation of
indigenous community security rests on indigenous agency in cultural preserva-
tion, which can be achieved through a realisation of linguistic and educational
rights, in addition to land and natural resources rights.
In order to mitigate the negative environmental and community impacts
that industrial activities poses on the Barents Region, a substantial improve-
ment in the existing legislation is needed. Indigenous community security in
the Barents Region rests on a need for comprehensive cooperation across
indigenous communities, locals and policy makers. In this sense, cooperation
requires inclusion in multiple aspects: inclusion in public life, participation in
public debate and inclusion in decision-making processes. Inclusion is vital to
security as people both ‘derive their security through being active members of
a group’ and ‘[develop] active and inclusive relationships between residents,
private sector, public sector and civil society organizations, in order to foster
individual and collective well-being’ (UNDP 2009, 13; Berger-Schmitt 2000,
406). The ultimate aim of inclusion in community security thus is to ‘develop
a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity’ (Scott
2010, 56). Hence, indigenous community security in the Barents Region is
ensured in a human rights context through two main aims: involving peoples in
decision-making, and improving legal existing tools. In light of this, ensuring
the inclusion of indigenous peoples in decision-making in alignment with
existing tools such as ILO 169 and the UNDRIP serves as the basis for ensuring
indigenous community security in the Barents Region.
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2.9 Political security in the Barents Region
Dorothée Cambou
Political security is a crucial component of human security. The concept
underlies and crosscuts all other aspects of human security. However, it is also
poorly deﬁned and the topic is not well addressed from a Barents perspective.
In this regard, the purpose of the following analysis is to deﬁne and assess con-
temporary political security challenges in the Barents Region. In this assessment,
the study more speciﬁcally argues that political security is intertwined with
democracy and human rights but that some issues and concerns subsist in the
Barents Region notably in relation to the respect and protection of the rights of
citizens, the rights of indigenous peoples and the preservation of the peace and
security in the region following the impacts of the Ukrainian crisis.
1 Deﬁnition
Originally the concept of political security was ‘not widely used or accepted
in social studies’ (United Nations Development Programme 1990, 3). It is
also a concept that is imprecise and ambivalent. Nevertheless, it has also been
more recently considered that political society remains a ‘relevant concept for
gathering concerns in the political action’ (Costa 2008, 568). In this regard, it
is important to clarify the concept in order to ensure a more informed debate
about its use and implementation.
Traditionally, political security has been loosely deﬁned in reference to the
protection of basic human rights. In this regard, political security must be
distinguished from national security, which essentially focuses on the protection
of the nation and the values espoused by the national society. Political security
is concerned with the rights of individuals and peoples, not those of the states
or nations. In its 1994 report, the UNDP indicates more precisely that political
security is one of the most ‘important aspects of human security’ and includes
the protection of people against ‘political repression, systematic torture, ill
treatment or disappearance’ as well as ‘political detention and imprisonment’
(United Nations Development Programme 1990, 32). In accordance with this
interpretation, political security therefore encompasses the defence of individuals
against any form of political repression or human rights abuses. A predominant
focus on repression is, however, insuﬃcient in comprehensively addressing the
issue of political security. While political security necessarily entails the nega-
tive obligation of the state to refrain from interfering with basic individual
freedoms, it also includes positive obligations for national authorities to take
necessary measures to safeguard basic political rights (Hokkanen v. Finland,
24 August 1994).1 The protection of such rights include the freedom to vote,
freedom of speech, freedom of press, the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief, and the freedom of movement. These rights are protected
under international law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratiﬁed by 184 states around the
world. In this sense, political security also ensures people’s ability to take part
in the political life of the society to which they belong therefore sustaining a
democratic governance system.
In this sense, political security is closely intertwined with democratic gov-
ernance: ‘democracy provides the political foundation necessary to sustaining
all other dimensions of security’ (Young 2002). Similarly, political security
involves ‘support to transition to democratic practices’, a view also shared
by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UN Human Security
Unit 2009, 21). There is also a growing consensus under international law
that only in a democratic system can individuals fully exercise their human
rights. Conversely, ‘only when human rights are respected can democracy
ﬂourish’ (European Commission 2013). Thus, human rights and democracy
are inextricably related and mutually reinforcing. Democratic governance
provides the framework, institutions and process to uphold a state’s responsi-
bility to safeguard the rights and needs of the population. On the other hand,
human rights provide a set of values that inform the content of democratic
governance and sustain political security. In practice, achieving the ambitions
of political security has therefore become tied to the promotion of democracy
and human rights.
The links between democratic governance and human rights are enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and further developed in the
ICCPR, which recognises a host of political rights and civil liberties under-
pinning meaningful democracies. More speciﬁcally, article 25 of the Covenant
recognises and protects the right of every citizen ‘to take part in the conduct
of public aﬀairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have
access to public service’. According to the Human Rights Committee, which
is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the
ICCPR by its State parties, ‘Article 25 lies at the core of democratic govern-
ment based on the consent of the people’ (General Comment No 25, 1996,
para.2). However, democracy does not only centre on the electoral process.
The deﬁnition of democracy must be holistic and encompass procedural
and the substantive elements. In other words, democratic governance must
ensure that the outcomes of elections are representative of the people. It must
also ensure that the will of peoples is freely exercised, and that all individuals
can participate in political aﬀairs free from discrimination. Democracy also
implies the establishment of governance structures, which ensure freedom of
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expression and access to information, as well as guarantees the right to freedom
of association and peaceful assembly. Democracy is thus an intersectional
issue. It enjoins all political rights and freedoms necessary to ensure ‘the
freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic,
social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their
lives’ (UN General Assembly 2009).
Whereas democracy originally focused on the individual rights of citizens
to freely participate in electoral processes without discrimination, democracy
also ‘entails a principle that everyone whose basic interests are aﬀected by
policies should be included in the process of making them’ (Young 2002). In
this regard, the concept of democracy has now become more inclusive and
implies the participation of minorities and indigenous peoples groups in
the decision-making processes that aﬀect them. More particularly, ensuring the
engagement of indigenous peoples and their organisations has now become
critical for preventing, resolving conﬂicts and enhancing democratic govern-
ance (UNDP 2001). In this regard, the study of democracy as a governance
framework involves the collective inclusion of indigenous peoples and minor-
ity groups in decision-making processes concerning them and their right to
participate in the governance of their traditional land and natural resources.
This conceptualisation of democracy is far-reaching, and is further entrenched
within the intersections between political security and personal and community
security (see chapters 2.7 and 2.8).
Alongside the extension of its subject, the extension of the concept of
democracy outside the framework of the state polity is also increasingly taken
into account. As postulated by Grigorescu, during these last decades, democratic
norms have spread from domestic politics to intergovernmental organisations
(IGOs) (Grigorescu 2015). Democratic values inﬂuence the institutional
design and work of intergovernmental organisations such as the UN. In eﬀect,
democracy is now one of the universal and indivisible core values and prin-
ciples of the United Nations. Thus the contemporary deﬁnition of democracy
must be inclusive and comprehensive. It concerns the decision-making pro-
cesses that involve formal institutions and informal processes; people of all
genders, majorities and minorities; governments and civil society; and
includes institutions at the national, local and international levels.
While it is ‘obvious that democracy, or the installation of democratic
regimes, is a component of political security’ (Costa 2008, 562), democracy
remains ﬂexible and is set on open-texture political values. As noted by the
UN, ‘democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of
people’. Moreover, it is also recognised as well that, while these norms and
standards are both universal and essential to democracy, there is no one
model of democracy (General Assembly resolution 62/7). Indeed, the ideal of
democracy is rooted in philosophies and traditions from many regions of the
world. While the western standards of democracy have a value for the new
democracies, the democratic ideal should integrate and suits local conditions
and particularities (Beetham et al. 2008). In this regard, securing democratic
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governance as a means to ensure political security can be pursued through
diverse routes. This diversity has cast some doubts on whether any form of
democracy can always provide political security for all. It is also questionable
to which extent the standards of universal democracy can/are truly being
dissociated from western values in practice.
Nonetheless, because democracies are less conﬂict-prone than non-
democracies (e.g. Russett and Oneal 2001) and democratising countries with
well-managed transitions are less likely to be engaged in interstate warfare
(Landman 2005), ensuring democratic governance continues to be a main
element in enhancing political security. Ultimately, the promotion of
democracy as a means to ensure political security must therefore be valued
and contextualised in accord with the population that invokes it.
2 Contextualisation
Preserving and maintaining political security requires democratic governance.
However, ‘democratization is a process that requires time and patience’, and
which must ‘be built from within societies’ and ‘cannot be imported, or exported,
but supported’ (Beetham et al. 2008, 7). As noted in the 1993 Barents declara-
tion, the Barents institutions were established to meet this need: to support
‘the ongoing process of reform in Russia which aims, inter alia, at strength-
ening democracy, market reforms, and local institutions, and which is there-
fore important for closer regional co-operation in the Barents Euro-Arctic
Region’. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the
situation in Russia and its relation with Nordic countries changed. During
this period, the discourse on political security also shifted from traditional
security, which concerns the protection of the state, military issues and war, to
a focus on human security and the needs of the Barents population. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation begun its transition to
democracy. In line with democratising principles, the Russian Federation
pursued renewed cooperation with its European neighbours, notably increasing
its cooperation with Nordic states through the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.
In 1996, the Russian Federation acceded to the Council of Europe, the oldest
European institution and main protector of rule of law, human rights and
democracy on the old continent ‘on the basis of its democratic progress,
taking into account the particular circumstances following the fall of the
Soviet Union.’ (Bindig 2010, 35; Massias 2007, 6; Stahl 2011, 176).
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, support for democratic development has
become a vital aspect of Barents cooperation. According to the Norwegian
Barents secretariat, the Barents cooperation is considered ‘as an integral part
of creating a stable, democratic and prosperous Europe’, which brings
‘administrative structures closer to the citizens and to improve the democratic
functions of society’ (The Norwegian Barents Secretariat 2017). This recog-
nition of the common democratic values of the region are also present in the
1993 Kirkenes Declaration and in reference to several other documents
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published under the auspices of the Barents cooperation.2 In 2013, the Kir-
kenes Declaration reiterated that the Barents cooperation is ‘a unique under-
taking that conﬁrms the value of close interaction between intergovernmental
cooperation, cooperation among county administrations and direct people-to-
people cooperation’ that seeks to develop its ‘societies in full respect of inter-
nationally recognised principles for ensuring sustainable development’. Thus,
the achievements of the last two decades have been the development of closer
cooperation between local and regional initiatives by Barents communities
and institutions, as well as the increase in activities across sectors such as
business and civil society (Kirkenes Declaration 2013). In this regard, the
regional framework has successfully strengthened cooperation between
governance mechanisms.
Despite this progress, the democratic transition of the whole Barents
Region remains incomplete. In its 2015 concluding observation report, the
Human Rights Committee expressed its continuous concern regarding the
Russian Government’s failure to ensure freedom of expression and freedom of
association, as well as to combat the rise of racism, xenophobia, Islamopho-
bia and anti-Semitism, and to eradicate torture and ill treatment (Human
Rights Committee 2015). Today, the Russian Federation also continues to
have the largest number of pending cases before the European Court of
Human Rights. Moreover,
the examination of recent developments in the ﬁeld democratic transition
at local and regional level has shown that Russia, despite ﬁrst positive
signs at the beginning of the reforms in 2000, has still not been able to
meet the obligations it committed to when acceding to the CoE.
(Stahl 2011)
Although this issue mainly concerns Russia, it also has implications for
the Barents Region. In 2017, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, a non-
governmental organisation that works to promote respect for human rights,
requested ‘Norwegian authorities to increase the emphasis on democracy
and human rights in the Russian part of the Barents Region,’ because ‘on
the Russian side, the human rights problems remain very severe’ (Human
Rights House 2007). In addition, studies like the Freedom in the World
survey for 2017 notes a continued decline in Russia in the ﬁeld of political
rights and civil liberties, notably ‘due to the heavily ﬂawed 2016 legislative
elections, which further excluded opposition forces from the political pro-
cess’ (Freedom House 2017a). Similarly, the Nations in Transit survey for
2017 indicates a low Russian performance when it comes to national
democratic governance, electoral processes, civil society, independent media,
local democratic governance, independence and corruption (Freedom House
2017b). Altogether, a low performance on these elements represent an
important threat to the democracy and the political security of Russian
citizens.
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In contrast to the Russian Federation, the Nordic countries are among the
champions of human rights and democracy. For many years, Norway,
Sweden and Finland have shared the top positions on several democracy
analyses (Global Democracy Ranking 2015; The Economist 2016; Freedom
House 2017a). Yet, the Nordic countries are not entirely exempt from political
insecurity concerns. The consolidation of democracy and the safeguard of
human rights are continuous processes. As indicated by minister of foreign
aﬀairs Børge Brende, human rights and rule of law are central components of
good democratic governance:
human rights provide a framework for identifying and addressing
inequalities and thus ensuring that no one is left behind. This includes
safeguarding the rights of those who are hardest to reach – the most
vulnerable and marginalised groups, including indigenous peoples and
persons with disabilities.
(Brende 2014)
The recognition and protection of the rights of the indigenous peoples in the
Nordic counties remains nonetheless a major issue. The protection of the
rights of the Sámi people, and their inclusion in the democracy of their
respective states, implies the recognition and implementation of their right to
self-determination. This has yet to occur in practice (Anaya 2011; Tauli-
Corpuz 2016). Whereas the economic and social situation of the Sámi people
is better than it is for many other indigenous peoples around the world, the
Sámi in the Nordic countries continue to face major human rights challenges
that aﬀect their political security as a distinct people living in western demo-
cratic states (Multiculturalism Policy Index 2010).
Finally, political security is interconnected with peace and stability. How-
ever, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Eastern Ukraine have
raised questions about the Russian Federation’s governmental relationship
with European countries. This event also incurred great speculations about
conﬂict in the Barents Region that could threaten the political security of its
population.
With this context in mind, the purpose of the next section is to assess some
of the issues that currently challenge the democratic order of the Barents
Region and the political security of its population.
3 Assessment
There are many political security challenges that can be identiﬁed in the
Barents Region. While such challenges are complex and interconnected, it is
possible to narrow the scope of insecurity issues to three main components.
The ﬁrst component concerns the protection of democratic rights, which
includes safeguards on the rights of individual citizens to vote, and their other
political freedoms. The second component concerns the collective rights of
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indigenous peoples, their inclusion in decision-making process and the exercise
of their right to self-determination. The last component concerns the stability
of the region and the geopolitical relations between the Russian Federation
and its neighbouring countries, as well as the preservation of cooperation
across the borders of the Barents Region.
The following section subsequently analyses each component as a challenge
to political security in the Barents Region.
3.1 Political rights and freedoms
In the Barents Region, the consolidation and strengthening of democracy is an
on-going process. This process entails the protection of the right to vote and the
guarantee of political freedoms at all levels of the decision-making process.
The right to vote in national, regional and local elections is crucial to
ensure the establishment of representative institutions in a democracy, because
the authority of the government derives itself from the consent of the governed.
According to statistics from Patchwork Barents,3 the voter turnout in the
latest elections to national, regional and local legislative assemblies, as well as
in regional parliament elections, varies substantially within the Barents
Region. National elections are much more popular among Barents citizens,
with a turn out ranging from 50% in Argnaglesk Oblast to 87.5% in Vaster-
botten (Ulyanova 2015). Also, whereas Sweden had a voter turnout of over
80% in regional elections, all other regions in Norway, Finland and Russia
registered considerably lower participation. In Arkhangelsk Oblast, only
20.99% of the electorate participated in the gubernatorial elections and in
Murmansk Oblast, the average turnout throughout the regional elections was
23.10%. In contrast, elections held in the Republic of Karelia in 2011 gath-
ered a turnout of 44.4%, and in the Komi Republic in 2015, this ﬁgure was
44.2%. At the regional level, Finnish and Norwegian voters were also more
active voters. The latest (2012) turnout ﬁgures for Lapland and Northern
Ostrobothnia were 60.6 and 56.5%. In Norway, according to NRK,4 the local
election turnout in Nordland, Troms and Finnmark was 59.8, 58.9 and 58.1%
respectively in 2015. In comparison with previous elections, the turnout in
Norway was, however, signiﬁcantly lower than in the previous elections
organised in 2011, which gathered a turnout of 63.4, 64.6 and 61.7% voters
across the three counties respectively. Thus, the participation of citizens in the
electoral process has been decreasing, though this is probably also reﬂective of
a global crisis of trust in the democratic process.
However, while all modern democracies hold elections, not all elections are
democratic. In order to ensure democratic elections, all citizens should be
entitled to exercise their right to vote free from discrimination. Genuine and
periodic elections are also essential to ensure the accountability of repre-
sentatives for the exercise of the legislative or executive powers vested in
them. In accordance with Article 25 ICCPR, ‘such elections must be held at
intervals which are not unduly long and which ensure that the authority of
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government continues to be based on the free expression of the will of electors.’
According to the HRC, reasonable limitations on campaign expenditure may
also ‘be justiﬁed where this is necessary to ensure that the free choice of voters
is not undermined or the democratic process distorted by the disproportionate
expenditure on behalf of any candidate or party’ (HRC 1996, para. 19).
In the Russian Barents, however, irregularities have been noted which
question the democratic nature of national and local elections. According to
the independent election watchdog, Golos,5 ‘the main problems in Russian
elections are connected with the activities of state oﬃcials on both national
and local level. The oﬃcials actively use their available administrative resources
to promote party interests in public events and the media’ (Staalesen 2016).
These irregularities were especially reported in Arkhangelsk, which was one of
the regions with the biggest number of registered oﬀences.
Another issue of concern in the Barents Region concerns youth. Whereas
the interests of young people and their involvement in diﬀerent regional
activities is essential to strengthening civil society and democracy in the
Barents Region,6 the lack of engagement of youth in political aﬀairs is suﬃ-
ciently signiﬁcant to be reported. In Norway, it has been noted that the
number of ﬁrst-time voters (18–21 years) practising their right to vote in local
elections dropped from 53% in 1971 to below 30% in 2007 (Dalhaug 2012,
77). Voter turnout among youth is also lower than among adults in both local
and national parliament elections, and the number of young members in
Norwegian political parties has also fallen from about 44.000 in 1977 to
23.000 in 1995.7 Russia is experiencing similar disproportionality, with ﬁgures
in 2007 from the Komi Republic showing that 37.3% of the population aged
18–30 years took part in the regional elections, 49.6% in elections to the State
Duma and 58% in presidential elections. While the lack of political engagement
in young people through participation in elections should not be overstated,
according to Dalhaug, project manager for the Barents Youth project at the
Norwegian Barents in 2003, ‘the low number of young people involved in
political activity in more conventional forms calls for concern’ (Dalhaug
2012, 77). More particularly, the low number of political youth organisations
and the low number of youth representatives in local and regional constituencies
can undermine the representative outcome of political decision-making pro-
cesses and their relevance for youth. As noted by the Barents Youth Council,
‘youth need experience in democratic decision-making processes to under-
stand the beneﬁts of democratic societies’ (BEAC Youth Working Group
2011). In this regard, youth involvement in the Barents Region must be
strengthened through their inclusion in decision-making processes and
through increased support for youth engagement in NGOs and media, in
order to foster active citizenship and a plural democratic process.
Finally, participation in electoral processes is no panacea for democracy.
Beyond participation in the political processes, it is also important to ensure
that all citizens beneﬁt from their political freedoms. However, the democracy
scores and regime ratings of the country of Russia continue to raise general
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concern, which also aﬀects the political security of the Barents population.
According to the Freedom of House’s 2017 report, Russia’s democratic score
is declining. More particularly, the organisation argues that ‘the regime sought
to perfect its authoritarian control over Russian citizens and the economy in
order to prevent any real democratic changes’ (Freedom House 2017b). To
some extent, those conclusions are consistent with the 2014 HRC conclusions
on Russia’s State report, which stresses the need for the government to take
all necessary measures to ensure that individuals fully enjoy their freedom of
speech and the expression of dissenting political opinion, their right to
peaceful assembly and their freedom of association (HRC 2015, para 18–22).
In particular, government measures to suppress political dissent and the
‘reports of harassment, violence and killing of lawyers, journalists, human
rights defenders and opposition politicians’ have raised strong concern in
Russia (HRC 2015, para 18–19). In relation to peaceful assembly, the HRC
also expressed concern
about consistent reports of arbitrary restrictions on the exercise of freedom
of peaceful assembly, including violent and unjustiﬁed dispersal of pro-
testers by law enforcement oﬃcers, arbitrary detentions and imposition of
harsh ﬁnes and prison sentences for the expression of political views.
(HRC 2015, para. 21)
Concerning the freedom of association, the Committee also worried about
‘restrictions on the operations of NGO activities and to suspension or voluntary
closure of some NGOs’ (HRC 2015, para. 22). The right to free association
and peaceful assembly are, however, essential in conjunction to the rights of
individuals to participate in political aﬀairs, and are protected under article
25 of the ICCPR. In this regard, it is required of states to ensure that basic
freedoms are protected in their internal management, in order to enable citi-
zens to fully exercise their democratic rights. In the absence of fully-ﬂedged
protection of such rights, the political security of citizens living in the Russian
Federation remains consequently pale in comparison to the situation aﬀorded
to the population in the Nordic countries.
3.2 Inclusion and self-determination
While it is fundamental to ensure that individual citizens can fully exercise
their democratic rights, it is also crucial to ensure that all peoples participate
in political life and are active decision-makers – especially indigenous peoples.
This is essential to overcome historical inequalities and discrimination. However,
in the Barents, the inclusion of indigenous peoples in the democratic system
remains an ongoing issue in all four states.
In the Nordic states, the recognition and protection of the rights of the
Sámi people has made some progress in the last thirty years. This includes the
establishment of a Sámi assembly in each of the three Nordic countries to
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represent the Sámi community at the domestic level, which also exercises
certain competencies in the decision-making process aﬀecting the Sami liveli-
hoods. It also includes the adoption of multiple national regulations and
legislations to ensure the protection of the cultural rights of the Sámi people,
their language and traditional way of life. Yet, such progress has not been
suﬃcient to remediate the historical inequality the Sámi people have faced,
and have not evolved to protect them from new challenges, such as those
provoked by the negative impacts of industrial development on their traditional
lands. While it is important to reform legislative and political frameworks
to guarantee the human rights of the Sámi people, the autonomy and self-
governance powers of the Sámi parliaments must also be strengthened in
order to ensure the right of the Sámi people to self-determination.
The right of the Sámi people to self-determination is an essential feature of
their human rights and is the basis for their inclusion in the democratic orders
that govern them. As noted by both the former and current Special Rapporteur
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, there is an ongoing need to strengthen
the Sámi Parliament’s ability to participate in and genuinely inﬂuence decision-
making in matters that aﬀect the Sámi people (Anaya 2011, para. 37). In
Finland and Sweden for instance, the Sámi Parliament does not have sub-
stantial inﬂuence or decision-making powers. Whereas in Finland the Sámi
parliament has limited advising powers, in Sweden, the Sámi Parliament
functions as both a popularly elected body and a State administrative agency
which includes an obligation of the Sámi parliament to implement policies
and decisions made by the Swedish Parliament and government institutions.
This can be problematic, however, when decisions made by the Swedish
Parliament do not reﬂect the view and interests of the Sámi people. In
Norway, substantial progress has been made, especially since the Norwegian
government has ratiﬁed Convention ILO 169 concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples, and adopted a consultative agreement in 2005 to strengthen the
political inﬂuence of the Sámi Parliament in political processes (Falch et al.
2016). Yet, in its 2016 report, the current Special Rapporteur, Tauli-Corpuz,
noted that Norway should ‘enhance eﬀorts to implement the right of the Sámi
people to self-determination and to more genuinely inﬂuence decision-making
in areas of concern to them’ (Tauli-Corpuz 2016, para. 76). In particular, she
advised the need for a more eﬀective consultation arrangement, which should
also cover budgetary decisions. The following recommendations have, however,
not yet been addressed by the Norwegian government.
In Russia, indigenous peoples have also called for ‘greater democracy and
participation’ (Prakhova 2005). In eﬀect, the situation for the Sámi people
and other indigenous communities living in the country is even more alarming
than it is in the Nordic states. This is in spite of the guarantees provided by
the Russian Federation for the rights of small indigenous peoples under
Article 69 of the Constitution. In its 2014 report, the HRC indicated for
instance that it remains concerned regarding insuﬃcient measures taken to
respect and protect the rights of indigenous peoples, and to ensure that
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members of such peoples are recognised as indigenous in Russia. In its report,
the HRC stressed particular emphasis on the lack of protections for the tradi-
tional lands and sacred areas of indigenous peoples, which are ‘unprotected
from desecration, contamination and destruction by extractive, development
and related activities’. In addition, it also emphasised ‘that consultation with
indigenous peoples on matters of interest to their communities is insuﬃciently
enforced in practice and that access to eﬀective remedies remains a challenge’
(HRC 2015, para. 23). This is the case for Nenets in Russia, where the develop-
ment of extractive industry operations continues to undermine the traditional
way of life of Nenets people, and activities continue without obtaining the
free, prior and informed consent of the concerned communities for most
proposed projects. Thus, there is a need for new governmental measures in
order to eﬀectively ensure the accommodation of the rights of indigenous
peoples at the domestic level, and especially to ensure their right to self-
determination, including their right to fully and meaningfully participate in
the management of their land and territories.
Additionally, this extends to the right of indigenous peoples to represent
their own interests through their own and truly representative organisations.
The closure and reform of RAIPON, the Russian Association of Indigenous
Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East, because of an ‘alleged lack of
correspondence between the association’s statutes and federal law’ have sparked
major reactions both regionally and internationally. Today, it is still questioned
whether the organisation operates under free and genuine indigenous control
(International Work Group for Indigenous Aﬀairs 2012). In the absence of
representative institutions, the situation of indigenous peoples’ rights is at risk
of further erosion in Russia.
Finally, while the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples occurs
primarily at the domestic level, it is also important for indigenous representatives
to be included in the decision-making processes that operate on regional and
international levels. In the Barents Region, indigenous peoples have strength-
ened their inﬂuence in decision-making processes aﬀecting them through their
participation in the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. The working
group consists of the representatives of the Sámi, Nenets and Veps peoples. It
was established as a means to recognise the speciﬁc needs and interests of
indigenous peoples living in the Barents Region. The working group has a
speciﬁc position within the Barents cooperation framework; in addition to its
operational role as a working group, it also has an advisory role to both the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Barents Regional Council
(BRC) (Working Group of Indigenous Peoples – BEAC 2017). Through this
advisory function, the working group consequently has a political dimension.
It can inﬂuence the decisions made by the BRC and the BEAC to the extent
that the councils take its opinions into account. In addition, the working
group can also participate in all Barents working group sessions. However, the
working group solely oﬀers consultative status for indigenous peoples within
the Barents Councils institutions. Therefore, in order to enhance their rights
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to self-determination, the Sámi together with the Nenets and the Veps have
asked for permanent status within the Barents cooperation framework, as
opposed to simply being granted consultative status as a working group. The
status of permanent participant would aﬀord them direct representation
instead of indirect representation through a working group (BEAC Newsletter
2010). This way, indigenous peoples would be granted full and active partici-
pation within the BEAC and BRC as permanent participants, and, as they
argue, this status would be in line with their right to self-determination.
The above analysis makes explicit that the inclusion of indigenous peoples
in democratic governance remains an on-going issue in the Barents Region,
both at the domestic and regional level. In order to ensure political security for
all peoples in the Barents Region, it is consequently important that governance
institutions at the local, national and regional levels recognise their land and
cultural rights, promote inclusion and foster their full self-determination and
participation in democracy as valued members of national societies and the
regional Barents community.
3.3 Peace and stability
Political security is conditional to peace and stability. One of the best indicators
for political insecurity in a country is the priority the government accords to
military strength (UNDP 1994, 32). During the Cold War, the Barents Region
was an area of military confrontation and therefore possessed a high level of
human insecurity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the possibilities for
military conﬂict to take place in the region declined. The development of
cooperation in the region also largely contributed to enhancing the peace and
stability of the region. However, although it is unlikely that a conﬂict could
start in the region, there are concerns that the region could be aﬀected by
geopolitical tensions elsewhere. In particular, Russia’s annexation of Crimea,
and its involvement in the conﬂict in Ukraine in 2014, have resulted in a
strained relationship between the Nordic countries and the Russian government,
which could threaten the peaceful state of aﬀairs in the Arctic (Rahbek-
Clemmensen 2017). Although it is diﬃcult to assess the full impact of such
tensions for the Barents Region, the following subsection attempts to address
some aspects relating to the peace and stability of the region.
As mentioned elsewhere in this book, the Ukrainian conﬂict increased
political tensions between all Arctic countries. After the annexation of Crimea,
the United States and the European Union enacted sanctions on Russian
individuals and businesses, which were also reciprocated by Russian counter
measures. Several types of sanctions have been imposed on Russia. The sanc-
tions include asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities that have
been involved or have beneﬁted from Russia’s actions in Ukraine, sectoral
sanctions targeting the oil and gas, defence and ﬁnancial sectors in Russia,
and an arms embargo restrictions on doing business and investing in Russian-
occupied Crimea. In addition, the sanctions also prohibit American and EU
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companies from providing equipment and expertise to complex deep-water,
Arctic and shale oil development projects in Russia. While the impact of the
sanctions on Russian resources business remains limited – gas production and
exports have fallen slightly and oil production remains unaﬀected for the time
being8 – the impact of ﬁnancial sanctions has been immediate and signiﬁcant.
In particular, sanctions contributed to the collapse of the Russian ruble and
the Russian ﬁnancial crisis. With the impact of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, such
sanctions have isolated Russia from the global economy and held back its
economic modernisation (EU Parliament 2016). Furthermore, it has also
been reported that sanctions caused economic damage to a number of EU
countries, with total losses estimated at €100 billion. In the Barents Region,
Norway was particularly aﬀected by the sanctions on Russia, with a drop by
28% year-on-year to a total of €672 million in the ﬁrst half of 2015 and a
major export decline, though Russian trade to Norway in the period increased
by 10% to a total of €586 million (Staalesen 2015).
Despite economic tensions and little political contact since 2014, coopera-
tion between Norway and Russia in the north has continued at the regional
level. Most notably, the Barents cooperation has continued to operate in areas
such as ﬁsheries, border control, environment and nuclear safety. Broader
people-to-people contact networks between Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and the
northern parts of the Nordic countries have also been maintained. In fact,
maintaining good relations in the Barents Region despite tensions in bilateral
relations has been an objective for all governments. The importance of preser-
ving cooperation in the Barents Region despite major geopolitical turmoil was
also noted by the head of the Barents Regional Council, Arkhangelsk Governor
Igor Orlov, who ‘told his Oblast government in September 2014 that compli-
cated geopolitics should not aﬀect Barents Cooperation’ (Nilsen 2017). In
practice, the organisation of a series of high-level talks in the Barents-Euro
Council after the annexation of Crimea underscores that mutual interests in
the region have continued to guide cooperation in the region. As such, while
media headlines speculated great potential for conﬂicts in the Barents-Arctic,
a common understanding of joint interests in maintaining dialogue has
contributed to preserving the peace and stability within the region.
In addition, military activities within the region do not currently constitute
a threat for its stability. Even though the activities of NATO and Russia outside
the Barents have raised some concerns, it must also be noted that NATO does
not have a strong presence in the Arctic. After the end of the Cold War,
NATO’s focus gradually shifted away from the Arctic to strengthen its role in
the Mediterranean and more recently in the Eastern part of Europe. While a
signiﬁcant part of the region is within the territory of NATO members,
NATO does not have a speciﬁc Arctic policy and therefore no clear role in the
region. Nonetheless, following the Ukrainian crisis, the possibility and the
importance of enhancing the presence of NATO in the region has been ques-
tioned. According to Øystein Bø (2016), State Secretary of the Norwegian
Ministry of Defence, a strong NATO presence in the North would be in the
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US’ and Norway’s interests. On the other hand, it has been stressed that the
purpose of strengthening NATO’s presence in the Barents does not inevitably
aspire to revive or hearten conﬂict in the region. As noted by NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg in his 2016 speech, ‘NATO does not seek con-
frontation with Russia’. NATO ‘does not want a new Cold War’ nor ‘wants a
new arms race’. Rather, its ‘aim is a more positive and a more cooperative
relationship with Russia’ (Stoltenberg 2016). In this regard, it is also sug-
gested that an increasing NATO presence does not necessarily mean an
increased focus on hard security issues. Instead, it has been suggested that
NATO would focus on ‘soft security’ issues including the ecological con-
sequences of global warming and the risk of manmade and environmental
disasters (Sergunin 2015, 110). Although this focus does not exclude military
components of NATO policy, as reﬂected in a series of exercises conducted
under the NATO allegiance, Sergunin argues that NATO reinforced involve-
ment in the Arctic would principally target human activities and the global
competition for resources (Sergunin 2015, 110). As such, the strengthening of
NATO presence and military activities would not necessarily constitute a
factor of insecurity for its population but perhaps could provide a means to
increase political security in the region.
Yet, relations between Russia and the Nordic countries remain compli-
cated and inﬂuenced by larger geopolitical developments, especially in the
domain of military activities occurring outside the Barents Region. In 2013,
Russia’s Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, indicated during the Barents
Summit in Kirkenes ‘that Moscow sees the Arctic as an area with good
opportunities to implement joint programs and initiatives’ (Nilsen 2017).
However, he also underlined that ‘any expansion of NATO to include
Sweden and Finland would upset the balance of power and force Russia to
respond’. With Finland and Sweden strengthening their ties to NATO and
growing speculation around joining the Alliance, Russia continues to warn
that they would be forced to take a military response if such a situation
materialised, without however, clarifying the extent to which such a response
would entail (O’Dwyer 2016). Currently, it also remains questionable whe-
ther Sweden and Finland would compromise their non-alignment policy. In
2016, Margot Wallstrom, Foreign Minister, indicated that these policies
have served them well until today and ‘contributes to stability and security
in northern Europe’ (Wallstrom 2016). However, Sweden military exercise
with US and NATO troops around the Baltic Sea island of Gotland in 2017
in response to large scale military exercises by Russia on the borders of Europe
have again raised the possibility of the country joining NATO. According to
the Swedish Defence Minister, the Swedish military exercise constitutes
‘important signal to the Swedish population and also to other countries and
partners that (they) take this security situation seriously’ (Hultqvist 2017).
Although those events demonstrate that the security situation in the vicinity
of the Nordic states have deteriorated since the Crimea crisis (Fiskvik 2016),
it nevertheless remains diﬃcult to prognosticate to which extent those
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developments will aﬀect more generally the stability of the Barents Region
and its population.
In any event, ensuring peace and stability requires the maintenance of dia-
logue between all national governments, in particular concerning military
activities in order to ensure that regional military activities do not jeopardise
cooperation in the Barents. In addition, it is also important to ensure trans-
parency in military exercises along national borders and to ensure the provi-
sion of necessary information to all concerned parties. An increase in Russian
unannounced military exercises since 2014 have raised concerns regarding the
Russian government’s lack of clear expression on its motivations (NATO’s
Timo Koster and US deputy permanent representative to NATO Earle
Litzenberger in Gronning and Norwegian Institute of Foreign Aﬀairs Con-
ference 2016). In this regard, it is generally agreed that more ‘stability, pre-
dictability and cooperation with Russia is needed in the Arctic’ (Gronning
and Norwegian Institute of Foreign Aﬀairs Conference 2016). Whether these
goals are achievable with a more involved NATO in the region is, however,
still contested (Gronning and Norwegian Institute of Foreign Aﬀairs Con-
ference 2016). As a result, monitoring the development of peaceful military
relations and activities in the Barents should continue in order to ensure that
cross-border cooperation and the promotion of human security prevail in the
future.
4 Conclusions
With the establishment of the Barents cooperation and the development of
cross-borders relations between peoples and institutions since the 1990s, the
Barents Region has become one of the most peaceful and stable regions in
the world.
Yet, the political security of the Barents population is not unchallenged. As
previously discussed, beyond peace and stability, political security necessarily
involves guaranteeing the democratic governance of states and human rights
of the population. In the Barents Region, there is an excellent level of pro-
tection aﬀorded to the individual political rights of citizens living in the
Nordic countries, but mediocre guarantees provided for those living in Russia.
There are also concerns in both countries about the level of participation in
electoral activities, which constitutes the primary medium to ensure the exercise
of democracy. Finally, there is also a clear lack of political freedom in Russia
and a lag in the rights to free press, association and assembly, which in turn
constrain democracy and political security in this part of the region. In this
regard, there is a clear and urgent need for the promotion, enhancement and
assurance of basic human rights and political freedoms in the Barents Region
for all citizens.
Additionally, the present analysis has also demonstrated that political
security in the Barents Region concerns the inclusion of indigenous peoples in
the political and democratic order of the Barents Region. For many decades,
182 Dorothée Cambou
indigenous peoples have been colonised, marginalised and forcibly assimilated
by their states. Today, they continue to suﬀer from the grievous consequences
of historical injustices and contemporary challenges, which include the lack of
inclusion in decision-making processes aﬀecting them and the exploitation of
their traditional lands and resources. Fuelling more support to indigenous
representative institutions through the recognition of their rights to self-
determination is therefore fundamental to increasing political security in
the Barents Region. In particular, the ratiﬁcation of ILO Convention 169 and
the adoption of the Nordic Sámi Convention would be key elements to
enhance the political and legislative framework of all the Barents states con-
cerning the rights of the Sámi people. While the Barents institutions have already
recognised the speciﬁc status of indigenous peoples through the establishment
of the working group on indigenous peoples, strengthening the role and
inﬂuence of this mechanism would also be a means to increase the inclusion
of indigenous peoples in the decision-making processes aﬀecting them at the
regional level. Ultimately, there is a pressing need to adopt a holistic per-
spective towards the rights of indigenous peoples in order to ensure that their
political security is equally ensured in the Barents Region.
Finally, preserving peace and stability in the region is also required. Political
security remains indeed conditional to peace and stability. Whereas it is unlikely
that conﬂicts would resurface in the Barents Region (Rahbek-Clemmensen
2017), reinforcing dialogue and cooperation between concerned actors and
strengthening transparency and predictability in the ﬁeld of military activities
remains necessary both within and outside the Barents Region. While coop-
eration in the Barents Region has been maintained despite the Ukrainian
crisis, recent events have raised some tensions and concerns regarding military
relations and its signiﬁcance for the region. In this context, maintaining
peaceful military relations between states must continue in order to ensure
that cross-border cooperation and the improvement of human security prevail
in the region.
Notes
1 European Court of Human Rights, Hokkanen v. Finland, 24 August 1994.
2 XII Session of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Joint communique,Murmansk, 15
October 2009; XV Session of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Oulu, 15 October 2015.
3 Patchwork Barents, http://patchworkbarents.org/, last visited on 17-07-2017
4 NRK, Norwegian Result, www.nrk.no/norge/resultater-valg-2015-1.12499895, last
visited on 17-07-2017.
5 Golos was awarded the Sakharov Prize its ‘outstanding eﬀorts to promote democratic
values through free and fair elections’ by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee in 2012.
6 BEAC Committee of Senior Oﬃcials 2008.
7 Norwegian Government, NOU 2001: 03, www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/krd/dok/
nouer/2001/nou-2001–03.html?id=143453, last visited on 17–07–2017.
8 However, it is stated that oil export earnings have dropped signiﬁcantly but this is
certainly due to lower oil prices. In 2016, Russian oil companies were planning to
export 6% less than in 2015, (EU Parliament, 2016).
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2.10 Digital security in the Barents Region
Mirva Salminen
This chapter depicts the current state of digital security in the Barents Region.
Basing on a human security approach, it analyses the situation under the
following six themes: (1) access to digital networks, (2) availability of digital
services, (3) access to (relevant) information, (4) digital awareness and skills,
(5) digital inclusion policies and protection of human rights, and (6) state of
cybercrime and digital abuse. Digital security in the region varies and addi-
tional research is required for making well-based decisions that better include
the interests, needs and wants of people in the future digital development.
1 Deﬁnition
No univocal deﬁnition of ‘digital security’ exists. In addition, the term is often
used interchangeably with such concepts as ‘information security’ or ‘cyber-
security’. Even if the latter terms can also be deﬁned in multiple ways, they
are both used by the United Nations1 and hence utilised in this chapter for
deﬁning digital security as an aspect of human security in the Barents Region.
Digital security is not a dimension of human security as speciﬁed in the
original UNDP2 Human Development Report in 1994. However, over the
past decades virtually all aspects of human life have been digitised to the extent
that the everyday security of individuals and communities arguably depends
on the uninterrupted functioning of information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs). The realisation that information infrastructure is critical for a
smoothly functioning society has led to the adoption of information and/or
cybersecurity agendas throughout the globe, including the Barents Region.3
Digital security found its way onto the agenda of the UN General Assembly
from a Russian initiative in 1998 under the heading of ‘developments in the
ﬁeld of information and telecommunications in the context of international
security’ (UNODA n.d.; see also UNGA 1999; cf. IISS 2015, 26). Since then,
the UN has had three streams for discussing digital security, namely: (1) the
politico-military stream focusing on the questions of cyber peace and warfare,
(2) the economic stream focusing on the criminal misuse of ICTs, and (3) the
broader internet governance stream. Yet, the organisation’s activities have
been fragmented due to member states’ competing agendas (Maurer 2011,
15–16, 18; see also UNODA 2015). The International Telecommunication
Union (ITU)4 with its assigned responsibility for ICT issues has often stood
at the heart of these disputes (e.g. Kwalwasser 2009, 509–514).
ITU deﬁnes cybersecurity on its website as:
the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards,
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber envir-
onment and organization and user’s assets.5 […] The general security
objectives [in the cyber environment] comprise the following: availability,
integrity (which may include authenticity and non-repudiation), and
conﬁdentiality.6
Conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability of information are building blocks of
the majority of information security conceptualisations. For example, SANS
Institute’s7 deﬁnition as ‘the processes and methodologies which are designed
and implemented to protect print, electronic, or any other form of con-
ﬁdential, private and sensitive information or data from unauthorized access,
use, misuse, disclosure, destruction, modiﬁcation, or disruption,’8 repeats
similar conceptual elements.
Whereas cybersecurity gravitates towards the maintenance of national security
in the digital environment and international cooperation in countering cyber-
crime, the conceptualisation of digital security in relation to the daily lives of
individuals and communities receives less attention. Therefore, by naming the
object of study as ‘digital security’9 and highlighting its importance for indi-
vidual and community wellbeing in the Barents Region, this chapter aims at
integrating digitalisation ﬁrmly with human security. It recognises individuals
and communities as actors who actively impact (in)security and (un)trust-
worthiness of the digital environment and, thus, the everyday life of themselves
and others.
2 Contextualisation
A trustworthy and secure digital environment is necessary for a smoothly
functioning society in the Barents Region. It enables the utilisation of social,
economic, cultural, educational and informational opportunities provided by
digitalisation to all stakeholders. However, in comparison to the main urban
areas of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, the information infrastructure
in the Barents Region is thin (sparse ﬁbre optic cable network and highlighted
reliance on mobile technologies), unstable, perforated and partially outdated.
Harsh climate, long distances, scarce population and limited economic activity
complicate the challenges of building and maintaining the much needed
infrastructure. Simultaneously, the provision of public and private services,
tourism, commerce, agriculture, manufacturing, logistics and all other liveli-
hoods increasingly depend on digital information processing. The state of
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aﬀairs adds demand for improved connections and pressure on existing
infrastructure.
In addition to infrastructural challenges, people’s awareness of and skills
to operate safely in the digital environment require supplementation. The
development pace of technology and its accelerating application in everyday
practices tend to leave people behind. They are expected to adapt to the
omnipresence of ICTs which requires additional education, training and support.
This development highlights some of the existing socio-cultural-economic
divides, while diluting others and creating new ones. Yet, technology ought to
be developed to serve the needs, interests and wants of people and communities
living in the region, for solving everyday practical problems and improving
the quality of life. For this reason, people and communities should have a say
in digitalisation. Inclusiveness and empowerment are equally important cor-
nerstones of human security alongside the reduction of fear, want and indignity.
3 Assessment
The following assessment of digital security in the Barents Region examines
six themes:10
1 access to digital networks
2 availability of digital services
3 access to (relevant) information
4 digital awareness and skills
5 digital inclusion policies and protection of human rights
6 state of cybercrime and digital abuse.
The aforementioned themes are interlinked. Moreover, they directly and/or
indirectly aﬀect all recognised dimensions of human security from economic
to political security. They have the ability to either enhance or mitigate threats
to human security, as well as to either empower or disable individuals and
communities to act on behalf of their own wellbeing. As there is no compre-
hensive regional data available on the aforementioned themes, aggregated
national data is utilised as an indicative reference point.
The wellbeing of individuals and communities is not the main concern in
national digitalisation and information/cybersecurity policies. Instead, their pri-
mary reasoning lies in economic development, eﬃciency gains and/or smooth
and secured functioning of society. However, the policies promise increased
opportunities and ease of life to individuals, while allocating them a share of
responsibility for security production. In information/cybersecurity the human
being is often named as the weakest link of the security chain or as a threat (e.g.
Singer and Friedman 2014, 64–65, 77–103; cf. Carr 2012, 147; Dunn Cavelty
2014, 703–704), whereas digital security as an aspect of human security con-
centrates on the human being as its main referent object and an active producer
of security. Regardless of the perspective, improving people’s digital awareness
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and skills is the main policy recommendation. Yet improved awareness and skills
are of little help if inadequate or lacking access to digital networks constitutes an
obstacle to utilising the opportunities provided by digitalisation.
3.1 Access to digital networks
Relevant and up-to-date11 access data concerning the Barents Region
has been collected from ITU Country proﬁles in 2015 and collated into
Table 2.10.1. The number of ﬁxed or mobile broadband subscriptions is
higher in the Nordic countries than in Russia, which directly impacts the
percentage of population using internet. This chapter does not aim to map
national information infrastructure, compare business-to-business or consumer
Table 2.10.1 Access to digital networks according to ITU country proﬁles in 201512
Country location Finland Norway Russia Sweden
Fixed telephone subscriptions
per 100 inhabitants
9.8 21.2** 25.7 36.7
Mobile telephone subscriptions
per 100 inhabitants
135.5 116.1** 160 130.4
Fixed broadband subscriptions
per 100 inhabitants
32.3 38.8** 17.5 34.1
Mobile broadband subscriptions
per 100 inhabitants
144 88.8** 71.3 122.1
Households with a computer
(%)
89.3 95.4** 72.5 88.2
Households with internet access
at home (%)
89.9 93.1** 72 91
Individuals using internet (%) 92.6 96.3** 73.4 90.6
Deﬁnition of universal service/
access exists
Y Y** N*/Y*** Y**
Universal service/access policy
adopted
Y Y** Y*** Y**
Operators under universal ser-
vice/access obligation
Designated
universal
service
provider
Incumbent
ﬁxed line
operator(s)**
State-owned
Rostelecom
N (obliga-
tions allo-
cated on a
competitive
basis)**
Means of ﬁnancing operators
obligation
So far no
subsidies (the
option
remains)
Cross-
subsidy
between own
services
(internal
ﬁnancing)**
Universal
service fund
N**
Y = yes, N = no
* data available from 1999
** data available from 2014
*** In 2014, RIA and Comnews reported on announced state operator's investment programme:
https://ria.ru/economy/20140220/995994372.html and www.comnews.ru/node/80789 [accessed
2.2.2017]
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prices of equipment and subscriptions, or investigate regulatory frameworks
or market structures in the Barents Region. Therefore, it also abstains from
speculating the causes of national diﬀerences but settles for describing the
current state of aﬀairs.
An exception to the aforementioned rule is universal service/access policies.
These policies constitute a state intervention in the market which has turned
out to be necessary for the provision of network access and digital services in
the Barents Region (e.g. Lapin liitto 2013, 27–28, 41; Norrbotten 2014, 11, 20–
23). Aggregated national data, such as ITU data, does not give insight into
the substantial regional diﬀerences in network access. Universal service/access
policies have been the means for national, regional and local administrations
to advance digital network development in areas characterised by challenging
geographical features, long distances, harsh climates, sparse and ageing
populations, disadvantageous socio-economic situations, as well as a multiplicity
of cultural traditions and spoken languages.
Universal service/access policies exist across the Barents Region. The means of
organising and funding the provision of universal service/access varies between
the countries. Yet the basic idea remains the same: to provide digital opportunities
for authorities, businesses, other organisations and individuals regardless of their
physical location within the state. Consequently, digitisation enables the provision
of services in a novel format, which has a number of implications.
First, in principle, services can be provided on a transnational market to a
bigger pool of clients. Simultaneously, physical services can be withdrawn
from rural areas while reasoning this development with the provision of digital
substitutes. Second, full participation in digitalising societies requires access
to the digital environment and adequate skills and knowledge to operate in it.
Third, both physical and logical layers of cyberspace13 need to be successfully
protected so that everyday life continues smoothly. Fourth, the social layer of
cyberspace14 needs its security arrangements to be upheld so that people’s,
businesses’ and other organisations’ trust in the digital environment is main-
tained. Finally, utilisation of the opportunities provided by digitisation should
not endanger the realisation of human rights in any situation. What the latter
entails is currently under intensive political, legal and ethical discussion.
The extent and quality of information infrastructure in the Barents Region
is an acknowledged, continuing challenge (Lapin liitto 2013; Norrbotten
2014; AEC 2016). As technologies develop, and digital services require more
bandwidth, it is no longer enough, for instance, that a digital connection
simply exists; it also needs to be good enough to run and use digital services.
Therefore, not only end devices but also network infrastructures require con-
stant updating.15 The maintenance, update and extension of information
infrastructure generate high costs in the region due to its aforementioned
characteristics and scarcity of skilled people (AEC 2016, 12–13). Current
reports note problems, for instance, in running errands digitally with govern-
ment authorities or businesses, accepting card/mobile payments and utilising
ICTs in agriculture (Norrbotten 2014, 15–16, 25). In general, inadequate
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network infrastructure hinders all economic activities and development in the
region (cf. Delaunay 2014, 5). However, the establishment of, for instance,
novel extractive industrial sites may bring digital development with them
(AEC 2016, 19, 28). The Arctic Economic Council (2016, 22–26) has also
listed a number of planned or on-going transnational infrastructure develop-
ment projects such as NxtVn’s Oulu Nordic Express, the Russian Optical
Trans-Arctic Submarine Cable System and Svalbard Undersea Cable System.
3.2 Availability of digital services
The development of digital services in both private and public sectors is a
continuous undertaking. Regardless of the fast technological development,
digitalisation proceeds only gradually and requires adaptation in both sectors,
which leads to structural adjustments, novel operating models and/or ‘new
ways of doing old things’. For example, health and social services have been
digitised to a great extent in Lapland.16 These technology-mediated services
are designed for the use of customers, as well as of social and health care
professionals. Customer services include (pre-ﬁlled) online forms, online
appointment and advice, as well as counters and metrics for self-evaluation
and self-tracking. In addition, real-time connection with technical support
can be arranged to the customer’s home or to a physical service point17 for an
appointment or a negotiation. Services for professionals consist of online
consultation (also a real-time possibility) and a tool kit to support one’s work.
The services are developed in a particular project funded through national
and EU funding schemes.18
Adjustments and renewals often generate opposition and it takes time for
people and organisations to pick up digital services. However, the current
societal trajectory creates a situation in which people may have no alternatives
(Kilpeläinen 2016, 61). Yet digitisation occasionally fails, making services
diﬃcult to use or unaccountable. The failure leads to new rounds of adjust-
ments, redesigning and renewals, which all increase digitisation costs. One
important diﬀerence in service digitisation in private and public sectors is that
due to competition, the former needs to be sensitive to customer needs and
preferences, whereas – and regardless of national policy texts – development
in the latter is often driven by intra-organisational requirements (e.g. Lapin
liitto 2013, 21).
More and more digital services are becoming available in the Barents
Region to serve the needs and interests of businesses operating in the area,
tourism industry, the authorities, as well as local people and communities.
Nonetheless, gaps exist in recognising stakeholder needs and developing digital
solutions to them. Reasons for the state of aﬀairs may stem, for instance,
from inadequate research; lacking skills, interest or funding; lacking partners
within the technology industry; disputes over data ownership; and lacking
imagination. Moreover, the prospective client base and hence incoming cash
ﬂow for businesses is restricted in services tailored to the needs of the Barents
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region. Developing services across national borders within the region would
already increase the pool of potential clients. However, it could also increase
costs, for example, because services would need to be provided in a number of
languages. Lack of language versions, as well as problems in scalability to
diﬀerent end devices, is a problem recognised in current digital service provi-
sion. For example, in Finland it is diﬃcult to run errands digitally in any of
the Sámi languages or in Kven language in Norway.
European Union’s DESI reports19 for the Nordic countries in 2016 provide
data on the adoption of digital public services. The data has been collected
into Table 2.10.2. Unfortunately, the EU does not give a similar estimation
for Russia.
In general, the Nordic countries run clearly ahead of the EU average in the
development and adoption of digital services. For example, around half of
the internet-users aged between 16 and 79 in Finland, Norway and Sweden
have used e-government services. Pre-ﬁlled forms and online service comple-
tion are familiar to the people as well. Yet both technology and shareholder
needs evolve constantly, which calls for further service development.
3.3 Access to (relevant) information
The question of access to (relevant) information is sub-divided into two parts
in this chapter. The ﬁrst part discusses the availability of culturally and lin-
guistically relevant information, information related to livelihoods within the
region, as well as gaps in research. The second part concentrates on the freedom
of information in the Barents Region.
3.3.1 Access to culturally, linguistically and economically relevant information
Digitalisation has multiplied the amount of online information so that there is
a vivid discussion on ‘information overload’. For instance, EMC2/IDC estimated
in 2014 that the size of the ‘digital universe’ will reach 44 zettabytes by 2020.
However, excess of information does not signify that all relevant information
would be digitally accessible. As noted earlier, existing digital services, as well
as administrative or business-related information, either are not or are only
partially available in minority languages in the Barents Region (see also
Table 2.10.2 Users of digital public services in the Nordic countries in the Barents
Region as in 2015
Country users of digital public services Finland Norway Sweden EU average
eGovernment (% of individuals, out of
internet users aged 16–79)
63 59 49 31
Pre-ﬁlled forms (score 0–100) 87 79 75 49
Online service completion (score 0–100) 93 90 89 81
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Larsen and Fondahl 2014, 118). From the perspective of human security, this
state of aﬀairs constitutes a threat to people’s everyday wellbeing in digitalising
societies. Moreover, what is often referred to as ‘indigenous knowledge20‘ is
only gradually ﬁnding its way to the digital environment due to, for example,
constricted interest in digitising it, inadequate value given to it (e.g. Artic
Council 2016, xi), and individuals’ and communities’ unwillingness to share
it. Whether all information should be shared through digital networks is a
question beyond the scope of this chapter.
Substantial research needs be carried out on the ways that individuals and
communities in the Barents Region are using, cannot use, would like to use
and/or would refrain from using ICTs and digital information, as well as for
which purposes. Research also ought to map the existing lacks and gaps in
relevant information provision. For instance, economies in the region are
characterised as much by small-scale traditional production as by large-scale
production and natural resource distribution to international markets (Larsen
and Fondahl 2014, 151). Thus, whether and in which ways digitalisation may
improve or hinder economic development needs to be studied on a case-by-
case basis instead of making generalised assumptions, like the existing
national and regional strategies tend to do. Finding out what kind of data
would help best and how it can be analysed and utilised should be the driver
in developing innovative solutions. People and communities living in the
region should be included in the group of stakeholders discussing preferred
directions of development. Similarly, research ought to cover the ways of
cultural identity formation in the digital environment as a counterbalance to
the presumed threats to cultural identity established by digitalisation (e.g.
Larsen and Fondahl 2014, 128).
3.3.2 Freedom of information
According to UNHRC (2011, 1) states are increasingly censoring information
online through:
arbitrary blocking or ﬁltering of content; criminalization of legitimate
expression; imposition of intermediary liability; disconnecting users from
Internet access, including on the basis of intellectual property rights law;
cyberattacks; and inadequate protection of the right to privacy and data
protection.
While there are certain types of data to which access may be restricted, including
child pornography; hate speech; defamation; direct and public incitement to
commit genocide; and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that con-
stitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (UNHRC 2011, 8), the
overarching principle should be that of information freedom.
Freedom House21 publishes freedom indices of which ‘Freedom in the
World 2017’ gives Finland, Norway and Sweden full a 100 points out of 25
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political freedom and civil liberties indicators with the labelling of ‘free’.
Russia receives 20 points with the labelling of ‘not free’. The institute also
publishes a ‘Freedom on the Net’ report which, unfortunately, does not assess
the Nordic countries. In the 2016 version of the report, Russia’s information
space was estimated as ‘not free’ (Freedom House 2017, 20–24). The country
report pointed out violations in user rights, imprisonment of social media users,
content blocking and ﬁltering, as well as violent or cyberattacks on online
activists.22 There is no data available speciﬁc to the Barents Region, but similar
imbalance in freedom of information can be expected to exist regionally.
3.4 Digital awareness and skills
Access to digital networks does not guarantee that people and communities will
adopt ICTs and digital forms of service provision. Moreover, it does not ensure
that they are aware of and able to estimate risks inherent in the use of ICTs or
know how to operate in the digital environment in a safe and secure manner.
European Union’s DESI reports for the Nordic countries in 2016 provide
statistics about individuals having basic digital skills, being ICT specialists, or
STEM23 graduates. The data has been collected and collated into Table 2.10.3.
Unfortunately, the EU does not give a similar estimation for Russia. Finland has
the highest percentage of workforce in the ICT sector within the entire the EU,
while Sweden has the second highest. However, demand for highly skilled ICT
professionals remains high throughout the Barents Region (e.g. HS 17.5.2017).
According to aggregated Nordic data24 provided by FireEye (2016, 6) 35
per cent of the consumers in the Nordic countries believe they have ‘full
awareness and understanding’ of the potential impact of data breaches on
them personally. The respective percentages for having ‘partial awareness and
understanding’ and ‘little to no awareness and understanding’ are 52 and 12.
Furthermore, only 39 per cent of the respondents thought security as ‘an
important or main consideration’ when purchasing products or services. Yet,
45 per cent would ‘consider paying more to work with a provider with better
data security’ (FireEye 2016, 15–16). The data does not provide any infor-
mation on national – or regional – diﬀerences and the sample is very small.
Table 2.10.3 Digital skill levels in the Nordic countries in the Barents Region
Country skills level Finland Norway Sweden EU average
Basic digital skills (% of individuals
aged 16–74)
75* 80* 72* 55*
ICT professionals (% of employed
individuals)
6.7** 4.8** 6.0** 3.7**
STEM graduates (per 1,000
individuals aged 20–29)
22*** 13*** 15*** 18***
* data available from 2015
** data available from 2014
*** Data available from 2013
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However, it does support the general feeling amongst cybersecurity experts
that people are generally unaware of the risks inherent in the use of ICTs,
even if the level of awareness has been rising due to, for example, increased
public media attention given to digital security. Next to that, people tend to
bypass security concerns if the usability of digital products or services is at the
other end of the scale, due to peer pressure and/or if access to relevant digital
content through other channels is unavailable.
The burden of responsibility for improving one’s digital awareness and
skills has largely been left to individuals. Technology development has been
so fast that the majority of people in work life have not received adequate
training for the safe and secure use of ICTs at school, in later studies,
or through employer provided training. Skills development has depended on
their own interest in technology and its use. National policies in the Barents
Region alleviate part of the problem by increasing education on digital skills
at schools and other academic institutions. Employers are gradually waking
up to the problem, and individuals can improve their know-how through
training provided by NGOs or adult education institutes, among others. At
best, public media plays an important role in raising digital awareness,
whereas social media continues to test people’s media literacy. Media con-
vergence and the pace of dissemination in the digital environment complicates
the challenge of diﬀerentiating correct information from incorrect.
3.5 Digital inclusion policies and protection of human rights
Digital inclusion as a question of access to digital networks has been addressed
above. Nonetheless, it inheres further questions related to people’s socio-
economic standing, gender, minority position, disability, age, and attitude
(e.g. UNHRC 2011, 17; Cruz-Jesus et al. 2012). In the Barents Region, people
and organisations are buying or leasing their own ICTs and network
subscriptions. The chances to acquire equipment and connections depend
directly on one’s socio-economic standing. In addition, the willingness to ‘be
connected’ stems from one’s own attitudes and opinions. For example, in
Norrbotten it is estimated that around 30 000 inhabitants reside outside the
‘digital world’ (Norrbotten 2014, 17). In Finland, internet access has been
perceived as a fundamental right which, again, has led to the question of
whether it should be included in publicly provided social security. Currently,
public internet access is already provided, for example, in libraries, town halls
or community houses.
Policies for removing the obstacles to access and utilisation of the digital
environment exist in all Nordic countries. These cover the questions of age
and age-related additional challenges such as eyesight and hearing, as well
as the ease of use of end devices and digital services. They also address
challenges related to people with disabilities. Means of addressing such
challenges include, for instance, requirements for being able to adjust the font
size on websites, options to listen to the text on websites, as well as diﬀerent
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technical aids and support for using ICTs. Inequality questions related to
gender and minority positions are tackled with, for example, language versions
and training. However, a lot remains to be done before the digital environment
is equally friendly to all its utilisers.
In 2011, a report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression to the UN Human Rights
Council highlighted the importance of the digital environment ‘not only to
enable individuals to exercise their right to freedom of opinion and expression,
but also a range of other human rights’ (UNHRC 2011, 1). The former was
declared as ‘a fundamental right on its own accord’, as well as ‘an ‘enabler’ of
other rights’, including a number of economic, social and cultural rights,25 as
well as civil and political rights26 (UNHRC 2011, 7). Moreover, ‘[t]he right to
privacy is essential for individuals to express themselves freely’ (UNHRC
2011, 7, 15). Thus,
every individual should have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form,
whether, and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data ﬁles,
and for what purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain
which public authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may
control their ﬁles.
(UNHRC 2011, 16)
The general principles in and state responsibility for protecting human rights
apply as much in the digital environment as in the physical environment.
Furthermore, the contemporary merging of digital and physical environments
highlights the impossibility of keeping the two apart. The current tendency
throughout the Barents Region to curtail privacy and to strive for exemptions
in human rights protection in the name of national security is an alarming
development. Renewals of intelligence legislation are currently being prepared
in Finland and Sweden, whereas Russia already has an eﬃcient online sur-
veillance and data collection system in place.27 Simultaneously, many NGOs
aim to bring forward and keep in discussion the concern over human rights
protection in the digital environment.
3.6 State of cybercrime and digital abuse
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, the so-called Budapest
Convention,28 divides cybercrime into four categories: (1) oﬀences against
the conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems,
(2) computer-related oﬀences, (3) content-related oﬀences, and (4) oﬀences
related to infringements of copyright and related rights (European Council
2001). The ﬁrst category includes actions such as illegal access, illegal intercep-
tion, data interference, system interference and misuse of devices. The second
category consists of fraud and forgery, whereas the third deals with child
pornography. The convention recommends states to legislate cybercrime and
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develop mutual cooperation in countering it. More simply, cybercrime can be
divided, on the one hand, to crimes targeting ICTs and digital networks and,
on the other hand, to crimes utilising ICTs and digital networks.29
Nobody has a full situational picture of cybercrime. A large number of
crimes go unreported for reasons such as not being detected or not being
perceived as worth reporting, uncertainties about what cybercrime is and
where to report it, as well as pressures to uphold organisational reputation
(e.g. Helsingin seudun kauppakamari 2015, 1, 7; Leppänen et al. 2016, 20–21).
Moreover, trust in the ability of the police to solve cybercrimes has been
contested for reasons such as a late start in systematic collection and analysis
of cybercrime data (e.g. Leppänen et al. 2016, 15–17, 24; Clough 2010, 7–8, 15).
According to Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet,30 network operations and digital
espionage are the gravest cyber threat to the state, critical infrastructure
owners and/or operators, entities responsible for functions vital to society, and
high-technology companies in Norway. However, the rest of companies
should mainly worry about (economically motivated) cybercrime (NSM 2016,
5, 31) In Sweden, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap31 estimated
in 2015 that ICT-related organised crime is most often ﬁnancially motivated
and that the crime-as-service32 sector is growing. Malware-as-service,33
ransomware34 and identity thefts are also increasing. Mixing of traditional and
network-based crime is becoming more common and complex thus requiring
intensiﬁed international cooperation in countering it (MSB 2015, 35–39). In
general, cybercrime is well organised, globally connected and technically
advanced. Yet people and organisations continue to fall victim to simple scams
and hand over sensitive information carelessly when just being asked.
In its annual report for 2016 on information security, Viestintävirasto35 in
Finland lists internet scams and phishing36 as ﬂourishing businesses; ransom-
ware as having dominated the year of malware; network espionage and
advanced persistent threats37 as headaches for an increasing number of orga-
nisations; and (distributed) denial-of-service attacks38 as having increased in
volume and become a tool for blackmail. However, defective equipment is
still the main cause for network disturbances. In addition, advancement of
Internet of Things39 is beginning to cause novel and reformed cybersecurity
concerns (Viestintävirasto 2017, 5–19). According to FireEye (2015, 3–4, 6, 11),
regional characteristics such as rich natural resources, innovations in healthcare
and renewable energy, high levels of connectedness and high-technology
industry, strong shipping industry, as well as transparent governance make the
Nordic states targets for malicious digital activity.
The state of cybercrime in Russia is very diﬀerent from the Nordic countries.
According to Kaspersky Lab (2015, 2) ‘[t]he Russian-language cybercrime
market is known all over the world’ due to frequent global media coverage
and the accessibility of online platforms used by the criminal community. In
2011, a consolidation within the cybercrime market was noted: major cyber-
crime groups were emerging to overtake the previously disorganised market.
Simultaneously, traditional organised crime groups were penetrating the
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cybercrime market. This development increased both the value of Russian
cybercrime and its sophistication (Group-IB 2012, 7–8). In addition, the
relationship between cybercrime groups and the Russian administration has
been under speculation for years (e.g. FireEye 2014).
In 2015, all forms of ﬁnancially motivated cybercrime were prevalent in
Russia (targeting organisations both inside and outside the state borders).
Products and services were sold on the cybercrime market in diﬀerent com-
binations to enable mainly ﬁve types of crime: distributed denial-of-service
attacks, theft of personal data or data to access virtual money, money thefts
from organisations’ accounts, domestic or corporate espionage, and blocking
access to data for the purpose of extortion. For Russian cybercriminals the
risk of prosecution remains low. Cybercrime stays attractive also because of
the lack of established mechanisms for international cooperation (Kaspersky
Lab 2015, 5–6, 21). Moreover, Russian cybercrime is becoming increasingly
automatised (Trend Micro 2016, 6).
In the Barents Region, ﬁnancially motivated cybercrime is likely to be
strongly related to existing industries and digitising livelihoods: tourism, high-
technology companies, extractive industries, retail and logistics are likely targets
of cybercrime. Both the providers in and the clients of these industries suﬀer
the consequences of successful criminal activities, for example, in the form of
ﬁnancial and reputational losses, as well as delivery delays and/or outages.
Enduring problems with organisational continuity planning and risk man-
agement turn into questions of human security when people and communities
begin to experience the consequences in their everyday life. While individuals
can also fall victim to ﬁnancial cybercrime, hate speech (particularly in social
media), cyber bullying and digital abuse (verbal or visual) are highly likely
phenomena as well. The aforementioned forms of digital abuse still often go
unnoticed; are likely to relate to minority status, disabilities, sexual orientation,
gender or whichever trait another person ﬁnds ‘diﬀerent’; and should be
better investigated.
4 Conclusions
As this chapter has demonstrated, digital security is an increasingly important,
multifaceted, omnipresent and largely unexamined aspect of human security
in the Barents Region. It aﬀects the everyday life of people and communities
residing in the region both directly, for example, in the form of access to and
safety of digital services or potential for digital abuse and human rights viola-
tions, and indirectly, for instance, as a consequence of cybercrime against
businesses operating in the region.
Human security issues related to digitalisation have usually not been
addressed in the information/cybersecurity agenda, but within the frameworks
of universal service/access and national broadband policies, information
society or digitalisation policies, or as questions of socio-economic (in)equality.
However, this chapter argues that these issues need to be brought onto the
Digital security in the Barents Region 199
security agenda as questions of human security in the digital environment.
Only thus will digital awareness and skills, inclusivity of the digital environ-
ment, ICT-user safety and security, as well as access to digital networks, services
and relevant information receive the attention they deserve. For the ease of
people’s and communities’ everyday life, these themes are at least as important
as questions of data security and critical infrastructure protection.
Digital security is not a constant across the Barents Region but varies, for
instance, on the basis of national regulation and policies, market structures,
the state of regional development and inhabitants’ socio-economic standing,
majority/minority point of view and the accessibility of digital services. In
order to provide more detailed information and access to all stakeholders to
support the regional digital development serving local needs and interests,
substantial research has to be carried out. This research should concentrate
on the ways that individuals and communities in the Barents Region are
using, cannot use, would like to use and/or would refrain from using ICTs
and digital information, as well as for which purposes. Whether, and in which
ways, digitalisation may improve or hinder regional development needs to be
studied on a case-by-case basis instead of making generalised assumptions.
Finding out what kind of data would help best and how it can be analysed
should be the driver in developing innovative solutions.
In addition to research that would support better decision-making in both
public and private sectors, the implementation of existing digitalisation and
information/cybersecurity strategies, policies and programmes needs to be
improved. Examining the applicability of existing regulation that supports
human security needs to be intensiﬁed in the digital environment. The principle
of ‘what is unacceptable in the physical environment is also so in the digital
environment’ ought to be followed more strictly, and in a demonstrable
manner. This requires commitment, suﬃcient resource allocation, general
enhancement of digital awareness and skills, willingness and ﬁrmness in
decision-making, adjustments in or novel regulation when deemed necessary,
as well as enhanced cooperation both within the Barents Region and across
its borders. Demonstrated decisiveness in tackling digital security concerns as
an aspect of human security would, hopefully, encourage similar development
outside the region. Moreover, implementation but also reformation of the
existing policies to better support human security needs to be opened to all
stakeholders in the Barents Region so that people’s and communities’ needs
and fears are addressed in a comprehensive manner. Improvements to inclusion
could be achieved through, for example, consultation and integration in
diﬀerent stages of decision-making, as well as active enhancement of public
dialogue in digital security.
Notes
1 E.g. United Nations Oﬃce for Disarmament Aﬀairs (UNODA) utilises the concept
of ‘information security’, whereas ITU uses ‘cybersecurity’.
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2 UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
3 National ‘information security’ strategies and frameworks have existed in the Nordic
countries and in Russia since the 1990s. Norway published her cyber security strat-
egy in 2012; Finland in 2013; and Sweden in 2017. Russia has addressed digital
security questions under the umbrella of ‘international information security’ in 2013;
in early 2014, a national cyber security strategy was also reported to be in the
making (http://tass.com/russia/714091 [30.1.2017]).
4 the UN specialised agency for information and communication technologies
(ICTs). See www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx [18.5.2017]
5 Organisation and user’s assets include connected computing devices, personnel,
infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality
of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment.
6 International Telecommunication Union (N/D). Deﬁnition of cybersecurity. http://
itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/Pages/cybersecurity.aspx.
7 SANS Institute is a recognised American private company specialising in technical
training in information and cybersecurity.
8 SANS Institute (N/D). Information Security Resources. https://sans.org/informa-
tion-security/.
9 and, thus, avoiding the national security and critical infrastructure focus of
‘cybersecurity’ and the general information or technology focus of ‘information
security’
10 Several metrics for assessing national cybersecurity or digitalisation exist, for
instance, ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index (GSI) and EU’s Digital Economy and
Society Index (DESI). Nonetheless, they do not approach digital security from the
human security perspective. As being only partially suitable for this chapter, some
of their insights have been integrated in the seven themes. UN Human Develop-
ment Report utilise two digital indicators beneﬁcial to this chapter, both under the
heading of ‘mobility and communication’ and namely ‘mobile phone subscriptions
(per 100 people)’ and ‘internet users (% of population)’.
11 Up-to-date meaning that the data has been provided either for 2014 (Sweden;
Norway and Russia partially) or 2015 (Finland; Norway and Russia partially).
12 Available through www.itu.int/net4/itu-d/icteye/CountryProﬁle.aspx [9.12.2016]
(excluding data about Russia in 2014).
13 Physical layer: the physical location of network elements, as well as all hardware
and infrastructure (wired, wireless, and optical) that supports the network and its
physical connectors (wires, cables, radio frequency, routers, servers, and compu-
ters). Logical layer: the logical network component which is technical in nature
and consists of the logical connections that exist between network nodes (i.e. any
device connected to the network). www.acqnotes.com/acqnote/careerﬁelds/cyberspa
ce [1.2.2017]
14 Social layer: a person’s identiﬁcation or persona on the network (e.g. e-mail
address, computer IP address or cell phone number) and the people actually on the
network. www.acqnotes.com/acqnote/careerﬁelds/cyberspace [1.2.2017]
15 AEC (2016, 17–18) estimates that also in the future the information infrastructure
in the Barents Region will consist of a compilation of diﬀerent network
technologies.
16 See www.sosiaalikollega.ﬁ/virtu.ﬁ/ [5.2.2017]. Available only in Finnish.
17 Service points consist of all necessary equipment, software and connections for
using the digital services. They are provided by municipalities and located in public
spaces such as libraries, town halls or community houses.
18 Virtu.ﬁ-presentation. PowerPoint-presentation explaining the project and introdu-
cing the services. Acquired through email from the project leader, Pirttijärvi, M.
(the Centre of Excellence on Social Welfare in Northern Finland), in 17.8.2016. In
the possession of the author.
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19 European Commission. 2016. The Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI).
Progress by country reports are available through https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/progress-country.
20 Here understood as local knowledge unique to a particular culture or community
21 Freedom House is an independent American watchdog organisation ‘dedicated to
the expansion of freedom and democracy around the world’ and operating through
‘a combination of analysis, advocacy, and action’ (https://freedomhouse.org/a
bout-us [14.2.2017]).
22 Freedom House’s ‘Freedom on the Net’ 2016 country report on Russia. https://
freedomhouse.org/sites/default/ﬁles/FOTN%202016%20Russia.pdf; see also Kshetri
(2016, 211–221).
23 STEM: Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
24 Countries included are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. A
market research company interviewed 500 selected consumers aged 18 or over
online in April 2016 for the report (FireEye 2016, 2.)
25 such as the right to education and the right to take part in cultural life and to
enjoy the beneﬁts of scientiﬁc progress and its applications (UNHRC 2011, 7)
26 such as the rights to freedom of association and assembly (ibid.)
27 SORM as a ‘system for operational investigative measures’. In 1996, the ﬁrst ver-
sion of the system was established to monitor telephone conversations. In 1998, it
was extended to internet. In practice, ‘Internet Service Providers (ISPs) must install
a special device on their servers to allow the FSB [Federal Security Service] to
track all credit card transactions, e-mail messages and web use.’ http://resources.
infosecinstitute.com/ russia-controls-internet/ [1.7.2014/14.2.2017] In 2014, a new
wiretapping system requirements were introduced: https://rublacklist.net/8827/
[14.2.2017] See also Freedom House’s ‘Freedom on the Net’ country report on
Russia.
28 The convention was signed in Budapest on Nov 23, 2001. It has become the ﬁrst
de facto international treaty on cybercrime.
29 Poliisi (n.d.). Kyberrikollisuus: https://poliisi.ﬁ/rikokset/kyberrikollisuus.
30 Norwegian National Security Authority
31 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
32 Crime-as-service: illegal business model in which an entire cybercrime or part(s) of
it is provided as a service in the black market.
33 Malware-as-service: ready-made or custom-made malware, build-it-yourself kits
and hosted management services for deploying malware that can be bought as a
service in the black market.
34 Ransomware: malware which after infecting a computer encrypts information on it
so that the information becomes unavailable to its legitimate user and a call for
ransom can be made. The criminal claims to decrypt the information when ransom
has been paid.
35 Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (hosts Cyber Security Centre)
36 Phishing: attempts to acquire sensitive information like credit card numbers, social
security codes, passwords and usernames for misuse. Carried out by disguising as a
trustworthy organisation or a representative of one in digital communication.
37 Advanced persistent threat: a series of sophisticated cyber-attacks carried out in a
stealthy manner so that the selected target should not become aware of the on-going
operation.
38 Denial-of-service attack: an attempt to make a digital resource unavailable to its
legitimate users by disrupting services e.g. by overloading the resource with service
requests.
39 Internet of Things: development in which more and more equipment and
appliances are connected to internet and communicate without human
interference.
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Conclusion
Kamrul Hossain and Dorothée Cambou
While there is certainly much more that remains to be discussed regarding
human security in the Barents Region, one thing is certain: the protection of
the environment remains a major source of insecurity in the region. There are
several drivers of environmental insecurity, but climate change and the impact
of pollution on the ecosystem are central issues in the region. Even if global
actions are required to cope with this issue, environmental security challenges
can also be mitigated through regional actions. Two such actions include, for
example, expanding the Environmental Hot Spots programme, or reducing
black carbon emissions in the region. Considering that climate change is
already causing widespread challenges to the Arctic environment, it is also
necessary to adopt eﬀective measures for adaptation that could set an exam-
ple for other countries. In this regard, we argue for the production of a
detailed or binding plan to tackle climate change under the auspices of the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Finally, we suggest that instead of opening new
nuclear power facilities, there should be an investment of time, money and
expertise in renewable energy sources. Although nuclear energy is sometimes
considered an environmentally friendly solution, the safety of the plants and
the disposal and management of nuclear waste still require critical attention,
as their mismanagement can cause detrimental eﬀects on all aspects of human
security.
Concerning economic security, the responsible management of lands and
resources requires the foundations for strong regional cooperation to enable
economic growth and sustainable development. In our assessment, the need
for an attractive environment friendly living condition in order for people to
move in, stay or return to the region is emphasised. In order to stimulate
economic development and the attractiveness of the region, infrastructural
development, such as transportation routes and public service facilities,
require improvements. However, tensions surrounding economic and envir-
onmental security often arise as a result of conﬂicting interests. For example,
the need to develop industrial and transportation activities to spur economic
development conﬂicts with the need for further environmental protections. In
addition, there is also a need to ensure that income generated through eco-
nomic development is distributed more equally, especially in Russia where
poverty is still aﬀecting a large part of the Barents population. Another
important dilemma concerns the protection of indigenous groups, whose eco-
nomic livelihoods are challenged by the adverse impacts of extractive indus-
tries. While the rights of indigenous peoples have achieved some progress and
recognition in the last decades, conﬂicts between indigenous peoples and
industrial actors such as mining companies are still omnipresent. Therefore,
removing the barriers that hinder the engagements of multiple actors, including
indigenous peoples, would be beneﬁcial to the economy of the region and
would consequently strengthen economic security as well. Ultimately, ensuring
that economic development beneﬁts the wellbeing of the population at the local
level should be the sacrosanct principle in governing the Barents economy.
Health security is also an issue that is intrinsically connected to the envir-
onment and the economy of the region. Living and working conditions in the
Barents-Arctic region can pose challenges to both physical and mental health.
Given that the health security of the population is also aﬀected by work-life
changes associated with climate change and by the increasing industrial
activities in the region, a concerted eﬀort by all relevant institutions to ﬁght
against the eﬀects of pollution and environmental degradation is necessary.
There is also need for intersectional policy actions focusing on disease preven-
tion, safety issues and mental wellbeing. More speciﬁcally the spread of HIV
and tuberculosis must be contained, and more research on potential new or
hidden disease caused by environmental and societal changes are required.
Finally, there is also a need to ensure the development of strategies to address
the psychological health of Barents peoples and provide support for community
and cultural wellbeing, especially for indigenous peoples living in the region.
Concerning the food, water and energy nexus, these three resources are
fundamental in guaranteeing the promotion of human wellbeing in the
region. In the assessment of human security, we discuss how food, water and
energy security are closely interconnected. Because the impacts of climate
change and the extraction of resources in the region have signiﬁcant and
negative impacts on the safety of foods, it is important to promote speciﬁc
and targeted policies that govern food security and safety in the region and
which take into account the unique context of the region. To this degree, the
importance of an informed and involved community is also underlined in
decision-making on factors that impact wellbeing. Moreover, we suggest pro-
motion of policy development in strengthening traditional food supply chains,
which would not only improve food security, but also generate income. In this
regard, better cross-border collaboration and knowledge sharing amongst
stakeholders in the Barents Region is important, requiring the intervention of
diverse actors such as governmental authorities, business corporations and
local communities.
Regarding water security, integrated policymaking still faces signiﬁcant
gaps. Water governance structures must take into account diverse perspectives
from across the region and from diﬀerent sectors. An interdisciplinary
approach to water governance will make decision-making more robust and
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account for trade-oﬀs and opportunities between resources. Given the lack of
existing sources, more research is needed on the impacts of climate change on
local freshwater resources in order to understand how communities are adapting
water and sanitation systems to the warming and changing environment. There
is also great need for more data on the hydrological characteristics of Arctic
rivers and watersheds, and for improved methods for the measurement of
precipitation. Groundwater assessments and studies should be conducted to
determine the quantity and quality of groundwater resources and to establish
a baseline. Measureable quantitative indicators of water security should be
implemented and monitored in the Arctic regions and more speciﬁcally in the
Barents area over time.
Consequently, we believe that individual and community interests must be
prioritised as the pre-condition for the promotion of food, water and energy
security nexus. As discussed, energy security within the Barents Region
depends not only on the energy resource in question but also on the interests,
aspirations and experiences of the individuals, families and communities that are
aﬀected by or dependent on energy-related events, decisions and developments.
We also highlight the need for improvements to the reliability and safety of
existing energy infrastructures, and for the reduction of dependencies on
energy imports. This can be achieved through diversiﬁcation of energy sources
and, where possible, through the decentralisation of energy production. The
application of social impact assessments should be improved: one-oﬀ pre-
project assessments should be replaced by processes of monitoring and
managing the social aspects of energy developments throughout the lifespan
of the project. Furthermore, eﬀorts should be made to ensure a more balanced
representation of consulted communities, and to better understand the impacts
of climate change on northern energy production and consumption.
Aside from its resource dimensions, human security in the Barents popula-
tion also depends on the promotion of security at both individual and com-
munity levels, as well as in the political sphere. In relation to personal
security, the assessment revealed that current data and research remains
insuﬃcient or imminent. Current indicators – from the 2004 and 2014 Arctic
Human Development Reports to the Arctic Social Indicators – cannot pro-
vide enough data for a comprehensive gender analysis. Nevertheless, these
reports recognise gaps and call for gender-disaggregated data. For instance,
sex-disaggregated data and gender-sensitive policies are necessary to protect
women’s rights to personal security, and research and data on gender-based
violence remain underdeveloped. Such data would provide a more nuanced
understanding of the region’s adaptive and transformative capacity while
providing more eﬀective policies tailored to the intersectionality of the
Barents’ population.
Community security is complex, and requires a people-centred approach to
determining speciﬁc recommendations. In the Barents Region, indigenous
groups articulate community security as the preservation of their culture.
Speciﬁc aspects of cultural preservation can be achieved through the
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safeguarding and promotion of linguistic and educational rights, as well as
land and natural resources rights aﬀecting traditional livelihoods. Our assess-
ment in this regard asserts that cultural preservation and community security
require the inclusion of all relevant actors, including indigenous peoples, in
decision-making. Indeed, centralising indigenous participation in decision-
making processes can result in increased self-determination and social cohesion
in addressing immediate and long-term challenges such as climate change,
exploitation of natural resources and use of indigenous lands. It is important
to highlight strengthened institutional and regulatory frameworks for enhan-
cing the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination in all Barents
countries, as their existence oﬀers cultural signiﬁcance and cultural diversity
for the region. The necessity to protect indigenous rights has become central,
in particular to the political security of the region. Yet these recommendations
are non-exhaustive and there is still a general lack of data focusing on these
issues. Future research is necessary to examine the diﬀerences in human
security of indigenous peoples in the Barents Region.
More broadly, there is also an urgent need to strengthen the human rights
of all citizens, not only of indigenous people. In our view, an obvious problem
is the reinforcement of democratic values, human rights and fundamental
freedom for all, especially in the Russian Barents. Further, we opine that
preserving peace and stability in the region is a condition sine qua non for poli-
tical security. While military activities in the Barents Region do not at present
constitute a threat, militaries and geopolitical events occurring outside of the
region have raised signiﬁcant tensions between states that could adversely
aﬀect the regional cooperation with an impact on the region’s population. It
is therefore necessary to further cooperation both within and outside the
region, and strengthen transparency and predictability in the ﬁeld of military
activities.
Digital security is also linked to human security, despite the lack of pre-
existing scholarship made from the latter perspective. Therefore, we recognise
that omnipresent digitalisation crucially aﬀects human security in the Barents
Region, and understanding it is the ﬁrst step towards ensuring security.
Currently, digital security varies across the region, but can be improved through
additional contextualised research on its speciﬁcities; improved implementation
of the existing digitalisation and information/cybersecurity strategies, policies
and programmes; and better inclusion of all regional stakeholders in the
direction of the digital development. Our assessment calls for the promotion
of a comprehensive approach to address the interests, needs and fears related
to digitisation. We therefore see the need for improvements in the inclusion of
all relevant actors, for instance, through consultation and integration in diﬀerent
stages of decision-making, as well as active enhancement of public dialogue in
digital security.
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